Cited by 2,700Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorLanguage and cultural evolution

Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring

Nowak, Martin A., Sigmund, Karl·1998·Nature

Abstract

Darwinian evolution has to provide an explanation for cooperative behaviour. Theories of cooperation are based on kin selection (dependent on genetic relatedness), group selection and reciprocal altruism. The idea of reciprocal altruism usually involves direct reciprocity: repeated encounters between the same individuals allow for the return of an altruistic act by the recipient. Here we present a new theoretical framework, which is based on indirect reciprocity and does not require the same two individuals ever to meet again. Individual selection can nevertheless favour cooperative strategies directed towards recipients that have helped others in the past. Cooperation pays because it confers the image of a valuable community member to the cooperating individual. We present computer simulations and analytic models that specify the conditions required for evolutionary stability of indirect reciprocity. We show that the probability of knowing the 'image' of the recipient must exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act. We propose that the emergence of indirect reciprocity was a decisive step for the evolution of human societies.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1038/31225

Cites

34 of 34 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Individual-based simulations show that if the cost-to-benefit ratio is sufficiently low, and the amount of information about the co-player's past sufficiently high, cooperation based on discrimination can emerge.

    “Individual-based simulations show that if the cost-to-benefit ratio is sufficiently low, and the amount of information about the co-player's past sufficiently high, cooperation based on discrimination can emerge.”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [36]

  • In the resulting population, help is channelled towards those who help.

    “In the resulting population, help is channelled towards those who help 35-37 .”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [36]

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Michod, R. E. & Sanderson, M. J. in Evolution: Essays in Honor of John Maynard Smith (eds Greenwood, P. J., Harvey, P. & Slatkin, M.) 95–106 (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, (1985).
  2. Wilson, E. O. Sociobiology (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, (1975).
  3. Sudgen, R. The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare (Blackwell, Oxford, (1986).

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K.
Affiliations
  • University of Oxford (GB)
  • University of Vienna (AT)
Corresponding author
Nowak, Martin A.
Venue
Nature
Published
1998-06
Volume
393
Issue
6685
Pages
573-577
ISSN
  • 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
  • 1476-4687
OpenAlex
W2154715890
Cited by
2,700
References
34
Citations by year
2026: 102 · 2025: 114 · 2024: 99 · 2023: 124 · 2022: 116 · 2021: 117 · 2020: 105 · 2019: 107 · 2018: 124 · 2017: 117 · 2016: 138 · 2015: 129 · 2014: 155 · 2013: 110 · 2012: 117
FWCI
96.04
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Nature (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • IIASA PURE (International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
Keywords
indirect reciprocity, evolution of cooperation, image scoring, reputation, evolutionary stability, reciprocal altruism, kin selection, group selection, individual selection, benefit-cost ratio, evolution of human society
MeSH terms
Altruism, Computer Simulation, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Helping Behavior, Humans, Mutation, Selection, Genetic

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review