The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Piece-Rate Incentive Schemes
Abstract
This paper uses recent results from incentive theory to study heretofore informal critiques of piece-rate compensation schemes. The informal critiques are based on the history of failed attempts to install piece-rate compensation schemes at the turn of the century. The formal analysis emphasizes the importance of information and commitment in contracting. The main result is as follows. In a work environment characterized by hidden information and a hidden action, if neither the firm nor the worker can commit to future behavior, then no compensation scheme, piece-rate or otherwise, can induce the worker not to restrict output.
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Citations
Cites
An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
Mirrlees, J. A. (1971) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296779 · Cited by 4,510
Cited by
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets
Spence, M. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260136200 · Cited by 2,435
Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
Baker, G., Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118358 · Cited by 953
Self-citationPerformance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender
Dohmen, T., & Falk, A. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.2.556 · Cited by 739
The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911362 · Cited by 680
Performance standards in incentive contracts
Murphy, K. J. (2000) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00013-1 · Cited by 549
Jia, N., Huang, K. G., & Man Zhang, C. (2019) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2016.0543 · Cited by 532
Determinants and Effects of Subjectivity in Incentives
Gibbs, M., Merchant, K. A., Stede, W. A. V. D., & Vargus, M. E. (2004) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2004.79.2.409 · Cited by 486
The Role of Incentives in the Public Sector: Issues and Evidence
Burgess, S. (2003) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/19.2.285 · Cited by 369
Incentives Between Firms (and Within)
Gibbons, R. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0229 · Cited by 362
Self-citationA Behavioral Account of the Labor Market: The Role of Fairness Concerns
Fehr, E., Goette, L., & Zehnder, C. (2009) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143217 · Cited by 303
Human Resource Management and Productivity
Bloom, N., & Van Reenen, J. (2010) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w16019 · Cited by 287
Tournament Rewards and Risk Taking
Hvide, H. K. (2002) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/342041 · Cited by 277
Metadata
- Authors
- Gibbons, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1987-10
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 4, Part 1
- Pages
- 413-429
- ISSN
- 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5307
- OpenAlex
- W2044740802
- Cited by
- 199
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 5.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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