The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Tournament Rewards and Risk Taking
Open accessAbstract
I consider two seemingly unrelated puzzles. 1.Why is relative performance evaluation (RPE) used less in CEO compensation than agency theory suggests? 2.Why is sometimes, e.g., for fund managers, a 'modest' performance more highly rewarded than 'very high' performances? I consider a simple tournament model where agents can influence the spread of output in addition to its mean. I show that standard tournament rewards induce risky and lazy behavior from the agents. This finding sheds light on Puzzle 1. Second, I consider a scheme that ranks agents according to their relative closeness to a benchmark k. I show that there exists intermediate values of k such that the risky-lazy problem of the standard tournament can be mitigated, and first best level of effort can be implemented. This result sheds light on Puzzle 2.
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Cites
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003457 · Cited by 4,903
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E. P., & Rosen, S. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261010 · Cited by 4,560
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives
Chevalier, J., & Ellison, G. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/516389 · Cited by 2,290
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1983) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912246 · Cited by 2,095
Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry
BROWN, K. C., HARLOW, W. V., & STARKS, L. T. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05203.x · Cited by 1,485
Pay Equality and Industrial Politics
Lazear, E. P. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261616 · Cited by 1,201
Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition
Nalebuff, B. J., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003535 · Cited by 1,111
The Other Side of the Trade‐Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation
Aggarwal, R. K., & Samwick, A. A. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250051 · Cited by 1,037
Cited by
Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets: a Review and Synthesis
Hirshleifer, D., & Hong Teoh, S. (2003) · European Financial Management · doi:10.1111/1468-036x.00207 · Cited by 885
Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment
Apesteguia, J., & Palacios-Huerta, I. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.5.2548 · Cited by 305
Rankings and Risk‐Taking in the Finance Industry
KIRCHLER, M., LINDNER, F., & WEITZEL, U. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12701 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Hvide, H. K.
- Venue
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2002-10
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 877-898
- ISSN
- 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5307
- OpenAlex
- W1497982986
- Cited by
- 277
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 13.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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