Adverse Selection, Private Information, and Lowballing in Insurance Markets
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent contributions to the adverse selection literature have focused on a multiperiod competitive environment. In this setting a clean distinction arises between the predictions of competing models. Cooper and Hayes extend the model of Rothschild and Stiglitz to multiple periods. The result is a self-selecting equilibrium characterized by price highballing, or systematically overcharging new business. Kunreuther and Pauly suggest that information asymmetries between competing insurance firms render such price-quantity policies infeasible. Their model results in a pooling equilibrium that is characterized by price lowballing, or systematically undercharging new business. Our evidence is consistent with the Kunreuther and Pauly model and reveals the persistence of adverse selection in the automobile insurance market. Copyright 1990 by the University of Chicago.
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Citations
Cites
Status quo bias in decision making
Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00055564 · Cited by 5,897
Cited by
Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice
Cohen, A., & Einav, L. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.3.745 · Cited by 708
Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets
Cohen, A., & Siegelman, P. (2010) · Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6975.2009.01337.x · Cited by 418
Automobile insurance ratemaking in the presence of asymmetrical information
Dionne, G., & Vanasse, C. (1992) · Journal of Applied Econometrics · doi:10.1002/jae.3950070204 · Cited by 173
Consumer Information and Decisions to Switch Insurers
Schlesinger, H., & von der Schulenburg, J.-M. G. (1993) · The Journal of Risk and Insurance · doi:10.2307/253381 · Cited by 82
Non-risk price discrimination in insurance: Market outcomes and public policy
Guy Thomas, R. (2012) · The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice · doi:10.1057/gpp.2011.32 · Cited by 22
Cream Skimming: Innovations in Insurance Risk Classification and Adverse Selection
Cather, D. A. (2018) · Risk Management and Insurance Review · doi:10.1111/rmir.12102 · Cited by 22
Metadata
- Authors
- D'Arcy, S. P., & Doherty, N. A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Business
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1990-01
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 145
- ISSN
- 0021-9398 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5374
- OpenAlex
- W2011972526
- Cited by
- 151
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 13.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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