Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects
Open accessAbstract
What determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional “modular” understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level cognition, a tidal wave of recent research alleges that states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, intentions, and linguistic representations exert direct, top-down influences on what we see. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the distinction between perception and cognition may itself be unsustainable. We argue otherwise: None of these hundreds of studies – either individually or collectively – provides compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception, or “cognitive penetrability.” In particular, and despite their variety, we suggest that these studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls. And whereas abstract theoretical challenges have failed to resolve this debate in the past, our presentation of these pitfalls is empirically anchored: In each case, we show not only how certain studies could be susceptible to the pitfall (in principle), but also how several alleged top-down effects actually are explained by the pitfall (in practice). Moreover, these pitfalls are perfectly general, with each applying to dozens of other top-down effects. We conclude by extracting the lessons provided by these pitfalls into a checklist that future work could use to convincingly demonstrate top-down effects on visual perception. The discovery of substantive top-down effects of cognition on perception would revolutionize our understanding of how the mind is organized; but without addressing these pitfalls, no such empirical report will license such exciting conclusions.
AI snapshot
Written from a shortened version of the paper’s full text (it is longer than we read).
TL;DR
Firestone and Scholl argue that none of the hundreds of reported "top-down" effects of cognition on visual perception provides compelling evidence for genuine cognitive penetrability, because the studies collectively fall prey to a small set of methodological pitfalls. They present six such pitfalls, each anchored in empirical case studies, and offer a checklist for future work.
Key findings
- The authors count "more than 175 papers published since 1995" reporting top-down effects on perception, with a median publication year of 2010 for the empirical papers cited in their review of contemporary effects.
- They identify six pitfalls: (1) an overly confirmatory research strategy (the "El Greco fallacy"), (2) conflating perception with judgment, (3) demand and response bias, (4) low-level stimulus differences, (5) peripheral attentional effects, and (6) memory and recognition.
- In their own replications, effects survived when they should have canceled out if truly perceptual: subjects still picked a darker grayscale patch to match a room after reflecting on an unethical action (Firestone & Scholl 2014b, Experiment 5), and still reported narrower apertures when responding with an aperture (Experiment 2).
- The "moral pop-out effect" replicated with trivial categories: fashion-related words (e.g., "robe," "slippers") and transportation-related words (e.g., "car," "passenger") were more accurately identified than unrelated words, suggesting semantic relatedness/memory rather than morality drives the effect.
- Blurring race-diagnostic information from face stimuli (Firestone & Scholl 2015a) left the lightness difference intact even among observers who judged the faces to be the same race, implicating low-level visual features.
Methods
- Design: a theoretical review and critique, combining conceptual argument with "empirically anchored" case studies that re-test prominent alleged top-down effects.
- Data/sample: the published literature on top-down effects (New Look era through recent work), plus the authors' own replication experiments (e.g., Firestone & Scholl 2014b, 2015a, 2015b).
- Analysis: for each pitfall, the authors show in principle how studies could be susceptible and in practice how specific reported effects are explained by the pitfall, then extract lessons for future research into a six-item checklist.
Limitations
- The authors state that Pitfall 5 (peripheral attentional effects) "is not on the sort of firm empirical footing enjoyed by the other pitfalls," having fewer case studies.
- They acknowledge their claim is "ambitious" given hundreds of reported effects, and note that their presentation covers only effects they "had space to discuss, out of a much larger pool."
- They concede that not all attentional effects need be peripheral, and that attention may interact with perception in "rich and nuanced ways" — a caveat the accompanying commentaries (e.g., Clark, de Haas et al., Lupyan) argue undermines the breadth of the thesis.
- Evident from the text: the paper is a critique rather than new primary data across the full literature, and several of its deflationary explanations rest on the authors' own replication studies rather than independent replication.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
0 of 225 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingown data
Firestone and Scholl replicated the morality/brightness effect with grayscale patches instead of a numerical scale.
“We replicated this effect with one small change: Instead of a numerical scale, subjects used a scale of actual grayscale patches to rate the room's brightness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
The vast majority of reported top-down effects on perception involve only confirmatory tests, in which an effect is observed when the theory calls for it.
“the vast majority of reported top-down effects on perception involve only the first sort of test: a hypothesis is proffered that some higher-level state affects what we see, and then such an effect is observed.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingreasoning
Later experiments determined the true nonperceptual explanation for the rod/aperture effect, involving task demands.
“In later experiments, we determined the true, nonperceptual, explanation for this effect, involving task demands; see Pitfall 3.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingcitation
In the follow-up study, subjects still picked a darker patch to match the room after reflecting on an unethical action.
“the follow-up study succeeded: subjects still picked a darker patch to match the room after reflecting on an unethical action (Firestone & Scholl 2014b, Experiment 5).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Firestone & Scholl 2014b
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- Findingreasoning
Many alleged top-down effects on perception are explicable by routine judgments.
“Many alleged top-down effects on perception seem explicable by appeal to these sorts of routine judgments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingreasoning
Nearly every study of top-down effects on perception fails to test disconfirmatory predictions of the El Greco type.
“The studies that fail to test such predictions are too numerous to count; essentially, nearly every study falls into this category.”
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Many top-down effects on perception are found even when no visual stimuli are used at all.
“One especially telling pattern of results is that many of these effects are found even when no visual stimuli are used at all.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingnone given
No pitfall is as generally applicable as demand and response bias, especially for studies relying entirely on observer reports.
“Perhaps no pitfall is as generally applicable as demand and response bias, especially for studies relying entirely on observer reports.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingcitation
The demonstration of race-based lightness distortions is exceptional, one of the only such demos in this large literature.
“the demonstration of race-based lightness distortions (Levin & Banaji 2006) is exceptional, insofar as it is one of the only such demos in this large literature.”
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- Findingnone given
Many top-down effects involve manipulations of stimuli across experimental conditions.
“many other topdown effects involve manipulations of the stimuli used across experimental conditions.”
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Firestone and Scholl (2015a) replicated the Levin and Banaji study with blurred face stimuli to eliminate race information while preserving low-level differences.
“we replicated this study with blurred versions of the face stimuli, so as to eliminate race information while preserving many low-level differences in the images (including the match in average luminance and contrast)as in Figure 3B (Firestone & Scholl 2015a).”
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- Findingcitation
Even observers who asserted the faces had the same race judged the blurry image derived from the Black face to be darker than the blurry image derived from the White face.
“even those observers who asserted that the faces had the same race nevertheless judged the blurry image derived from the Black face to be darker than the blurry image derived from the White face.”
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Few top-down effects can actually be experienced for oneself.
“it strikes us as an awkward fact that so few such effects can actually be experienced for oneself.”
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Many other effects that initially seemed to reflect high-level factors have been shown to reflect lower-level visual differences across conditions.
“Many other effects that initially seemed to reflect highlevel factors have been shown to reflect lower-level visual differences across conditions.”
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The Black face truly looks darker than the luminance-matched White face.
“As you may experience in Figure 3A, the Black face truly looks darker than the luminance-matched White face.”
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Fashion-related words were more accurately identified than non-fashion-related words.
“The effect replicated even with this trivial, arbitrary category: Fashion-related words were more accurately identified than non-fashion-related words (see Fig. 4B).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingcitation
Moral words were more frequently detected than nonmoral words (matched for length and frequency), only when presented at the threshold for perceptual awareness.
“We previously reported that moral words were more frequently detected than nonmoral words (matched for length and frequency), only when presented at the threshold for perceptual awareness (termed the moral pop-out effect, Gantman & Van Bavel 2014;2015).”
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- cites [2015]
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The facilitation-by-congruency effect is dependent on observer's internal states induced by motor actions unrelated to targets.
“It is dependent on the observer's internal states induced by motor actions unrelated to targets to be detected”
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The facilitation-by-congruency effect is independent of memory.
“It is independent of memory in the sense that the detection of subtle signs of happiness or anger in unfamiliar faces likely involves a general perceptual ability, independent of episodic memories of specific individuals.”
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The facilitation-by-congruency effect is independent of peripheral attention.
“It is independent of peripheral attention; the performance improvement produced by uncomfortable actions, inducing high arousal, is selective (i.e., they improve anger, not happiness, detection)”
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The detection threshold for anger decreased about 7.4% after congruent-uncomfortable than incongruent-comfortable reaches (p = 0.003).
“the detection threshold for anger (in a different group of observers, to control for carryover effects) decreased about 7.4% after a sequence of congruent-uncomfortable than incongruent-comfortable reaches (p = 0.003)”
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The facilitation-by-congruency effect is operationalized by shifts of performance-based measures (d′, absolute threshold, just noticeable difference) consistent over different paradigms.
“It is operationalized by shifts of performance-based measures (d′, absolute threshold, just noticeable difference) consistent over different paradigms (identification and detection)”
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The moral pop-out effect occurred over and above measured differences in valence, arousal, or extremity.
“The moral pop-out effect occurred over and above measured differences in valence, arousal, or extremity.”
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Perceived facial expressions of emotion depend on the congruency between bodily action (comfort/discomfort) and target emotion (happiness/anger) valence.
“Respecting all constraints proposed by Firestone & Scholl (F&S), we have shown that perceived facial expressions of emotion depend on the congruency between bodily action (comfort/discomfort) and target emotion (happiness/anger) valence.”
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The detection threshold for happiness decreased about 2.2% after congruent-comfortable than incongruent-uncomfortable reaches (p = 0.001).
“the detection threshold for happiness decreased about 2.2% after a sequence of congruent-comfortable than incongruent-uncomfortable reaches (p = 0.001)”
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When we included a forced-choice question that directly asked participants to choose which face was White and which was Black, we repeatedly observed that 75%-80% of participants correctly assigned race.
“Indeed, when we included a forced-choice question that directly asked participants to choose which face was White and which was Black, we repeatedly observed that 75%-80% of participants correctly assigned race.”
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Holding visual items in memory causes people to see things differently.
“This is why holding visual items in memory causes people to see things differently (e.g., Scocchia et al. 2013).”
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- Findingcitation
Classical feedforward feature-detector models account for only about 40% of the variance in V1 function.
“Classical feedforward feature-detector models account for only about 40% of the variance in V1 function (Carandini et al. 2005).”
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- Findingcitation
The largest effect of the target-preview in Klemfuss et al. (2012) was to slow search performance for the meaningful-number condition, bringing it in line with that of the meaningless-shape condition.
“But actually, the largest effect of the target-preview was to slow search performance for the meaningful-number condition, bringing it in line with that of the meaningless-shape condition.”
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- Findingcitation
Top-down contextual influences occur during the formation stages of a visual percept, extending all the way back to early visual cortex.
“Using magnetoencephalography and phase synchrony analyses, these top-down contextual influences are shown to occur during the formation stages of a visual percept, extending all the way back to early visual cortex (Kveraga et al. 2011).”
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- Findingcitation
In EIB target perception is worse at the location of the emotional distractor.
“Specifically, in contrast to studies demonstrating that emotional stimuli capture attention to their location, in EIB target perception is worse at the location of the emotional distractor (e.g., Most & Wang 2011).”
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- Findingcitation
Activity patterns in the ventral temporal cortex and the anterior insular cortex contained the representational geometry of modally bound valence representations belonging to the visual and gustatory systems, respectively.
“We found that activity patterns in the ventral temporal cortex and the anterior insular cortex contained the representational geometry of modally bound valence representations belonging to the visual and gustatory systems, respectively.”
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- Findingcitation
Approximately 60%-80% of V1 responses are attributable to other V1 neurons or nongeniculate inputs.
“approximately 60%-80% of V1 responses are attributable to other V1 neurons or nongeniculate inputs (Muckli & Petro 2013).”
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- Findingcitation
Only about 5% of the excitatory synaptic input to layer IV of V1 derives from geniculate drive.
“Only about 5% of the excitatory synaptic input to layer IV of V1 derives from geniculate drive (Douglas & Martin 2007)”
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- Findingcitation
There is evidence for a population code in orbitofrontal cortex that is shared across events originating from distinct modalities.
“In addition to such modality-specific representations, we also found evidence for a population code in orbitofrontal cortex that is shared across events originating from distinct modalities”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Chikazoe et al., 2014
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- Findingcitation
M-biased stimuli specifically activated a pathway from the occipital cortex to OFC, which then initiated top-down feedback to the fusiform gyrus.
“An fMRI study using dynamic causal modelling later confirmed that M-biased stimuli specifically activated a pathway from the occipital cortex to OFC, which then initiated top-down feedback to the fusiform gyrus.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kveraga et al. 2007a
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- Findingcitation
Early activity was evident in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) ∼130 ms after stimulus presentation, well before object recognition-related activity peaks in the ventrotemporal cortex.
“early activity was evident in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) ∼130 ms after stimulus presentation, well before object recognition-related activity peaks in the ventrotemporal cortex (Bar et al. 2006).”
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- Findingcitation
Social cues directly influence the perception and neural response to facial emotion.
“Social cues, including eye gaze, gender, culture, and race are found to directly influence the perception and neural response to facial emotion (Adams & Kleck 2005;Adams et al. 2003;2015)”
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- cites Adams et al. 2003
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- cites Adams et al. 2015
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- Findingcitation
The fMRI models for the biased trials matched participants' reports of perceived direction better than actual directions of motion.
“The fMRI models for the biased (top-down influenced) trials turned out to match the participants' reports of the perceived direction better than they did the actual directions of motion”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kok et al. (2013)
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- Interpretationreasoning
It is almost never clear which mental process a descending pathway is descending to.
“so that it is almost never clear which mental process a descending pathway is descending to (or if that descending pathway is influencing the input or the processing of whatever it descends to, per sect.2.1).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Other confounding variables were eventually implicated in the original effects.
“Other confounding variables were eventually implicated in the original effects, leading several researchers to conclude that”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Landis et al. 1966
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- Interpretationreasoning
Visual processing often said to involve problem solving or unconscious inference refers to aspects of processing that are wired into the visual module itself, and so do not imply effects of cognition on perception.
“In those cases, such terminology (which may otherwise evoke notions of cognitive penetrability) refers to aspects of processing that are wired into the visual module itself (so-called”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The New Look movement's momentum eventually stalled as its findings buckled under methodological and theoretical scrutiny.
“However, the New Look movement's momentum eventually stalled as its findings buckled under methodological and theoretical scrutiny.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Carter & Schooler 1949
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- cites Landis et al. 1966
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- Interpretationreasoning
There is no evidence for top-down effects of cognition on visual perception, in every sense these claims intend.
“We argue otherwise: None of these hundreds of studieseither individually or collectivelyprovides compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception, or”
- Also stated in: § 1.2. Our thesis and approach · plain
“Against this wealth of evidence and its associated consensus, the thesis of this paper is that there is in fact no evidence for such top-down effects of cognition on visual perception, in every sense these claims intend.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The set of studies reporting top-down effects that the authors review is representative of all such studies.
- Also stated in: § 1.2. Our thesis and approach · plain
- Interpretationcitation
Context effects do not imply top-down effects because the underlying processes continue to operate reflexively regardless of cognitive inferences or problem-solving strategies.
“the underlying processes continue to operate reflexively (based solely on their visual input) regardless of your cognitive inferences or problem-solving strategies”
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- Premisecitation
Facial expressions associated with fear and disgust reliably vary the eye-aperture diameter, directly influencing acuity and sensitivity by altering the actual optical information reaching perceptual processing.
“facial expressions associated with fear (e.g., widened eyes) and disgust (e.g., narrowed eyes) have recently been shown to reliably vary the eye-aperture diameter, directly influencing acuity and sensitivity by altering the actual optical information reaching perceptual processing (Lee et al. 2014).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lee et al. 2014
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- Interpretationreasoning
This type of top-down influence has no necessary implications for cognitive penetrability.
“this type of”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Several alleged top-down effects are actually explained by the pitfalls in practice.
“In each case, we show not only how certain studies could be susceptible to the pitfall (in principle), but also how several alleged top-down effects actually are explained by the pitfall (in practice).”
- Also stated in: § 4. The six "pitfalls" of top-down effects on perception · boosted
“These are not idle suspicions about potential causes of such effects, but rather they are empirically groundednot just in the weak sense that they discuss relevant empirical evidence, but in the stronger sense that they have demonstrably explained several of the most prominent apparent topdown effects on perception, in practice.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 4. The six "pitfalls" of top-down effects on perception · boosted
- Premisecitation
The vast majority of models in vision science do not consider top-down factors.
“Notice, for example, that the vast majority of models in vision science do not consider such factors; yet, apparently, such models have been successful!”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rust et al. 2006
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- Interpretationnone given
The pitfalls are perfectly general, with each applying to dozens of other top-down effects.
“Moreover, these pitfalls are perfectly general, with each applying to dozens of other top-down effects.”
- Also stated in: § 1.2. Our thesis and approach · boosted
“Moreover, each pitfall we present is perfectly general, applying to dozens more reported top-down effects.”
- Also stated in: § 3. They are general in scope. · plain
“Beyond our concrete case studies, we also aim to show that the pitfalls are broadly applicable, with each covering dozens more top-down effects.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Also stated in: § 1.2. Our thesis and approach · boosted
- Premisecitation
Brain regions initially considered higher up in a processing hierarchy can modulate lower regions through re-entrant processing from descending neural pathways.
“there is now considerable evidence that brain regions that were initially considered”
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- cites Rolls 2008
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- cites Zhang et al. 2014
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- Premisecitation
Follow-up studies on the value-based size-distortion effects could replicate them only when subjects made judgments from memory rather than during online viewing.
“For example, follow-up studies on the value-based size-distortion effects could replicate them only when subjects made judgments from memory rather than during online viewing (Carter & Schooler 1949; see also Landis et al. 1966)”
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- cites Landis et al. 1966
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- Premisenone given
Nearly all brain regions subserve multiple functions.
“One reason is that nearly all brain regions subserve multiple functions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Action is included among the sorts of states that cannot affect perception.
“we mean to defend an extremely broad thesis regarding the sorts of states that cannot affect perception, and this most definitely includes action.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisereasoning
Lightness illusions based on unconscious inferences persist in the face of countervailing knowledge.
“as when lightness illusions based on”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Firestone and Scholl exploited the El Greco fallacy to show that multiple alleged top-down effects cannot genuinely be effects on perception.
“We exploited the El Greco fallacy to show that multiple alleged top-down effects cannot genuinely be effects on perception.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Input may sometimes change visual processing by increasing sensitivity over time to certain visual features.
“Despite encapsulation, input may sometimes change visual processing by increasing sensitivity over time to certain visual features.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The El Greco fallacy involves the conceptual confusion that if El Greco had experienced a stretched-out world, he would also have experienced an equally stretched-out canvas, canceling out the distortions in his reproductions.
“If El Greco had truly experienced a stretchedout world, then he would also have experienced an equally stretched-out canvas, canceling out the supposed real-world distortions and thus leaving no trace of them in his reproductions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Anstis 2002
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- cites Firestone 2013b
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- Interpretationown data
The rod/aperture effect cannot reflect a true perceptual distortion because it occurs even when it should not.
“Therefore, this effect cannot reflect a true perceptual distortionnot because the effect fails to occur, but rather because it occurs even when it shouldn't.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Crossmodal integration is itself a reflexive, apparently impenetrable process.
“For example, such crossmodal integration is itself a reflexive, apparently impenetrable process: The sounds' effects occur”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Shams et al. 2002
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- Premisecitation
Figure-ground assignment for ambiguous stimuli is sometimes biased by experience: The visual system will more likely assign figure to familiar shapes.
“For example, figure-ground assignment for ambiguous stimuli is sometimes biased by experience: The visual system will more likely assign figure to familiar shapes, such as the profile of a woman with a skirt (Peterson & Gibson 1993; Fig. 2A).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Peterson & Gibson 1993
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- Interpretationreasoning
Such effects aren't top-down in any sense that implies cognitive penetrability, because the would-be penetrator is just the low-level visual input itself.
“Thus, such effects aren't”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
What may superficially appear to be an influence of knowledge on perception is simply increased sensitivity to certain contours.
“Therefore, what may superficially appear to be an influence of knowledge on perception is simply increased sensitivity to certain contours.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Such results are consistent with the entire process being contained within perception itself, rather than being an effect of more central cognitive processes on perception.
“Collectively, such results are consistent with the entire process being contained within perception itself, rather than being an effect of more central cognitive processes on perception.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The distortions in El Greco's paintings could not reflect literal perceptual distortions.
“The distortions in El Greco's paintings, then, could not reflect literal perceptual distortions”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Anstis 2002
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- cites Firestone 2013b
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- Interpretationreasoning
The morality/brightness effect must not reflect the way the world actually looked to subjects.
“This effect, thenlike the distortions in El Greco's workmust not reflect the way the world actually looked to subjects.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Inversion eliminates the figure-ground effect even when subjects know the inverted shape's identity.
“For example, inversion eliminates this effect even when subjects know the inverted shape's identity (Peterson & Gibson 1994).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Peterson & Gibson 1994
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- Interpretationcitation
The El Greco fallacy may afflict reports that linguistic color categories alter color appearance.
“The El Greco fallacy may also afflict reports that linguistic color categories alter color appearance (Webster & Kay 2012).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Webster & Kay 2012
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- Premisecitation
Goldstone (1995) reported that after viewing red/violet letters and blue/violet numbers, subjects judged violet letters redder and violet numbers bluer than they were.
“after repeatedly viewing one set of red and violet letters and a second set of blue and violet numbers, subjects judged token violet letters to look redder than they truly were and token violet numbers to look bluer than they truly were (Goldstone 1995; Fig. 2J).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Goldstone 1995
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- Interpretationreasoning
If color terms affect perceived color, such effects should already have been assimilated into the perceptually uniform color space, leaving no room for color terms to exert influence in studies using such spaces.
“If color terms affect perceived color, then such effects should already have been assimilated into the color space, leaving no room for color terms to exert their influence in studies using such color spaces.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Effects on estimated distance of unseen or imagined locations must reflect judgment and not perception.
“Clearly such effects must reflect judgment and not perception”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In Goldstone's study, the adjusted stimulus used to measure the effect was a copy of the symbol being tested.
“However, the adjusted stimulus was a copy of that symbol!”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Goldstone 1995
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- Interpretationreasoning
The resemblance of unseen-location effects to other claimed top-down effects on perception suggests many such cases could reflect judgmental processes.
“yet their resemblance to other cases that are indeed claimed as top-down effects on perception suggests that many such cases could reflect judgmental processes after all.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Studies of linguistic color categories use color spaces constructed for perceptual uniformity, such that each step is perceived as equal in magnitude.
“such studies use color spaces specifically constructed for perceptual uniformity, such that each step through the space's parameters is perceived as equal in magnitude.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Webster & Kay 2012
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- Interpretationreasoning
Any time an experiment shifts perceptual reports, it is possible that the shift reflects changes in judgment rather than perception.
“any time an experiment shifts perceptual reports, it is possible that the shift reflects changes in judgment rather than perception.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Factors such as value and ease of action affect the estimated distance of completely unseen or imagined locations such as Coney Island or one's work office.
“those same factors have been shown to affect the estimated distance of completely unseen (and sometimes merely imagined) locations such as Coney Island (Alter & Balcetis 2011) or one's work office (Wakslak & Kim 2015).”
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- cites Wakslak & Kim 2015
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- Interpretationreasoning
That Goldstone's effect was nevertheless obtained suggests it cannot be perceptual.
“That such an effect was nevertheless obtained suggests it cannot be perceptual.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Goldstone's effect commits the El Greco fallacy because if Es really look redder after seeing red letters, both the to-be-matched E and the adjustable E should look redder and cancel.
“This commits the El Greco fallacy: if Es really look redder after one sees other red letters, then both the to-be-matched E and the adjustable E should have looked redder, and the effects should have canceled one another out.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The Woods et al. result suggests the original heavy-ball results reflected what subjects thought about the distance rather than how the distance truly looked.
“suggesting that the original results reflected what subjects thought about the distance rather than how the distance truly looked to them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Cañal-Bruland et al. (2010) found that the effect of dart-throwing performance on size judgments disappeared when subjects threw while hanging on a rock-climbing wall 12 feet above the ground.
“another study also demonstrated an effect of dart-throwing performance on size judgmentsbut found that the effect disappeared when subjects made their throws while hanging onto a rock-climbing wall 12 feet above the ground (Cañal-Bruland et al. 2010).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Cañal-Bruland et al. 2010
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
That studies using perceptually uniform color spaces still show labeling effects suggests an alternative explanation.
“That these studies still show labeling effects suggests an alternative explanation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The rock-climbing finding can be recast as an effect on judgment: subjects who performed poorly had an obvious explanation and no need to inflate target-size estimates.
“the finding could easily be recast as an effect on judgment instead: Subjects who performed poorly while clinging to the rock-climbing wall had an obvious explanation for performing poorly and so had no need to explain their misses by inflating target-size estimates.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The German/Dutch color classification effect is just as plausibly explained by subjects following social convention in naming the discs as by language affecting perception.
“it seems just as plausible that the subjects were simply following convention, assigning the yellow-orange discs the socially appropriate names for that context.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Durgin et al. (2009) found that giving backpack-wearing subjects a cover story completely eliminated the effect of heavy backpacks on slant estimation.
“When backpack-wearing subjects were given a compelling (but false) cover story to justify the backpack's purpose (to hold heavy monitoring equipment during climbing), the effect of heavy backpacks on slant estimation completely disappeared (Durgin et al. 2009; see also Durgin et al. 2012).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Durgin et al. 2009
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- cites Durgin et al. 2012
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
The social nature of psychology experiments can lead to reports being contaminated by task demands, wherein subjects adjust responses in accordance with assumptions about the experiment's purpose.
“the social nature of psychology experiments can readily lead to reports (of anything, including percepts) being contaminated by task demands, wherein certain features of experiments lead subjects to adjust their responses (either consciously or unconsciously) in accordance with their assumptions about the experiment's purpose (or the experimenters' desires).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rosenthal & Rubin 1978
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
One difficulty in manipulating stimuli across conditions is that the intended top-down manipulation may be confounded with changes in low-level visual features, which might be responsible for perceptual differences.
“one difficulty in manipulating stimuli across experimental conditions is the possibility that the intended top-down manipulation (e.g., the evoked arousal) is confounded with changes in the low-level visual features of the stimuli (e.g., as live tarantulas might differ in size, color, and motion from plush toys)and that those low-level differences might actually be responsible for perceptual”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
No effect of required climbing effort is found without a transparent manipulation, such as when subjects estimate the slant of an effortful staircase versus an effort-free escalator in a between-subjects design.
“no effect of required climbing effort is found without a transparent manipulationsuch as when subjects estimate the slant of either an (effortful) staircase or an (effort-free) escalator in a between-subjects design (Shaffer & Flint 2011).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Shaffer & Flint 2011
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Contamination by demand characteristics seems especially likely in experiments involving a single conspicuous manipulation and a single perceptual report.
“Contamination by demand characteristics seems especially likely in experiments involving a single conspicuous manipulation and a single perceptual report.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) reported an effect of wearing a heavy backpack on slant estimates.
“Consider the effect of wearing a heavy backpack on slant estimates (Bhalla & Proffitt 1999; Fig. 2D).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bhalla & Proffitt 1999
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The blurring results are unlikely to reflect unconscious race categorization.
“And note that such results are unlikely to reflect unconscious race categorization; it would be a distinctively odd implicit race judgment that could influence explicit lightness judgments but not explicit race judgments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Coren and Enns's follow-up experiments still involve important geometric differences of this sort.
“(Coren and Enns are quite sensitive to this concern, but their followup experiments still involve important geometric differences of this sort.)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
No alleged top-down effect of cognition on perception has so far successfully met the challenges collectively embodied by the pitfalls reviewed.
“It is our view that no alleged top-down effect of cognition on perception has so far successfully met the challenges collectively embodied by the pitfalls we have reviewed.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The six pitfalls reviewed are the primary alternative explanations for reported top-down effects, and the literature review is comprehensive enough to support the claim that no alleged top-down effect has met these challenges.
- Premisecitation
The reported effect magnitudes for typical-color effects far exceed established discrimination thresholds.
“even though the reported effect magnitudes far exceed established discrimination thresholds (e.g., Hansen et al. 2008;Krauskopf & Gegenfurtner 1992).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Hansen et al. 2008
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- cites Krauskopf & Gegenfurtner 1992
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- Interpretationnone given
There are no top-down effects of cognition on perception in the strong sense that would violate informational encapsulation or cognitive impenetrability.
“We have been arguing that there are no top-down effects of cognition on perception, in the strong and revolutionary sense wherein such effects violate informational encapsulation or cognitive impenetrability and so threaten the view of the visual system as a functionally independent (modular) part of the mind.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The six pitfalls reviewed are the primary alternative explanations for reported top-down effects, and the literature review is comprehensive enough to support the claim that no alleged top-down effect has met these challenges.
- Interpretationown data
The blurring result shows that the lightness difference can derive from low-level visual features present in the original images without any contribution from perceived race.
“This result effectively shows how the lightness difference can derive from low-level visual featureswhich, critically, are present in the original imageswithout any contribution from perceived race.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The initial demonstration of Levin and Banaji (2006) provides no evidence for a top-down effect on perception.
“we conclude that the initial demonstration of Levin and Banaji (2006) provides no evidence for a top-down effect on perception.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Levin & Banaji 2006
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- Premisecitation
Studies of how fear may affect spatial perception often involve stimuli with very different properties or perspectives.
“Or, in a very different case, studies of how fear may affect spatial perception often involve stimuli with very different properties (e.g., a live tarantula vs. a plush toy; Harber et al. 2011), or even the same stimulus viewed from very different perspectives (e.g., a precarious balcony viewed from above or below; Stefanucci & Proffitt 2009).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Harber et al. 2011
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- cites Stefanucci & Proffitt 2009
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
It remains eminently plausible that there are no top-down effects of cognition on perception.
“Until this high bar is met, it will remain eminently plausible that there are no top-down effects of cognition on perception.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The six pitfalls reviewed are the primary alternative explanations for reported top-down effects, and the literature review is comprehensive enough to support the claim that no alleged top-down effect has met these challenges.
- Premisereasoning
Although the face stimuli were matched for mean luminance, there are many visual cues to lightness independent of mean luminance.
“Though the face stimuli were matched for mean luminance, there are of course many visual cues to lightness that are independent of mean luminance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Only a small handful of pitfalls can deflate many reported top-down effects on perception.
“However, we have now seen that only a small handful of pitfalls can deflate many reported top-down effects on perception.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Other investigations of top-down effects on size contrast manipulate low-level properties.
“Other investigations of top-down effects on size contrast also manipulate low-level properties, for example contrasting natural scenes with different distributions of color and complexity (e.g., van Ulzen et al. 2008).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites van Ulzen et al. 2008
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- Interpretationnone given
Peripheral attention can account for a wide variety of apparent top-down effects on perception.
“However, our contention in this pitfall is that the merely peripheral sorts of attentioninvolving simple changes in which locations, features, or objects we focus oncan account for a wide variety of apparent top-down effects on perception.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The possibility of low-level confounds is a potential issue for any top-down effect that varies stimuli across conditions.
“The possibility of such low-level confounds is a potential issue, almost by definition, with any top-down effect that varies stimuli across conditions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The same researchers discovered systematic low-level differences in their stimuli-animals had more curvature than artifacts-which sufficiently explained the search benefits.
“the same researchers discovered systematic low-level differences in their stimuliwherein the animals (e.g., snakes, fish) had more curvature than the artifacts (e.g., chairs, briefcases)which sufficiently explained the search benefits (as revealed by follow-up experiments directly exploring curvature).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Levin et al. 2001
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
Semantic priming would not be a top-down effect on perception.
“Crucially, such semantic priming would not be a topdown effect on perception.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Follow-up studies suggest that the mere deployment of attention may be the mediator of action effects on spatial perception.
“However, follow-up studies suggest that the mere deployment of attention may be the mediator of these effects.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Cañal-Bruland et al. 2011
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- cites Gray & Cañal-Bruland, 2015
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- Premisecitation
Action-planning effects on spatial judgments arise from the deployment of visual attention alone, even in the absence of motor planning.
“Moreover, the well-documented effects of action-planning on spatial judgments (e.g., Kirsch & Kunde 2013a; 2013b)also arise from the deployment of visual attention alone, even in the absence of motor planning (Kirsch 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kirsch 2015
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Recognition necessarily involves not only visual processing per se, but also memory.
“However, by its nature, recognition necessarily involves not only visual processing per se, but also memory: To recognize something, the mind must determine whether a given visual stimulus matches some stored representation in memory.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Many top-down studies report effects on how we recognize various stimuli rather than on what we see.
“Top-down effects on perception are meant to be effects on what we see, but many such studies instead report effects on how we recognize various stimuli.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Lupyan & Spivey 2008
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- cites Gantman & Van Bavel 2014
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- Interpretationreasoning
Many top-down effects involve visual recognition and so may be susceptible to the memory pitfall.
“Many top-down effects involve visual recognition and so may be susceptible to this pitfall.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Many recently reported top-down effects on perception use ambiguous figures but do not rule out relevant attention mechanisms.
“Most immediately, many recently reported top-down effects on perception use ambiguous figures but do not rule out relevant attention mechanisms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Prinz & Seidel 2012
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- cites Balcetis & Dunning 2006
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- Interpretationcitation
Voluntary switches in ambiguous figures are occasioned by processes that do not demonstrate top-down penetration of perception.
“However, several later studies showed that such voluntary switches from one interpretation to another are occasioned by exactly the sorts of processes that uncontroversially do not demonstrate top-down penetration of perception.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Peterson & Gibson 1991
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- cites Toppino 2003
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- Premisecitation
Shifting patterns of attention can change what we see.
“Perhaps most prominently, shifting patterns of attention can change what we see.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Attentional effects are not sensitive to the content of the intention or belief that occasioned them.
“Put differently, such attentional (or light-turning-off) effects may be occasioned by a relevant intention or belief, but they are not sensitive to the content of that intention or belief.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
They observed the effects even when reporting the lightness of a face using a copy of that exact face.
“because they observed the effects even when reporting the lightness of a face using a copy of that exact face”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Levin and Banaji (2006)
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- Premisecitation
Regions of the medial temporal lobe (e.g., perirhinal cortex) are crucial for perceptual as well as memory tasks.
“Evidence exists that regions of the medial temporal lobe are indeed crucial for perceptual as well as memory tasks (e.g., the perirhinal cortex; Graham et al. 2010).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Graham et al. 2010
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- Interpretationcitation
These other experiments fall prey to the El Greco fallacy (as in Pitfall 1).
“and the El Greco fallacy (as in Pitfall 1, because they observed the effects even when reporting the lightness of a face using a copy of that exact face)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Levin and Banaji (2006)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Inferring that activity in the hippocampus is nonperceptual and related to memory or knowledge about the environment is well substantiated.
“therefore, inferring that activity in this area is nonperceptual and related to the creation of memory or knowledge about the environment is well substantiated.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The hippocampus is one of the few regions of the brain that has not been found to subserve multiple functions, despite intense study for decades.
- Premisecitation
Prior work has not found perceptual effects for the hippocampus proper.
“However, this work stops short of finding perceptual effects for the hippocampus proper, the region that differentiates Perceivers and Non-Perceivers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Graham et al. 2010
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- Premisecitation
Emberson and Amso (2012) has no difference in task demands (Pitfall 3).
“and has no difference in task demands (Pitfall 3).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Emberson and Amso (2012)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
If color category labels truly shape perception in the way that categorical perception discussions assert, then they should have first shaped the color spaces themselves, leaving no work left for such labels to do upon presentation of the laboratory stimuli using those color spaces.
“But if color category labels truly shape perception in this way, then they should have first shaped the color spaces themselves, leaving no work left for such labels to do upon presentation of the laboratory stimuli using those color spaces.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Collins & Olson 2014
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisenone given
Emberson and Amso (2012) does not have low-level stimulus differences to account for (Pitfall 4).
“It does not have low-level stimulus differences to account for (Pitfall 4)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Emberson and Amso (2012)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Recent work demonstrates that semantic information is extracted during continuous flash suppression.
“(Lupyan & Ward [2013] attempted to guard against semantic priming by claiming that semantic information is not extracted during continuous flash suppression, but recent work now demonstrates that this is not the case; e.g., Sklar et al. 2012.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sklar et al. 2012
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisenone given
Emberson and Amso (2012) is not subject to the El Greco fallacy (Pitfall 1).
“is not subject to the El Greco fallacy (Pitfall 1)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Emberson and Amso (2012)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
For simpler auditory and visual discriminations, earlier primary sensory cortical loci have been implicated in perceptual learning.
“For simpler auditory (Recanzone et al. 1993) and visual (Jehee et al. 2012) discriminations, even earlier primary sensory cortical loci have been implicated in perceptual learning.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Recanzone et al. 1993
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- cites Jehee et al. 2012
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- Premisenone given
When a particular cortical area for vision projects to a higher level, there are typically recurrent connections from that higher level back to the cortical area.
“Neurophysiologically, when a particular cortical area for vision projects to a higher level, there are typically recurrent connections from that higher level back to the cortical area.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Learning of complex visual features ought to be considered perceptual, based on neural locus in IT and behavioral evidence.
“The learning of these complex visual features ought to be considered perceptual, rather than generically associative, based both on its neural locus in IT brain regions specialized for visual shape representation (Logothetis et al. 1995) and on behavioral evidence indicating perceptual constraints on the acquisition of these features (Goldstone 2000).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Logothetis et al. 1995
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- cites Goldstone 2000
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- Interpretationreasoning
For both simple and complex perceptual learning, attention and perception are inextricably intertwined.
“For both simple and complex perceptual learning, attention and perception are inextricably intertwined.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Saturation and brightness are aspects of color that most people have difficulty separating.
“For example, saturation and brightness are aspects of color that most people have difficulty separating.It is hard for people to classify objects on the basis of saturation while ignoring brightness differences (Burns & Shepp 1988).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Burns & Shepp 1988
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Attention can be effectively deployed to subtle, simple discriminations and complex configurations only because perceptual processes have been adapted to fit task demands.
“Attention can be effectively deployed to subtle, simple discriminations and complex configurations only because perceptual processes have been adapted to fit task demands.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Human behavior on perceptual tasks is a product of an integrated perception-attention system.
“Given the intertwined nature of perception-attention relations such as these, it is appropriate to consider human behavior on perceptual tasks to be a product of an integrated perception-attention system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Study design and conductnone given
Participants in F&S's studies were never randomly assigned to experiments.
“For example, participants were never randomly assigned to experiments.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
The efficiency of search for conjunctions of visual parts gradually increases over hours of training.
“For example, the efficiency of search for conjunctions of visual parts gradually increases over the course of hours of training (Shiffrin & Lightfoot 1997).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Shiffrin & Lightfoot 1997
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- Interpretationreasoning
Similar behavioral effects (moral vs. fashion/transportation word detection) may arise by different processes even at the semantic level.
“Yet, there is good reason to believe these similar behavioral effects (moral vs. fashion/transportation word detection) arise by different processes even at the semantic level.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Treating feature-driven attention as distinct in kind from object or location-driven attention is problematic because mechanisms are similar and impacts analogous.
“Treating feature-driven attention as distinct in kind from object or location-driven attention is equally problematic, because the apparent mechanisms underlying these processes are quite similar, and the impacts are entirely analogous.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The nature and organization of fuzzy top-down information rule out any direct, spatially accurate influence.
“Thus, the nature and organization of this fuzzy top-down information rule out any direct, spatially accurate influence.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
Conscious perception of space is manifested in detailed, high-resolution, topographically precise depiction of spatial elements.
“Conscious perception of space is manifested first and foremost in the detailed, high-resolution, topographically precise depiction of spatial elements.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisereasoning
Only the acute image is consciously perceived.
“Note that it is only the acute image, small or large, tilted or not, bright or dark, that is consciously perceived.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Cognitive inputs originate in nonvisual areas and go through multisynaptic, multiarea paths before reaching V1.
“Cognitive inputs, which originate, presumably, in nonvisual areas, go through multisynaptic, multiarea paths before reaching V1.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
The route into visual cortex goes through large RF cells of IT cortex.
“Even more important, the route into the visual cortex goes through the large RF cells of the IT cortex.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Such cells cannot represent fine spatial details.
“Clearly, such cells cannot represent the fine spatial details that we are so sensitive to.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
V1's preintegration response patterns must be the neural substance of image representation.
“Elsewhere, I show (Gur 2015) that because V1 is the only visual area that represents space at a resolution and topographical exactitude that is compatible with our perceptual abilities, its preintegration response patterns (”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gur 2015
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisenone given
We are consciously aware of visual objects together with the minute details that characterize each object.
“We are consciously aware of visual objects together with the minute details that characterize each object.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
The brain is not reflexively stimulus-driven.
“The brain is not reflexively “stimulus driven.””
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Barbas, 2015
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Chanes & Barrett, 2016
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
It is unlikely that cognition can affect V1 image representation because of detailed parallel V1 organization and nature of top-down connections, which can influence only large parts of visual field.
“That is unlikely because of the detailed parallel V1 organization and the nature of top-down connections, which can influence only large parts of the visual field.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
No feasible physical route exists for cognitive penetration into perception.
“The notion of cognitive penetration into perception is extraordinary because, as I show below, no feasible physical route exists for such a penetration.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Such connectivity rules out any direct, spatially circumscribed influence over V1 upper layers' cells representing object details.
“Such connectivity rules out any direct, spatially circumscribed influence over V1 upper layers' cells representing the objects' details (Gur 2015;Gur et al. 2005).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Gur 2015
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- cites Gur et al. 2005
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- Premisereasoning
All processes from V1 preintegration activity onward that extract spatial global information are not perceived.
“All of the processes, from V1 preintegration activity patterns onward, that extract spatial global information are not perceived.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
For cognition to penetrate perception, it needs to affect V1 image representation.
“For cognition to penetrate perception, it needs to affect V1 image representation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisereasoning
Top-down inputs to V1 do not match its topographic accuracy.
“However, top-down inputs to V1 do not match its topographic accuracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The brain is context-dependent.
“The brain is context-dependent.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Clark 2013 source
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- cites Friston 2010
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- Premisecitation
V1 is the only visual area with spatial resolution and topographical exactitude matching perceptual abilities.
“V1 is the only visual area with spatial resolution and topographical exactitude matching perceptual abilities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gur 2015
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisereasoning
It is our perception of details that enables us to discriminate between faces.
“Indeed, it is our perception of details that enables us to discriminate between facesin spite of their inherent similarity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The brain is not modular.
“The brain is not modular.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Marder 2012
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- cites Sporns 2011
Not checked in the free run.
- cites van den Heuvel & Sporns 2013
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Feedback from such cells makes it impossible for top-down input to influence a selective part of visual scene.
“Feedback from such cells, which are not sensitive to small spatial details, makes it impossible for top-down input to influence a selective part of the visual scenesuch as a stroke on a Chinese character or an image of a dog surrounded by shoes (Fig. 2 of the target article).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Top-down processes can affect perception in a variety of ways.
“In conclusion, it is clear that top-down processes can affect perception in a variety of ways.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Context shapes Bayesian priors that inform the brain's sensory predictions.
“Context shapes Bayesian “priors” that inform the brain's sensory predictions”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Clark 2013 source
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- cites Friston 2010
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- Interpretationnone given
Both hallucinations and mental imagery avoid all six of the potential confounds that F&S raised.
“Crucially, both examples avoid all six of the potential confounds that Firestone & Scholl (F&S) raised as arguments against previous studies claiming to demonstrate the influence of top-down effects on perception.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Requirements for action strongly shape moment-to-moment processing.
“it is well known that requirements for action strongly shape moment-to-moment processing”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Cisek & Klaska 2010
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The failure to disentangle perception from judgment is not a pitfall of flawed studies, but rather an acknowledgment that there is no clear division between the two.
“Consequently, the failure to disentangle perception from judgment is not a pitfall of flawed studies, but rather an acknowledgment that there is no clear division between the two.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
The BOLD fMRI activation caused by mental imagery is so similar to that generated by observed visual stimuli that a model based on tuning to low-level visual features trained on observed images could determine which images participants were subsequently visualising solely from BOLD fMRI activity during visualisations.
“The BOLD (blood-oxygen-level dependent) fMRI activation caused by mental imagery is so similar to that generated by observed visual stimuli that a model based on tuning to low-level visual features (e.g., spatial frequency and orientation) that was trained on the BOLD fMRI activity generated when participants observed real images was able to determine which of those images the participants were”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Naselaris et al. 2015
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Requirements for action exert a top-down influence on the processing of visual information.
“Requirements for action (dictated by the task context) exert a top-down influence on the processing of visual information.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Olfaction is a judgmental sense in which perceiving and judging are intertwined.
“Olfaction is a judgmental sense in which perceiving and judging are intertwined.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
One of the core properties of higher cognition and not perception is the assignment to slots in a relational structure.
“One of the core properties of higher cognition and not perception is the assignment to slots in a relational structure.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Halford et al. 2010
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisenone given
There are fundamental and well-established differences between cognition and perception independent of cognitive penetrability.
“There are fundamental and well-established differences between cognition and perception independent of cognitive penetrability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Failing to distinguish between perception and judgment is not a flaw in investigating top-down effects of cognition on perception.
“Failing to distinguish between perception and judgment is therefore not a flaw in investigating top-down effects of cognition on perception, as the authors suggest.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The prime example of a modality in which it is impossible to disentangle perception and judgment is olfaction.
“The prime example of a modality in which it is impossible to disentangle the two is olfaction.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
F&S's critique of research by Levin and Banaji (2006) is unfounded.
“We argue that Firestone & Scholl (F&S) provide worthwhile recommendations but that their critique of research by Levin and Banaji (2006) is unfounded.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Levin and Banaji (2006)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisenone given
By 7 years of age, the functionality of human visual perception is indistinguishable from that of an adult.
“what is not in dispute is that by 7 years of age, the functionality of human visual perception is indistinguishable from that of an adult.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisereasoning
CBS hallucinations often interact with the participant's visual perception of the external world.
“In addition, the hallucinations will often interact with the participant's visual perception of the external world.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
The distinction between judgment and perception is less obvious in nonvisual modalities.
“That such a distinction is clear, or even existent, is less obvious in nonvisual modalities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Both hallucinations and mental imagery activate the visual cortex in a way very similar to that of normal visual perception.
“Both hallucinations and mental imagery activate the visual cortex in a way very similar to that of normal visual perception, which helps explain why people describe hallucinations and mental imagery as true perceptual experiences.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Mental imagery is a further example of top-down cognition obviously affecting perception.
“Mental imagery (i.e., visualisation) is a further example of topdown cognition obviously affecting perception.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Hallucinations and mental imagery demonstrate that top-down cognitive and emotional processes can affect perception in a manner that avoids all six of the potential confounds F&S raise.
“Hallucinations and mental imagery demonstrate that topdown cognitive and emotional processes can affect perception in a manner that avoids all six of the potential confounds F&S raise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Drug-induced hallucinations are demonstrations of top-down effects on perception.
“Such drug-induced hallucinations are further demonstrations of top-down effects on perception.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Vision is largely a top-down affair.
“Vision is largely a top-down affair”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gilbert & Li 2013
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- Premisereasoning
The development of higher-order cognitive functions exhibits a much slower time course than the development of visual perception.
“The development of higher-order cognitive functions exhibits a much slower time course than the development of visual perception.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Evidence that the brain is active, not merely reactive, undermines the idea that perception is a bottom-up reflex isolated from cognition.
“Evidence that the brain is active, not merely reactive, undermines the idea that perception is a bottom-up reflex isolated from cognition.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisenone given
Perception integrates sensory input with reliable world-knowledge.
“However, we also know from many decades of research that perception integrates sensory input with reliable world-knowledge.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Hearing a word affects the earliest stages of visual processing.
“Hearing a word affects the earliest stages of visual processing (Boutonnet & Lupyan 2015; see also Landau et al. 2010;Pelekanos & Moutoussis 2011).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Boutonnet & Lupyan 2015
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- cites Landau et al. 2010
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- cites Pelekanos & Moutoussis 2011
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- Premisecitation
Meaningfulness affects putatively earlier processes such as shape discrimination and recovery of 3-D volumes from two-dimensional images.
“Meaningfulnessa putatively late processaffects putatively earlier processes such as shape discrimination (Lupyan & Spivey 2008;Lupyan et al. 2010) and recovery of 3-D volumes from two-dimensional images (Moore & Cavanagh 1998).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Lupyan & Spivey 2008
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- cites Lupyan et al. 2010
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- cites Moore & Cavanagh 1998
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- Premisecitation
Knowledge of real-world size affects perceived speed of motion.
“knowledge of real-world size affects perceived speed of motion (Martín et al. 2015)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Martín et al. 2015
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- Premisecitation
Expectations of motion affect motion perception.
“expectations of motion affect motion perception (Sterzer et al. 2008)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sterzer et al. 2008
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- Interpretationreasoning
F&S's thesis is wrong.
“F&S's thesis is wrong.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Attention warps visual representations.
“In so doing, attention warps the visual representations (e.g., Çukur et al. 2013; sect.5.2 in Lupyan 2015a for discussion).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Çukur et al. 2013
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- cites Lupyan 2015a
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- Interpretationcitation
Attentional effects are not an alternative to top-down effects on perception, but rather one of the mechanisms by which higher-level knowledge affects lower-level perceptual processes.
“Aside from the simplest confounds in spatial attention, attentional effects are not an alternative to top-down effects on perception, but rather one of the mechanisms by which higher-level knowledge affects lower-level perceptual processes (Lupyan & Clark 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lupyan & Clark 2015
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- Premisecitation
Knowledge of surface hardness affects amodal completion.
“For example, knowledge of surface hardness affects amodal completion (Vrins et al. 2009)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Vrins et al. 2009
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- Interpretationnone given
Perception is richly and interestingly influenced by cognition.
“Perception is richly and interestingly influenced by cognition.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
These additional experiments cast serious doubt on F&S's conclusion that the initial demonstration of Levin and Banaji (2006) provides no evidence for a top-down effect on perception.
“These additional experiments cast serious doubt on F&S's conclusion “that the initial demonstration of Levin and Banaji (2006) provides no evidence for a top-down effect on perception” (sect 4.4.1, para.5; emphasis added).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Levin and Banaji (2006)
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- Interpretationreasoning
Like attention, memory is part of the mechanism by which knowledge affects perception.
“Like attention, memory is part of the mechanism by which knowledge affects perception.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
F&S's sweeping claim that there are no top-down effects on perception is premised on incorrect assumptions.
“But, although F&S are correct that some published work on top-down effects suffers from confounds, their sweeping claim that there are no top-down effects on perception is premised on incorrect assumptions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisenone given
Many other studies are well-controlled investigations using gold-standard psychophysical methods.
“But many others are well-controlled investigations using gold-standard psychophysical methods.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Knowledge of bodies affects perceiving depth from binocular disparity.
“knowledge of bodies affects perceiving depth from binocular disparity (Bulthoff et al. 1998)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bulthoff et al. 1998
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- Interpretationreasoning
Studies in neuroscience with other forms of attention suggest that late vision is cognitively penetrated mainly through the effects of cognitively driven spatial and object-centered attention.
“Studies in neuroscience with other forms of attention, however, suggest that a stage of vision, namely late vision, is cognitively penetrated mainly through the effects of cognitively driven spatial and object-centered attention.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Late vision is the stage in which the percept is constructed.
- Interpretationreasoning
F&S's belief that one can draw the traditional distinction between perception and cognition only if perception is encapsulated from cognition rests on a conflation between two different notions of modularity.
“Although F&S cite a number of opposing authors who agree with this sentiment, we think that it rests on a conflation between two different notions of modularity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Inattentional blindness and emotion-induced blindness suggest that categorization and emotion shape what we perceive in the first place, not just the qualities that we judge them to have.
“Evidence from inattentional blindness and emotion-induced blindness suggests that categorization and emotion shape what we perceive in the first place, not just the qualities that we judge them to have.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The convergent experimental and ecological evidence suggests a visual processing system profoundly influenced by top-down effects.
“The convergent experimental and ecological evidence we have outlined suggests a visual processing system profoundly influenced by top-down effects.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
F&S overstate their case when claiming that evidence for top-down effects on perception is nonexistent.
“But they overstate their case when claiming that evidence for such effects is nonexistent.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
EIB appears to be a perceptual phenomenon rather than a memorial one.
“As with inattentional blindness, EIB appears to be a perceptual phenomenon rather than a memorial one.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kennedy & Most 2012
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- Interpretationreasoning
The existence of top-down effects should not undermine the distinction between vision and higher-level cognitive systems.
“Hence, we see no reason to think that the existence of topdown effects should undermine the distinction between vision and higher-level cognitive systems, either.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
These recurrent connections penetrate bottom-up perception and facilitate perception via feedback of activated information from the OFC.
“We argue not only that these results demonstrate the importance of descending neural pathways, which F&S do not dispute (cf.sect.2.2), but also that these recurrent connections penetrate bottom-up perception and facilitate perception via feedback of activated information from the OFC.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Perception is more properly conceptualized as a dynamically reverberating loop rather than encapsulated bottom-up and top-down streams.
“Recent developments in high-resolution tract tracing (Markov & Kennedy 2013) and considerations of electrophysiological timing (Briggs & Usrey 2005) suggest that perception is more properly conceptualized as a dynamically reverberating loop rather than encapsulated bottom-up and top-down streams.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Markov & Kennedy 2013
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- cites Briggs & Usrey 2005
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- Interpretationcitation
Inattentional blindness experiments suggest that categorization shapes perception in ways that cannot be attributed to selection for visual input.
“Inattentional blindness experiments suggest that categorization shapes perception in ways that cannot be attributed to selection for visual input.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Cognitively driven attention affects color processing in the human collateral sulcus at about 160 ms.
“Cognitively driven attention, for example, affects color processing in the human collateral sulcus (the main cortical area for analysis and coding of color information) at about 160 ms (Anllo-Vento et al. 1998).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Anllo-Vento et al. 1998
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- Interpretationcitation
Various precueing effects that affect early vision processing are not direct but indirect cognitive influences because they do not affect perceptual processing itself but, rather, the preparatory neuronal activity of the perceptual circuits.
“It should be noted that the various precueing effects that affect early vision processing are not direct but indirect cognitive influences because they do not affect perceptual processing itself but, rather, the preparatory neuronal activity of the perceptual circuits (Raftopoulos 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Raftopoulos 2015
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- Premisecitation
At about 235 ms in primate V1, attention distinguishes target from distractor curves.
“At about 235 ms in primate V1, attention distinguishes target from distractor curves (Roelfsema et al. 1998).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Roelfsema et al. 1998
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- Premisecitation
The N2 is sensitive to stimulus classification and evaluation.
“It is also sensitive to stimulus classification and evaluation (Mangun & Hilyard 1995).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mangun & Hilyard 1995
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- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 95
- May combine two claims. 81
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Findingnone givenThe median publication year for the empirical papers cited in section 3 is 2010.
“Indeed, the median publication year for the empirical papers cited in section 3 is 2010.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataMore than 175 papers published since 1995 report top-down effects on perception.
“(As of this writing, we count more than 175 papers published since 1995 reporting such effects; for a list, see http://perception.yale.edu/TopDownPapers.)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Findingown dataFirestone and Scholl replicated the rod/aperture effect but tested it with two poles forming an independent passable aperture instead of a measuring tape.
“We successfully replicated this result, but we also tested it with one critical difference: Instead of adjusting a measuring tape to record subjects' width estimates, the experimenter used two poles that themselves formed an independent and potentially passable aperture.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
FindingreasoningMany alleged top-down effects on perception live near the border of perception and cognition, where it is not always obvious whether a cognitive state affects what we see or only our inferences or judgments.
“Many alleged top-down effects on perception live near the border of perception and cognition, where it is not always obvious whether a given cognitive state affects what we see or instead only our inferences or judgments made on the basis of what we see.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Findingnone givenJudgment-based alternative explanations for top-down effects have been severely underappreciated in recent work.
“we contend that judgment-based alternative explanations for topdown effects have been severely underappreciated in recent work.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningOther purported top-down effects similarly explicable by judgment include effects on visually estimated weight, estimated looming of spiders, and rated anger in African-American or Arab faces.
“Other purported top-down effects that seem similarly explicable include effects on visually estimated weight (Doerrfeld et al. 2012), the estimated looming of spiders (Riskind et al. 1995), and the rated anger in African-American or Arab faces (Maner et al. 2005).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Doerrfeld et al. 2012
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- cites Riskind et al. 1995
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- cites Maner et al. 2005
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Findingnone givenStudies that manipulate stimuli often acknowledge the possibility of low-level differences and sometimes attempt to control for them.
“Studies that manipulate stimuli often do acknowledge the possibility of low-level differences (and on occasion actively attempt to control for them).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Findingnone givenThe distinction between perception and judgment is intuitive and uncontroversial in principle, but few discussions of top-down effects mention judgmental effects as possible alternative explanations.
“The distinction between perception and judgment is intuitive and uncontroversial in principle, but it is striking just how few discussions of top-down effects on perception even mention judgmental effects as possible alternative explanations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningSimilar demand-based explanations are plausible for reported effects of desirability on distance perception, racial identity on faces' perceived lightness, stereotypes on weapon/tool identity, tool use on perceived distance, scary music on interpretation of ambiguous figures, and fear of heights on perceived height.
“similar explanations seem eminently plausible for reported effects of desirability on distance perception (e.g., the estimated distance of feces vs. chocolate; Balcetis & Dunning 2010), of racial identity on faces' perceived lightness (Levin & Banaji 2006), of stereotypes on the identity of weapons and tools (Correll et al. 2015), of tool use on the perceived distance to reachable targets (Witt et”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Balcetis & Dunning 2010
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- cites Levin & Banaji 2006
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- cites Correll et al. 2015
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FindingcitationMany studies of top-down effects never mention the possibility of demand-based effects.
“Yet, so many studies never even mention the possibility of demand-based effects (including several studies mentioned above, e.g., Mitterer et al. 2009;Prinz & Seidel 2012).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Mitterer et al. 2009
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- cites Prinz & Seidel 2012
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Findingnone givenAssessing demand effects is often easy and cost-free.
“This is especially frustrating because assessing demand effects is often easy and cost-free.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
FindingcitationThe Levin and Banaji finding is widely regarded as one of the strongest counterexamples to modularity.
“This finding is today widely regarded as one of the strongest counterexamples to modularity (e.g., Collins & Olson 2014;Macpherson 2012;Vetter & Newen 2014)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Collins & Olson 2014
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- cites Macpherson 2012
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- cites Vetter & Newen 2014
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Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Findingnone givenThe Black face has a darker jawline, whereas the White face has darker eyes.
“And the Black face has a darker jawline, whereas the White face has darker eyes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingcitationAfter blurring, the vast majority of observers asserted that the two faces had the same race or were even the same person.
“After blurring, the vast majority of observers asserted that the two faces actually had the same race (or were even the same person).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
FindingreasoningMany top-down effects in Figure 2 are caricatured because when not caricatured readers could not understand the claims because they could not experience the effect.
“You may notice that many of the top-down effects in Figure 2 are caricatured, e.g., with actual luminance differences for positive vs. negative words and smiling vs. frowning faces.This is because when the effects weren't caricatured in this way, readers could not understand the claimsbecause they could not experience the effect!”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone givenThe six pitfalls cover at least nine times as many empirical reports of top-down effects as there are pitfalls.
“Indeed, merely considering our six pitfallsuniquely disconfirmatory predictions, judgment, task demands, low-level differences, peripheral attention, and memorywe have covered at least nine times that many empirical reports of top-down effects (and of course that includes only those top-down effects we had space to discuss, out of a much larger pool).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone givenThe median publication year of the many top-down reports cited in this paper is 2010.
“(For example, the median publication year of the many top-down reports cited in this paperwhich includes New-Look-era reportsis only 2010.)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe facilitation-by-congruency effect occurs even in the absence of response bias shifts, as response criterion c did not change significantly across congruency conditions.
“It occurs even in the absence of response bias shifts, given that the response criterion c did not change significantly across congruency conditions for both happiness and anger detection”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
FindingcitationParticipants who correctly distinguished the race of the noninverted faces also were more likely to judge that the Black face was darker.
“Baker and Levin found that participants who correctly distinguished the race of the noninverted faces also were more likely to judge that the Black face was darker.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
FindingcitationInstructing participants to view meaningless symbols as meaningful rotated numbers 2 and 5 improved visual search efficiency.
“For example, Lupyan and Spivey (2008) found that instructing participants to view the meaningless symbols and as meaningfulrotated numbers 2 and 5improved visual search efficiency.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lupyan and Spivey (2008)
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FindingcitationMotivational factors rapidly and profoundly influence neuronal responses at the earliest modality-specific perceptual stages, resulting in increased gain and/or altered tuning curves.
“Research conducted in alert animals has long recognized that motivational factors rapidly and profoundly influence neuronal responses at the earliest modality-specific perceptual stages, resulting in increased gain and/or altered tuning curves (McGann 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McGann 2015
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FindingcitationTonotopic map remodeling within primary auditory cortex optimizes the processing of tones paired with rewards or punishers.
“Findings collected across a range of mammalian species have demonstrated tonotopic map remodeling within primary auditory cortex that optimizes the processing of tones paired with rewards or punishers (Weinberger 2004).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Weinberger 2004
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FindingcitationWhen an unexpected E traveled across the screen, those tracking the letters were more likely to notice it than those tracking the digits, and this pattern reversed when the unexpected object was its mirror image, a block-letter 3.
“When an unexpected E traveled across the screen, those tracking the letters were more likely to notice it than those tracking the digits, and this pattern reversed when the unexpected object was its mirror image, a block-letter 3.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Most 2013
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Interpretationnone givenAny apparent top-down effect that falls prey to one or more of these pitfalls would be compromised, in the sense that it could be explained by deflationary, routine, and certainly nonrevolutionary factors.
“We contend that any apparent top-down effect that falls prey to one or more of these pitfalls would be compromised, in the sense that it could be explained by deflationary, routine, and certainly nonrevolutionary factors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationCrossmodal effects have been conclusively established and are common ground for all parties in this discussion.
“the existence of crossmodal effects has been conclusively established and is common ground for all parties in this discussion.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Shams et al. 2000
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- cites Sekuler et al. 1997
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PremisecitationParts of visual cortex are involved in imagery, recall, and reward processing.
“Even parts of visual cortex, for example, are involved in imagery (e.g., Kosslyn 2005), recall (e.g., Le Bihan et al. 1993), and reward processing (Vickery et al. 2011)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Kosslyn 2005
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- cites Le Bihan et al. 1993
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- cites Vickery et al. 2011
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InterpretationreasoningThese studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls; nearly all of the recent literature on top-down effects is susceptible to a surprisingly small group of such pitfalls.
“In particular, and despite their variety, we suggest that these studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls.”
- Also stated in: § 4. The six "pitfalls" of top-down effects on perception · hedged
“We suggest that this research falls prey to a set of”
- Also stated in: § 4. The six "pitfalls" of top-down effects on perception · hedged
“1.They are few in number.We suggest that nearly all of the recent literature on top-down effects is susceptible to a surprisingly small group of such pitfalls.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 4. The six "pitfalls" of top-down effects on perception · hedged
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationTop-down factors are entirely missing from contemporary vision science textbooks.
“Similarly, such factors are entirely missing from contemporary vision science textbooks (e.g., Blake & Sekuler 2005;Howard & Rogers 2002;Yantis 2013).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Blake & Sekuler 2005
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- cites Howard & Rogers 2002
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- cites Yantis 2013
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Premisenone givenThe existence of descending neural pathways has been conclusively established many times over, and they are now firmly part of the orthodoxy in our understanding of neural systems.
“The existence of descending neural pathways has been conclusively established many times over, and they are now firmly part of the orthodoxy in our understanding of neural systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationOther critiques identified theoretically puzzling moderating variables or reported that many other valuable objects and symbols failed to produce similar results.
“and other critiques identified theoretically puzzling moderating variables or reported that many other valuable objects and symbols failed to produce similar results (e.g., Klein et al. 1951;McCurdy 1956).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Klein et al. 1951
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- cites McCurdy 1956
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PremisereasoningClosing your eyes (or turning off the lights) changes only the input to perception; it does not change perceptual processing itself.
“Closing your eyes (or turning off the lights) changes only the input to perception; it does not change perceptual processing itself.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningA confirmatory-only research strategy misses half of the possible decisive evidence.
“in our view this strategy essentially misses out on half of the possible decisive evidence.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationStefanucci and Geuss (2009) reported that holding a wide rod across one's body makes the distance between two poles look narrower, as measured by adjusting a measuring tape.
“holding a wide rod across one's body (Fig. 2E) reportedly makes the distance between two poles (which form a doorway-like aperture) look narrower, as measured by having subjects instruct the experimenter to adjust a measuring tape to visually match the aperture's width.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Stefanucci & Geuss 2009
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InterpretationreasoningSuch changes don't involve any penetration because they don't involve effects of knowledge per se.
“However, such changes don't involve any penetration because they don't involve effects of knowledge per se.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenToday's alleged top-down effects on perception are effects of motivation, action, emotion, categorization, and language.
“Roughly, today's alleged top-down effects on perception are effects of motivation, action, emotion, categorization, and language.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationBanerjee et al. (2012) reported that reflecting on unethical actions makes the world look darker.
“the report that reflecting on unethical actions makes the world look darker (Banerjee et al. 2012; Fig. 2O).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Banerjee et al. 2012
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InterpretationreasoningThe El Greco fallacy applies to any constant-error distortion that should affect equally the means of reproduction and the item reproduced.
“the El Greco fallacy applies to any constant-error distortion that should affect equally the means of reproduction (e.g., canvases, grayscale patches) and the item reproduced (e.g., visual scenes to be painted, bright rooms).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe sounds' effects occur whether you like it or not, and they occur extremely quickly (less than 100 ms).
“The sounds' effects occur”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Shams et al. 2002
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Premisenone givenExperimental hypotheses can be tested in two ways: by observing an effect when the theory calls for it, and by not observing an effect when the theory demands its absence.
“In general, experimental hypotheses can be tested in two sorts of ways: Not only should you observe an effect when your theory calls for it, but also you should not observe an effect when your theory demands its absence.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe thesis of cognitive impenetrability constrains the information modules can access, but it does not constrain what modules can do with the input they do receive.
“(Put more generally, the thesis of cognitive impenetrability constrains the information modules can access, but it does not constrain what modules can do with the input they do receive; e.g., Scholl & Leslie 1999.)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Scholl & Leslie 1999
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Premisenone givenThe particular theoretical motivations behind the various results are nonuniform.
“However, the particular theoretical motivations behind these various results are nonuniform, so it will be useful to understand these studies in groups.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe Caruso et al. effect is more likely explained by darker photos seeming more negative and conservatives deeming them more representative because they think more negatively about Obama.
“it seems more likely that darker photos (or darker skin tones) seemed more negative to subjects, and that conservatives deemed them more representative (and liberals less representative) for that reasonbecause conservatives think more negatively about Obama than liberals do.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningAn alternative explanation for the heavy-ball effect is that subjects only judged the target to be farther, without a real change in perception.
“However, another possibility is that subjects only judged the target to be farther, even without a real change in perception.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationMeier et al. (2007) reported that subjects judged gray patches darker after reading negative versus positive words, and judged negative words printed in gray ink darker than positive words.
“Subjects judged gray patches to be darker after reading negative (vs. positive) words, and subjects judged words printed in gray ink to be darker if the words were negative (vs. positive), as measured by selecting a darker grayscale patch to match the word's lightness (Meier et al. 2007; Fig. 2G).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Meier et al. 2007
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PremisecitationWesp et al. (2004) reported that less-accurate dart throwing led to smaller target-size estimates.
“it was reported that accuracy in throwing darts at a target affected subsequent size judgments of the target, which was initially assumed to reflect a perceptual change: Less-accurate throwing led to smaller target-size estimates, as if one's performance perceptually resized the target (Wesp et al. 2004; Fig. 2F).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Wesp et al. 2004
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PremisecitationWitt et al. (2004) reported that throwing a heavy ball rather than a light ball increases estimates of a target's distance.
“It has been reported that throwing a heavy ball (rather than a light ball) at a target increases estimates of that target's distance (Witt et al. 2004).”
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PremisecitationWesp and Gasper (2012) replicated the dart-throwing size effect but found that telling subjects the darts were faulty eliminated the correlation between performance and reported size.
“the same research group (Wesp & Gasper 2012) replicated the earlier resultbut then ran a follow-up condition in which, before throwing, subjects were told that the darts were faulty and inaccurate.This additional instruction eliminated the correlation between performance and reported size.”
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InterpretationreasoningMeier et al.'s pair of results commits the El Greco fallacy because if reading negative words makes gray patches look darker, the gray patches from the second result should also have looked darker and cancel.
“Here too is an El Greco fallacy: if, per the first result, reading negative words makes gray patches look darker, then the gray patches from the second result should also have looked darker, and the effects of one should have canceled out the other.”
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InterpretationreasoningEffective demos can provide especially compelling evidence and may directly rule out task demands and postperceptual judgments.
“effective demos can provide especially compelling evidence, and they may often directly rule out the kinds of worries we expressed in discussing the previous two pitfalls (i.e., task demands and postperceptual judgments).”
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PremisecitationIn the backpack/slant study, many subjects explicitly articulated the experimental hypothesis when asked, and only those subjects showed the backpack effect.
“many subjects explicitly articulated the experimental hypothesis when askedand only those subjects showed the backpack effect (Durgin et al. 2009).”
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InterpretationreasoningThe backpack effect on slant estimates can be explained by subjects modifying their responses to suit the experimental circumstances.
“But another explanation is that subjects modified their responses to suit the experimental circumstances, in which a very conspicuous manipulation (a curiously unexplained backpack) was administered before obtaining a single perceptual judgment (regarding the hill's slant).”
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InterpretationreasoningDemand effects can be mitigated by nontransparent manipulations or indirect measures, and can often be assessed by asking subjects about the experiment during debriefing.
“although demand effects can be mitigated by nontransparent manipulations or indirect measures, they can also often be assessed by simply asking the subjects about the experimentfor example, during a careful postexperiment debriefing.”
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InterpretationcitationIn light of recent findings concerning task demands, it is no longer possible to provide compelling evidence for a top-down effect on perception without considering the experiment's social context.
“In light of recent findings concerning task demands in studies of top-down effects on perception (especially Durgin et al. 2009), it is no longer possible to provide compelling evidence for a top-down effect on perception without considering the experiment's social context.”
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InterpretationreasoningLow-level differences are even more pervasive and problematic than has been realized, and simple experimental designs can reveal when such differences are responsible for apparent top-down effects.
“we contend that such low-level differences are even more pervasive and problematic than has been realized, and that simple experimental designs can reveal when such differences are responsible for apparent top-down effects.”
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PremisecitationLevin and Banaji (2006) reported that Black faces look darker than White faces, even when matched for mean luminance.
“a report that Black (i.e., African-American) faces look darker than White (i.e., Caucasian) faces, even when matched for mean luminance, as in Figure 3A (Levin & Banaji 2006).”
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InterpretationreasoningClaims of top-down effects can no longer be credible without at least asking about and reporting subjects' beliefs about the experiment.
“we contend that claims of top-down effects (especially in studies using transparent manipulations) can no longer be credible without at least asking aboutand reportingsubjects' beliefs about the experiment.”
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PremisecitationDurgin et al. (2011a) found that changing instructions to hit the gift card directly led subjects to throw the beanbag farther, as expected if strategic throwing explained the initial results.
“A follow-up study (Durgin et al. 2011a) tested these possibilities directly and found that slightly changing the instructions so that the challenge was to hit the gift card directly (rather than land closest) led subjects to throw the beanbag farther”
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PremisecitationBalcetis and Dunning (2010) reported that subjects undershoot a $25 gift card but not a $0 gift card, suggesting more desirable objects look closer.
“it has been reported that, when subjects can win a gift card taped to the ground if they throw a beanbag closer to the gift card than their peers do, subjects undershoot the gift card if it is worth $25 but not if it is worth $0suggesting (to the original authors) that more desirable objects look closer (Balcetis & Dunning 2010; Fig. 2P).”
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Premisenone givenVision experiments occur in controlled environments, but any such environment is also inevitably a social environment.
“Vision experiments occur in a variety of controlled environments (including the laboratory), but any such environment is also inevitably a social environment”
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PremisecitationHansen et al. (2006) and Olkkonen et al. (2008) reported that knowledge of an object's typical color influences perceived color, such that a grayscale banana is judged more than 20% yellow.
“knowledge of an object's typical color (e.g., that bananas are yellow) reportedly influences that object's perceived color, such that a grayscale image of a banana is judged to be more than 20% yellow (Hansen et al. 2006;Olkkonen et al. 2008)”
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Interpretationnone givenIn the vast majority of cases, relevant studies never considered most of the pitfalls.
“Moreover, in the vast majority of cases, it's not that the relevant studies attempted to address these pitfalls but failed; rather, it's that they seem never to have considered most of the pitfalls in the first place.”
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InterpretationcitationIn the face stimuli, the Black face seems to be under illumination, whereas the White face does not look particularly illuminated or shiny, a difference known to influence perceived lightness.
“a close examination of the face stimuli in Figure 3A suggests that the Black face seems to be under illumination, whereas the White face doesn't look particularly illuminated or shinya difference that has long been known to influence perceived lightness (Adelson 2000;Gilchrist & Jacobsen 1984).”
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PremisecitationLevin et al. (2001) reported that categorical differences facilitate visual search with line drawings of animals and artifacts.
“reports that categorical differences facilitate visual search with line drawings of animals and artifactse.g., with faster and more efficient searches for animals among artifacts, and vice versa (Levin et al. 2001).”
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InterpretationreasoningDogs are more geometrically similar to each other than they are to shoes, and size contrast may be influenced by such geometric similarity.
“However, dogs are also more geometrically similar to each other than they are to shoes (for example, the shoe images were shorter, wider, and differently oriented than the dog images; Fig. 2L), and size contrast may instead be influenced by such geometric similarity.”
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PremisecitationVoluntary attention perceptually darkens transparent surfaces, which could explain the increase in perceived transparency among thirsty observers.
“And this is to say nothing of attentional effects on other visual propertiessuch as the fact that voluntary attention perceptually darkens transparent surfaces (Tse 2005), which could explain the increase in perceived transparency among thirsty observers (Changizi & Hall 2001; Fig. 2B) if nonthirsty observers simply paid more attention during the task (being less distracted by their thirst).”
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- cites Changizi & Hall 2001
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InterpretationreasoningVisual attention may be both necessary and sufficient for apparent effects of action on perception, suggesting they reduce to routine attention-perception interactions.
“That visual attention may be both necessary and sufficient for such effects suggests that apparent effects of action on perception may reduce to more routine and wellknown interactions between attention and perception.”
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Interpretationnone givenAttention is almost never empirically explored in this literature.
“On the other hand, given this prominence in theoretical discussions of top-down effects, it is curious that attention is almost never empirically explored in this literaturecurious especially given that such effects are often straightforwardly testable.”
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PremisecitationAttended items can be seen as larger, which challenges the interpretation of nearly every alleged top-down effect on size perception.
“For example, findings suggesting that attended items can be seen as larger (Anton-Erxleben et al. 2007) immediately challenge the interpretation of nearly every alleged top-down effect on size perception, including reported effects of throwing performance on perceived target size (e.g., Cañal-Bruland et al. 2010; Fig. 2F), of balance on the perceived size of a walkable beam (Geuss et al. 2010), of”
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InterpretationcitationThe effect of hunger on identification of food-related words could be due to hungry subjects having activated relevant memory representations before stimulus presentation.
“In another example, hungry subjects more accurately identified briefly presented food-related words relative to subjects who were not hungry (Radel & Clément-Guillotin 2012); but if hungry subjects were simply thinking about food more than nonhungry subjects were, then it is no surprise that they better recognized words related to what they were thinking about, having activated the relevant”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Radel & Clément-Guillotin 2012
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PremisecitationSwitches in the Necker cube's interpretation are driven by changes in which corner of the cube is attended, and the same has been found for other ambiguous figures.
“For example, switches in the Necker cube's interpretation are driven by changes in which corner of the cube is attended (Peterson & Gibson 1991;Toppino 2003), and the same has been found for other ambiguous figures (for a review, see Long & Toppino 2004).”
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PremisecitationVerbal shadowing impairs subjects' ability to notice changes to objects' identities but not to their spatial configuration, suggesting that labels enhance contentful memories rather than visual processing.
“Indeed, in similar contexts, the prevention of such labeling by verbal shadowing impairs subjects' ability to notice changes to objects' identities (e.g., a Coke bottle changing into a cardboard box) but not to their spatial configuration (e.g., a Coke bottle moving from one location in the scene to another), suggesting that the work done by such labels is to enhance contentful memories rather”
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PremisecitationWhen the memory component of the task was reduced by keeping a cue image on-screen, the labeling advantage disappeared, suggesting that memory was responsible.
“Under these conditions, the label advantage disappeared, suggesting that memory was the culprit all along.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Klemfuss et al. (2012)
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Interpretationown dataThese results suggest that relatedness is the key factor in such effects, and thus that memory, not perception, improves detection of words related to morality.
“These results suggest that relatedness is the key factor in such effects, and thus that memory, not perception, improves detection of words related to morality.”
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Interpretationnone givenMany recent studies of recognition do not acknowledge that a memory interpretation is important or interesting.
“Yet, it is striking how many recent studies of recognition (including nearly all of those mentioned in sect.4.6) do not even acknowledge that such an interpretation is important or interesting.”
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PremisecitationModern discussions agree that, to be compelling, top-down effects must not merely operate through attention.
“Nevertheless, these recent discussions happily agree that, to be compelling, top-down effects must not merely operate through attention.”
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InterpretationreasoningThe moral words could have primed each other and been easier to recognize for that reason rather than because of anything special about morality.
“In that case, it could be that the moral words simply primed each other and were easier to recognize for that reason rather than because of anything special about morality.”
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PremisecitationSensory information is meaningless without experience and knowledge.
“Any kind of information the sensory organs receive is meaningless because there is no inherent meaning in sensory information without experience and knowledge (Proulx 2011)”
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Interpretationnone givenBehavior is multiply determined by cognitive processes.
“Second, behavior is multiply determined by cognitive processes.”
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InterpretationreasoningIf unconscious inference plays a role in perception, then there must be some role of recognition and judgment even for low-level perception.
“But if unconscious inference plays a role in perception, as it certainly does even in the perception of a red object, then there must be some role of recognition and judgment even for low-level perception.”
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Interpretationnone givenPerception is not a unitary construct but is composed of multiple components.
“First, perception is not a unitary construct but is composed of multiple components.”
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InterpretationreasoningIf reported effects of desires on perceived size are explained simply by increased attention to the desired object, then such an effect is not a revolutionary discovery about perception.
“If it turns out, for example, that reported effects of desires on perceived size are explained simply by increased attention to the desired object, then such an effect will go from being a revolutionary discovery about the nature of perception to being simply a demonstration that people pay attention to objects they like.”
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PremisecitationEmberson and Amso (2012) argued that changes in visual percepts arise from activity in learning and memory systems, not that activity in perceptual systems is evidence for a top-down effect.
“The argument made by Emberson and Amso (2012) is not that one can find activity in perceptual systems as evidence for a top-down effect but rather that changes in visual percepts arise from activity in learning and memory systems.”
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PremisecitationLevin and Banaji (2006) report several other experiments with similar conclusions.
“Levin and Banaji (2006) report several other experiments with similar conclusions.”
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PremisecitationAfter perceptual input reaches the retina, multiple brain regions operate on the input-selecting the significant from the mundane, often by emotion or motivation, and some via top-down re-entrant processes-to construct perceptual experience.
“After perceptual input reaches the retina, multiple brain regions operate on the inputselecting the significant from the mundane (Lim et al. 2009), often by emotion (Anderson & Phelps 2001) or motivation (Egner & Hirsch 2005), and some via top-down re-entrant processes (Gilbert & Li 2013)to construct perceptual experience.”
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PremisecitationLong-term users of sensory substitution devices who once had vision have visual imagery evoked immediately by the sounds they hear with a device, and express that they have the perception of sight.
“there is evidence that long-term users of such devices who once had vision (who had acquired blindness) have visual imagery that is evoked immediately by the sounds they hear with a device, and therefore express that they have the perception of sight (Ward & Meijer 2010).”
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PremisecitationNew Look proponents faced similar criticisms from the beginning.
“Indeed, from the beginning, New Look proponents faced similar criticisms.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bruner and Goodman (1947)
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PremisecitationSome connections between the senses are direct and low-level.
“Although some connections between the senses appear to be direct and low-level (Meredith & Stein 1986)”
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PremisecitationOther connections between the senses are the product of learning and experience.
“others certainly are the product of learning and experience (Proulx et al. 2014).”
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InterpretationreasoningThe primary fuel for alternative conceptions of perception is the presence of many empirical reports of top-down influences on perception.
“Though many alternative conceptions of what perception is and how it works have deep theoretical foundations and motivations, we suspect that the primary fuel for such alternative conceptions is simply the presence of so many empirical reports of top-down influences on perceptionespecially in the tidal wave of such effects appearing over the last two decades.”
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PremisecitationNone of these other experiments involve subjectively appreciable demonstrations.
“None of these other experiments involve subjectively appreciable demonstrations, however”
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PremisecitationThe observers were explicitly told that the study was about
“because the observers were explicitly told that the study was about”
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PremisecitationCrossmodal perception is the norm, rather than the exception.
“Crossmodal perception is the norm, rather than the exception”
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PremisecitationSensory substitution devices allow someone with a damaged sensory modality to receive missing information by transforming it into a format another intact sensory modality can process.
“Sensory substitution devices allow someone with a damaged sensory modality (such as the visual system for the visually impaired) to receive the missing information by transforming it into a format that another intact sensory modality (such as the auditory [Meijer 1992] or somatosensory system [Bach-y-Rita & Kercel 2003]) can process.”
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InterpretationcitationMorality is not modular.
“Accordingly, we do not think morality is modular, either (Van Bavel et al. 2015).”
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InterpretationcitationIf brains resonate with similarity of motor and affective states, bodily actions may behave as affectively polarized primes that preactivate representations of emotionally related facial features.
“If brains resonate with the similarity of motor and affective states (Niedenthal et al. 2010), bodily actions may behave as affectively polarized primes that preactivate the representations of emotionally related facial features, thus facilitating the encoding of features belonging to the same, rather than to a different, valence domain.”
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Premisenone givenAttention is often inextricably intertwined with perception, and it is deployed not only to spatial regions, but also to sensory dimensions, learned dimensions, and learned complex configurations.
“Attention is often inextricably intertwined with perception, and it is deployed not only to spatial regions, but also to sensory dimensions, learned dimensions, and learned complex configurations.”
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PremisecitationExpressive qualities are phenomenally objective and show a remarkable dependence on configural stimulus properties.
“Despite being commonly conceived as subjective, expressive qualities are phenomenally objective (i.e., perceived as belonging to the object; Köhler 1929;1938) and show a remarkablethough not exclusivedependence on configural stimulus properties.”
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PremisecitationRecurrent connections are particularly important when processing degraded inputs, and they serve to strengthen weak bottom-up signals.
“These recurrent connections are particularly important when processing degraded inputs, and they serve to strengthen weak bottom-up signals (Wyatte et al. 2012).”
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PremisecitationCategorical perception exists and seems to contradict F&S.
“The existence of categorical perception (Goldstone & Hendrickson 2010) seems to contradict F&S.”
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InterpretationreasoningSemantic memory plays some role in the moral pop-out effect, but this does not rule out that the motivational relevance of morality boosts related content to awareness.
“Accordingly, it is trivially true that semantic memory plays some role in the moral popout effect (how else would our participants know words like kill and die), yet this does not rule out that the motivational relevance of morality (or any motivationally relevant construct) boosts related content to awareness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationWith training, dimensions that were originally fused can become more perceptually separated, and once this occurs, attention can select the separate dimensions.
“However, with training, dimensions that were originally fused can become more perceptually separated (Goldstone & Steyvers 2001), and once this occurs, it becomes possible for attention to select the separate dimensions.”
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PremisecitationPerceptual changes affect what can be attended, and attention affects what is perceptually learned.
“Perceptual changes affect what can be attended, and attention affects what is perceptually learned (Shiu & Pashler 1992).”
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PremisereasoningAttention influences perceptual processes at many stages and sometimes with a high degree of specificity.
“The problem with generalizing this kind of account is that attention influences perceptual processes at many stages and sometimes with a high degree of specificity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningMoral words are not explicitly encoded in semantic memory as moral terms or as having significant overlapping content.
“We suspect that moral words are not explicitly encoded in semantic memory as moral terms or as having significant overlapping content.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationCategorical perception can be acquired during individual experience and constitutes a paradigmatic case of observer-dependent, familiarity-mediated sensitivity change.
“Categorical perception can be acquired during individual experience (Beale & Keil 1995), and it constitutes a paradigmatic case of observer-dependent, familiarity-mediated sensitivity change.”
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Interpretationown dataOur evidence challenges the bold claim that cognition does not affect perception, supports a circumscribed penetrability of affective perception, and suggests indirect affective priming as a candidate mechanism.
“To summarize, our evidence challenges the bold claim that cognition does not affect perception, supports a circumscribed penetrability of affective perception, and suggests indirect affective priming as a candidate mechanism by which observer's states mold perceptual properties experienced as phenomenally objective and yet loaded with meaning.”
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InterpretationreasoningThe boundary between peripheral attention shifts and changes to perception is entirely unclear and potentially artificial.
“Because of the wide range of attentional effectsfrom centrally oriented modulations of percept selection, to adjustments of gain to certain features, to the extreme case of head-turningthe boundary between peripheral attention shifts and changes to perception is entirely unclear and potentially artificial.”
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Interpretationown dataOur studies challenge any bold claim against penetrability of perception and suggest that perceptual theory can benefit from demonstrations of how observer's states can mold expressive qualities.
“Our studies challenge any bold claim against penetrability of perception and suggest that perceptual theory can benefit from demonstrations of howunder controlled circumstancesobserver's states can mold expressive qualities.”
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PremisecitationAnterior IT object-selective and face-selective cells have very large RFs (10°-50°) and require large (>5°) stimuli for activation.
“At the pinnacle of the hierarchy we find anterior IT”
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PremisecitationInputs from prefrontal cortex reach first IT cortex; some outputs from IT reach V1 directly and some via V4→V2→V1 route.
“For example, inputs originating at the prefrontal cortex reach first the IT cortex; some outputs from the IT cortex reach V1 directly and some reach it via the V4→V2→V1 route (Gilbert & Wu 2013).”
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PremisecitationAthletes, musicians, coaches, doctors, and gourmets are familiar with engaging in training methods for improving their own perceptual performances.
“Athletes, musicians, coaches, doctors, and gourmets are all familiar with engaging in training methods for improving their own perceptual performances (Goldstone et al. 2015).”
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Premisenone givenWhen we see a face, we perceive it as an integrated whole, but at the same time we are consciously aware of all minute spatial elements.
“When we see a face, for example, we perceive it as an integrated whole, but at the same time we are consciously aware of all of the minute spatial elements that make up that face.”
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PremisereasoningInformation converges in successive hierarchical stages from V1 to V2, V4, IT, resulting in cells with increasingly large RFs that cannot encode spatial details but may be selective to global features.
“From these preintegration response patterns, information converges in successive hierarchical stages, from V1 orientation-selective cells through downstream cortical areas V2, V4, and the inferotemporal cortex (IT).This successive convergence results in cells having increasingly large receptive fields (RFs) that cannot encode spatial details but may be selective to global features such as size, or”
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Premisenone givenThose details are perceived instantaneously and in parallel.
“Those details are perceived instantaneously and in parallel.”
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PremisecitationAlmost all top-down information reaches V1 via layer 1, where spatial extent of synaptic connectivity is spread out.
“Almost all top-down information reaches V1 via layer 1 (see summary Fig. 1 in Gur & Snodderly 2008), where the spatial extent of its synaptic connectivity is rather spread out (Rockland 1994).”
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InterpretationreasoningThe perceptual ability to transform individual spatial elements into holistic objects is instantaneous and parallel, arguing for feed-forward, encapsulated perception.
“We also note that the perceptual ability to transform individual spatial elements into holistic objects is instantaneous and parallelwhich argues for a feed-forward, encapsulated perception.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationModern neuroanatomy reveals that the brain is better understood as one large, interconnected network of neurons, bathed in a chemical system, that can be parsed as a set of broadly distributed, dynamically changing, interacting systems.
“Modern neuroanatomy reveals that the brain is better understood as one large, interconnected network of neurons, bathed in a chemical system, that can be parsed as a set of broadly distributed, dynamically changing, interacting systems”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Marder 2012
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Sporns 2011
Not checked in the free run.
- cites van den Heuvel & Sporns 2013
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIn visual cortex, objects in full details are represented by V1 response patterns while global information is extracted by information-integrating cells at various visual areas.
“Thus, in the visual cortex, objects in their full details are represented by V1 response patterns while the global information for each object that is required for comparing the acute image to its stored prototype (”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThese systems are domain general: their interactions constitute mental phenomena that we consider distinct, such as perception, cognition, emotion, and action.
“These systems are domain general: Their interactions constitute mental phenomena that we consider distinct, such as perception, cognition, emotion, and action”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Anderson 2014
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Barrett 2009
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Pessoa 2014
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May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningTop-down influences typically drive perception, and are constrained or corrected by incoming sensory inputs, rather than the other way around.
“This means that top-down influences typically drive perception, and are constrained or corrected by incoming sensory inputs, rather than the other way around.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThese assumptions, and the conclusion they support, are untenable given the considerable neuroscientific evidence that processing in the human brain is distributed, active, and exquisitely sensitive to context.
“These assumptions, and the conclusion they support, are untenable given the considerable neuroscientific evidence that processing in the human brain is distributed, active, and exquisitely sensitive to context.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationAbout 10%-30% of individuals who suffer from a severe visual impairment, such as glaucoma, experience Charles Bonnet syndrome (CBS).
“About 10%-30% of individuals who suffer from a severe visual impairment, such as glaucoma, experience Charles Bonnet syndrome (CBS; Schultz et al. 1996;Vukicevic & Fitzmaurice 2008).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Schultz et al. 1996
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Vukicevic & Fitzmaurice 2008
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningSeemingly distinct mental phenomena are implemented as dynamic brain states, not as individual, static mental organs.
“Seemingly distinct mental phenomena are implemented as dynamic brain states, not as individual, static mental organs”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThese examples show that top-down cognitive processes are not only able to penetrate visual perceptions, but also they can cause them.
“These examples show that top-down cognitive processes are not only able to penetrate visual perceptions, but also they can cause them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationLevin and Banaji (2006) demonstrated that participants seem to perceive Black faces to be darker than White faces.
“Levin and Banaji (2006) demonstrated that participants seem to perceive Black faces to be darker than White faces.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Levin and Banaji (2006)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningF&S apply an unjustified level of skepticism about top-down effects relative to other broad hypotheses about the sources of perceptual intelligence.
“In addition, we argue that F&S apply unjustified level of skepticism about top-down effects relative to other broad hypotheses about the sources of perceptual intelligence.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationPure visual hallucinations are possible and are associated with hyperconnectivity between the amygdala and the visual cortex.
“However, pure visual hallucinations are also possible and are associated with hyperconnectivity between the amygdala and the visual cortex (Ford et al. 2015), underscoring the role of top-down feedback in their formation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ford et al. 2015
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationCapacity limits of cognition are different from those of perception; humans are restricted to representing links between four variables or fewer in a single cognitive representation.
“Capacity limits of cognition are different from those of perception, and as humans, we are restricted to representing links between four variables (a quaternary relationship) or fewer in a single cognitive representation”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Halford et al. 2005
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenHallucinations and mental imagery are examples where perception is not only influenced by, but also driven by, top-down effects.
“In this commentary, we present two examples where perception is not only influenced by, but also in fact driven by, top-down effects: hallucinations and mental imagery.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningThe main thrust of F&S's critique is based on folk categories of perception and cognition as reified in a modular, reactive, and context-insensitive brain.
“But the main thrust of their critique is based on folk categories of perception and cognition as reified in a modular, reactive, and context-insensitive brain.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningF&S implicitly assume that top-down effects would uniformly influence all elements in a visual field.
“In discussing their “El Greco” fallacy, F&S implicitly assume that top-down effects would uniformly influence all elements in a visual field.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationA top-down effect that can be partially ascribed to memory does not mean it is not (also) an effect on perception, because part of what we call memory-visual memory-appears to have a perceptual locus.
“A top-down effect that can be partially ascribed to memory does not mean it is not (also) an effect on perception, because part of what we call memoryvisual memoryappears to have a perceptual locus (D'Esposito & Postle 2015;Pratte & Tong 2014).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites D'Esposito & Postle 2015
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Pratte & Tong 2014
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationcitationThese studies show that expectations and knowledge affect virtually all aspects of visual perception.
“These studies show that expectations and knowledge affect virtually all aspects of visual perception.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningAll of those assumptions are wrong.
“All of those assumptions are wrong.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningVisual memory is not a back-end system; it is perceptual.
“Visual memory is not a back-end system, as F&S assume.It is perceptual.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationColor knowledge affects color appearance of images and even color afterimages.
“Color knowledge affects color appearance of images (Hansen et al. 2006) and even color afterimages (Lupyan 2015b).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Hansen et al. 2006
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Lupyan 2015b
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningStatic distinctions between perception, cognition, and emotion reflect much more about historical intellectual biases than about the true operations of the brain/mind.
“It is quite possibleindeed it seems likelythat static distinctions between perception, cognition, and emotion reflect much more about historical intellectual biases in the field of cognitive science than about the true operations of the brain/mind.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenOne can perfectly well individuate a system in terms of what it does regardless of whether the operations of the system are sensitive to information from outside.
“In fact, one can perfectly well individuate a system in terms of what it does (e.g., what computations it performs) regardless of whether the operations of the system are sensitive to information from outside.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenEarly vision is cognitively impenetrable because there are no direct cognitive effects on early vision.
“I agree that early vision is cognitively impenetrable because there are no direct cognitive effects on early vision.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenIt is in virtue of stable bottom-up models that one can begin to understand how top-down effects modulate visual processing.
“In fact, it is in virtue of stable bottom-up models that one can begin to understand how top-down effects modulate visual processing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationLate vision and hence the percept is directly cognitively penetrated because the perceptual processes of late vision use cognitive information as a resource and cognition modulates the processes of late vision.
“There is, however, substantial neuropsychological evidence that late vision and, hence, the percept is directly cognitively penetrated because the perceptual processes of late vision use cognitive information as a resource and, thus, cognition modulates the processes of late vision.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Raftopoulos 2009
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Raftopoulos 2011
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: Late vision is the stage in which the percept is constructed.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningTo this aim, attention enhances the activity of neurons in the cortical regions that encode the stimuli that most likely contain information relevant to the testing of the hypothesis.
“To this aim, attention enhances the activity of neurons in the cortical regions that encode the stimuli that most likely contain information relevant to the testing of the hypothesis.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Attention enhances the activity of neurons in the cortical regions that encode the attended stimuli.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningThe aim of this interplay is to enable perceivers to respond and eventually adapt their responses as they interact with the environment so that this interaction be successful.
“The aim of this interplay is to enable perceivers to respond and eventually adapt their responses as they interact with the environment so that this interaction be successful.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPeripheral attention selects the input to perception but does not affect how the processing operates.
“Peripheral attention selects the input to perception but does not affect how the processing operates (ibid, sect.4.5.1, para.1).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites ibid, sect.4.5.1, para.1
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe investigation of top-down effects on perception requires a rigorous definition of what qualifies as perceptual to begin with.
“The investigation of top-down effects on perception requires a rigorous definition of what qualifies as perceptual to begin with.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe timing of these cognitive effects places them within late vision but outside early vision, which means that late vision, but not early vision, is affected directly by cognition.
“The timing of these cognitive effects places them within late vision but outside early vision, which means that late vision, but not early vision, is affected directly by cognition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The N2 is elicited about 200-300 ms after stimulus onset in monkeys and humans, in the area V4 and in the inferotemporal cortex.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationTo perceive the world is to use what you know to explain away the sensory signal across multiple spatial and temporal scales; the process of perception is inseparable from cognitive processes.
“Clark (2013) argues that to perceive the world is to use what you know to explain away the sensory signal across multiple spatial and temporal scales; the process of perception is inseparable from cognitive processes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Clark 2013 source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenCognition affects late vision in several ways, such as the application of concepts on some output of early vision so that hypotheses concerning the identities of distal objects can be formed and tested in order for the objects to be categorized and identified.
“There are several ways cognition affects late vision, such as the application of concepts on some output of early vision so that hypotheses concerning the identities of distal objects can be formed and tested in order for the objects to be categorized and identified.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningSuccess in such an endeavor relies on inferring correctly (or nearly so) the nature of the source of the incoming signal from the signal itself.
“Success in such an endeavor relies on inferring correctly (or nearly so) the nature of the source of the incoming signal from the signal itself.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThe N2 is considered to be a component of cognitively driven or sustained attention.
“Thus, N2 is considered to be a component of cognitively driven or sustained attention.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningThe cognitively driven direct attentional effects within late vision contribute to testing hypotheses concerning the putative distal causes of the sensory data encoded in the lower neuronal assemblies in the visual processing hierarchy.
“The cognitively driven direct attentional effects within late vision contribute to testing hypotheses concerning the putative distal causes of the sensory data encoded in the lower neuronal assemblies in the visual processing hierarchy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningWhen perceptual behavior is explained by invoking the role of peripheral attention, even if peripheral attention is guided by cognitive states, that does not entail perception being cognitively penetrated.
“Accordingly, the authors correctly conclude that when perceptual behavior is explained by invoking the role of peripheral attention, even if peripheral attention is guided by cognitive states, that does not entail perception being cognitively penetrated, a view also shared by the majority of philosophers (Zeimbekis & Raftopoulos 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Zeimbekis & Raftopoulos 2015
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe dividing line between perception and cognition is best attained at the functional level.
“Whereas Firestone & Scholl's (F&S's) phenomenological demarcation of perception from cognition appeals to intuition, we argue that the dividing line is best attained at the functional level.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationCognitively driven spatial and object/feature-centered attention, as expressed by the N2 ERP component, affects perceptual processing.
“Research suggests that cognitively driven spatial and object/feature-centered attention, as expressed by the N2 Event Related Potential (ERP) component, affects perceptual processing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Chelazzi et al. 1993
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Luck 1995
Not checked in the free run.
The paper relies on this without support.
The set of studies reporting top-down effects that the authors review is representative of all such studies.
“we count more than 175 papers published since 1995 reporting such effects”
“None of these hundreds of studieseither individually or collectivelyprovides compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception”
The paper relies on this without support.
The six pitfalls reviewed are the primary alternative explanations for reported top-down effects, and the literature review is comprehensive enough to support the claim that no alleged top-down effect has met these challenges.
“It is our view that no alleged top-down effect of cognition on perception has so far successfully met the challenges collectively embodied by the pitfalls we have reviewed.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The studies cited as evidence for the pitfalls are methodologically sound and their findings are reliable.
“for each alternative explanation we have offered here, we reviewed multiple case studies suggesting not only that it could matter (in principle), but also that it actually does matter (in practice)”
The paper relies on this without support.
The hippocampus is one of the few regions of the brain that has not been found to subserve multiple functions, despite intense study for decades.
“The hippocampus is one of the few regions of the brain that has not been found to subserve multiple”
The paper relies on this without support.
Category priming is more likely when terms are explicitly identifiable as being in the same category or at least as having multiple overlapping semantic features.
“Category priming is more likely when the terms are explicitly identifiable as being in the same category or at least as having multiple overlapping semantic features (e.g., pilot, airport).”
The paper relies on this without support.
Any observed behavior can be explained by multiple processes intervening between perceptual input and motor response.
“Any observed behavior can be explained by multiple processes intervening between perceptual input and motor response.”
The paper relies on this without support.
A single process rarely explains any behavior, and possible explanations are not always mutually exclusive.
“A single process rarely explains any behavior, and possible explanations are not always mutually exclusive.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The visual system consists of a proprietary set of mechanisms specialized for the analysis of signals originating from the retina.
“One can characterize the visual system as the set of brain mechanisms specialized for the analysis of signals originating from the retina.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Late vision is the stage in which the percept is constructed.
“late vision, the latter being the stage in which the percept is constructed.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Attention enhances the activity of neurons in the cortical regions that encode the attended stimuli.
“Attention is thought to enhance the activity of neurons in the cortical regions that encode the attended stimuli.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The N2 is elicited about 200-300 ms after stimulus onset in monkeys and humans, in the area V4 and in the inferotemporal cortex.
“The N2 is elicited about 200-300 ms after stimulus onset in monkeys and humans, in the area V4 and in the inferotemporal cortex.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Previous studies have shown perceptual biases with uninformative cues across a range of tasks, even in judgments of elementary visual properties like color.
“Previous studies have shown perceptual biases with uninformative cues (i.e., mere suggestions) across a range of tasks (27), even in judgments of elementary visual properties like color (28).”
From Social information creates self-fulfilling prophecies in judgments of pain, vicarious pain, and cognitive effort (2026) · cites this paper as [27]
Section 4.3.2 (page unavailable) says many studies report top-down effects in perceptual judgments and discusses possible demand and response bias. Section 3.4 (page unavailable) gives examples involving color and lightness. The cited paper does not establish that the cues in those studies were uninformative or merely suggestions; it also questions whether the reported biases reflect perception rather than responses. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredHumans have little access to the mechanisms underlying some of their psychology, such as perception.
“Similarly, humans are unreliable guides to their own inner workings: they are often overconfident in their explanatory knowledge (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002) and have little access to the mechanisms underlying some of their psychology (e.g., perception, see Firestone & Scholl, 2016).”
From Exploring the psychology of LLMs’ moral and legal reasoning (2024) · cites this paper as Firestone & Scholl, 2016
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Direction of dart-target size bias reverses
MinorThe paper first says inaccurate dart throwing led to smaller target-size estimates, but later describes explaining poor throws by inflating target-size estimates. These statements give opposite directions for the bias attributed to poor performance.
“Less-accurate throwing led to smaller target-size estimates, as if one's performance perceptually resized the target”
“Subjects who performed poorly while clinging to the rock-climbing wall had an obvious explanation for performing poorly and so had no need to explain their misses by inflating target-size estimates.”
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Spatial specificity of working memory representations in the early visual cortex
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Knowledge is power: How conceptual knowledge transforms visual cognition
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Perception of Lightness and Illumination in a World of One Reflectance
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The Predictive Coding Account of Psychosis
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Hallucinations and strong priors
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Suboptimality in perceptual decision making
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The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
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Behavioural and neural evidence for self-reinforcing expectancy effects on pain
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Hallucinations as Top-Down Effects on Perception
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Perceiving the World Through Group-Colored Glasses: A Perceptual Model of Intergroup Relations
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Exploring the psychology of LLMs’ moral and legal reasoning
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Paranoid and teleological thinking give rise to distinct social hallucinations in vision
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- Authors
- Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J.
- Affiliations
- Yale University (US)
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2015-07-20
- Volume
- 39
- Pages
- e229-e229
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2129245434
- Cited by
- 1,200
- References
- 309
- Citations by year
- 2026: 68 · 2025: 65 · 2024: 92 · 2023: 147 · 2022: 107 · 2021: 94 · 2020: 167 · 2019: 200 · 2018: 92 · 2017: 91 · 2016: 69 · 2015: 7
- FWCI
- 51.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philarchive.org
- Locations
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Taipei Medical University
- Taipei Medical University-Shuang Ho Hospital, Ministry of Health and Welfare
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Face Recognition and Perception
- Keywords
- top-down effects, visual perception, methodological pitfalls, linguistic representation
- MeSH terms
- Cognition, Emotions, Humans, Visual Perception, Intention
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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