The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reputation, Compliance, and International Law
Abstract
Increasingly skeptical about the efficiency and effectiveness of formal multilateral enforcement mechanisms, a growing number of international relations theorists and international lawyers have begun to argue that states’ reputational concerns are actually the principal mechanism for maintaining a high level of treaty compliance. This essay argues that there are a number of empirical and theoretical reasons for believing that the actual effects of reputation are both weaker and more complicated than the standard view of reputation suggests. While states have reason to revise their estimates of a state’s reputation following a defection or pattern of defections, they have reason to do so only in connection with those agreements that they believe are (1) affected by the same or similar sources of fluctuating compliance costs and (2) valued the same or less by the defecting state. Among the implications of this is that all but the newest states maintain multiple reputations.
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Cites
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Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern Gatt Legal System
Hudec, R. (1993) · Cited by 451
Reputation and international politics
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Alter, K. J., & Meunier, S. (2009) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592709090033 · Cited by 1,012
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Hathaway, O. A. (2007) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002707303046 · Cited by 582
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Guzman, A. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305562.001.0001 · Cited by 510
Rationality and Psychology in International Politics
Mercer, J. (2005) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818305050058 · Cited by 457
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Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior
Hill, D. W. (2010) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381610000599 · Cited by 303
Treaty Compliance and Violation
Simmons, B. (2010) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.040907.132713 · Cited by 291
Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover
ALLEE, T. L., & HUTH, P. K. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062125 · Cited by 263
Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment
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“While this argument about the constraining effect of global capital is both compelling and plausible, some previous scholars have highlighted the limitations of reputational explanations of international cooperation (Downs and Jones 2002; Mercer 1996).”
Reputational Concerns and the Emergence of Oil Sector Transparency as an International Norm
Gillies, A. (2010) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00579.x · Cited by 161
Metadata
- Authors
- Downs, G. W., & Jones, M. A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Legal Studies
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- S1
- Pages
- S95-S114
- ISSN
- 0047-2530 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5366
- OpenAlex
- W1565321128
- Cited by
- 334
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 14.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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