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Cited by 132Corruption and Economic DevelopmentPublic Procurement and PolicyPublic Policy and Administration Research

Lights on the shadows of public procurement: Transparency as an antidote to corruption

Bauhr, Monika, Czibik, Ágnes, de Fine Licht, Jenny, Fazekas, Mihály·2020·Governance
DOI 10.1111/gove.12432
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Abstract

The increased focus on marketizing mechanisms and contracting‐out operations following the New Public Management reform agenda has sparked a debate on whether the close interactions between public and private actors might drive corruption in the public sector. The main response to those worries has been increased transparency, but so far empirical evidence of its efficiency remains scant and mixed. This article argues that the beneficial effects of transparency on corruption are contingent on type of transparency, and in particular, who the intended receiver of the information is. Drawing on newly collected data of more than 3.5 million government contracts between 2006 and 2015, the analysis shows that overall tender transparency reduces corruption risks substantially, yet that the effect is largely driven by ex ante transparency, that is, transparency that allows for horizontal monitoring by insiders in the bidding process.

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Authors
Bauhr, M., Czibik, Á., de Fine Licht, J., & Fazekas, M.
Affiliations
  • University of Gothenburg (SE)
  • Government Transparency Institute
  • University of Gothenburg
  • Central European University (AT)
ORCID
Venue
Governance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2019-08-13
Volume
33
Issue
3
Pages
495-523
ISSN
  • 0952-1895 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0491
DOI
10.1111/gove.12432
OpenAlex
W2967037639
Cited by
131
References
80
Citations by year
2026: 21 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 32 · 2023: 28 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 1
FWCI
17.10
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)
Locations
Governance (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Public Procurement and Policy
  • Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
Keywords
public procurement, corruption, transparency, New Public Management, outsourcing, public-private relations

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