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Cited by 324

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate from Welfare to Work

Open access
van den Berg, Gerard J., van der Klaauw, Bas, van Ours, Jan C.·2004·Journal of Labor Economics

Abstract

In the Netherlands, the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low. Most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency. If they do not, then a sanction in the form of a temporary benefit reduction can be imposed. This article investigates the effect of such sanctions on the transition rate from welfare to work using a unique set of rich register data on welfare recipients. We find that the imposition of sanctions substantially increases the individual transition rate from welfare to work.

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Metadata

Authors
van den Berg, G. J., van der Klaauw, B., & van Ours, J. C.
Venue
Journal of Labor Economics
Published
2004-01
Volume
22
Issue
1
Pages
211-241
ISSN
  • 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5307
OpenAlex
W3023152110
Cited by
324
References
19
FWCI
51.54
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate from Welfare to Work. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/380408
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van den Berg, G. J., van der Klaauw, B., & van Ours, J. C. (2004). Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate from Welfare to Work. Journal of Labor Economics. https://doi.org/10.1086/380408

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.