The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political Correctness
Abstract
An informed advisor wishes to convey her valuable information to an uninformed decision maker with identical preferences. Thus she has a current incentive to truthfully reveal her information. But if the decision maker thinks that the advisor might be biased in favor of one decision and the advisor does not wish to be thought to be biased, the advisor has a reputational incentive to lie. If the advisor is sufficiently concerned about her reputation, no information is conveyed in equilibrium. In a repeated version of this game, the advisor will care (instrumentally) about her reputation simply because she wants her valuable and unbiased advice to have an impact on future decisions.
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Citations
Cites
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives
Chevalier, J., & Ellison, G. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/516389 · Cited by 2,290
Bernheim, B. D. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261957 · Cited by 1,304
Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers
Chevalier, J., & Ellison, G. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556034 · Cited by 848
Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning
Prendergast, C., & Stole, L. (1996) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262055 · Cited by 715
Managerial Incentives and Capital Management
Holmstrom, B., & Costa, J. R. I. (1986) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884180 · Cited by 671
Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
Benabou, R., & Laroque, G. (1992) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118369 · Cited by 565
Sobel, J. (1985) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297732 · Cited by 543
Campaign Contributions and Access
Austen-Smith, D. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082974 · Cited by 450
Cited by
Bad Greenwashing, Good Greenwashing: Corporate Social Responsibility and Information Transparency
Wu, Y., Zhang, K., & Xie, J. (2020) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3340 · Cited by 594
Credit Ratings as Coordination Mechanisms
Boot, A. W. A., Milbourn, T. T., & Schmeits, A. (2006) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhj009 · Cited by 482
Sasso, G., & Morelli, M. (2021) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104497 · Cited by 43
Metadata
- Authors
- Morris, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2001-04
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 231-265
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W4237019202
- Cited by
- 420
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 14.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
