The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Evolution of Cooperation through Reciprocal Altruism with Variable Investment
Abstract
Understanding the evolutionary origin and persistence of cooperative behavior is a fundamental biological problem. The standard "prisoner's dilemma," which is the most widely adopted framework for studying the evolution of cooperation through reciprocal altruism between unrelated individuals, does not allow for varying degrees of cooperation. Here we study the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma, in which cooperative investments can vary continuously in each round. This game has been previously considered for a class of reactive strategies in which current investments are based on the partner's previous investment. In the standard iterated prisoner's dilemma, such strategies are inferior to strategies that take into account both players' previous moves, as is exemplified by the evolutionary dominance of "Pavlov" over "tit for tat." Consequently, we extend the analysis of the continuous prisoner's dilemma to a class of strategies in which current investments depend on previous payoffs and, hence, on both players' previous investments. We show, both analytically and by simulation, that payoff-based strategies, which embody the intuitively appealing idea that individuals invest more in cooperative interactions when they profit from these interactions, provide a natural explanation for the gradual evolution of cooperation from an initially noncooperative state and for the maintenance of cooperation thereafter.
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Citations
Cites
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 2,700
A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
Nowak, M., & Sigmund, K. (1993) · Nature · doi:10.1038/364056a0 · Cited by 1,797
Wilson, D. S. (1975) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.72.1.143 · Cited by 1,259
Ostracism and indirect reciprocity: The reproductive significance of humor
Alexander, R. D. (1986) · Ethology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1016/0162-3095(86)90052-x · Cited by 137 · cited 2×
“…1999), which may, in particular, provide a natural explanation of how cooperation can evolve among very simple organisms; and indirect reciprocity (Alexander 1986; Nowak and Sigmund 1998), which may provide a new type of explanation for cooperative behavior among humans and perhaps some higher…”
Background
Cited by
Sumpter, D. J. T. (2010) · doi:10.1515/9781400837106 · Cited by 914
Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game
Doebeli, M., & Hauert, C. (2005) · Ecology Letters · doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2005.00773.x · Cited by 871
Self-citationThe evolution of cooperation and altruism – a general framework and a classification of models
Lehmann, L., & Keller, L. (2006) · Journal of Evolutionary Biology · doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2006.01119.x · Cited by 810
Sanctions, Cooperation, and the Stability of Plant-Rhizosphere Mutualisms
Kiers, E. T., & Denison, R. F. (2008) · Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics · doi:10.1146/annurev.ecolsys.39.110707.173423 · Cited by 345
The Evolutionary Origin of Cooperators and Defectors
Doebeli, M., Hauert, C., & Killingback, T. (2004) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1101456 · Cited by 331
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Metadata
- Authors
- Killingback, T., & Doebeli, M.
- Venue
- The American Naturalist
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2002-10
- Volume
- 160
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 421-438
- ISSN
- 0003-0147 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5323
- OpenAlex
- W2077299599
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 11.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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