The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Management Turnover and Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud
Abstract
Fraud scandals can create incentives to change managers in an attempt to improve the firm's performance, recover lost reputational capital, or limit the firm's exposure to liabilities that arise from the fraud. It also is possible that the revelation of fraud creates incentives to change the composition of the firm's board, to improve the external monitoring of managers, or to rent new directors' valuable reputational or political capital. Despite such claims, we find little systematic evidence that firms suspected or charged with fraud have unusually high turnover among senior managers or directors. In univariate comparisons, there is some evidence that firms committing fraud have higher managerial and director turnover. But in multivariate tests that control for other firm attributes, such evidence disappears. These findings indicate that the revelation of fraud does not, in general, increase the net benefits to changing managers or the firm's leadership structure.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
JENSEN, M. C. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x · Cited by 8,528
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
Yermack, D. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 · Cited by 6,603
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
DECHOW, P. M., SLOAN, R. G., & SWEENEY, A. P. (1996) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1911-3846.1996.tb00489.x · Cited by 4,065
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
(1997) · CFA Digest · doi:10.2469/dig.v27.n2.79 · Cited by 3,518
New York University Law Review
Rawls, J. (2017) · Justice · doi:10.4324/9781315193496-11 · Cited by 2,872
Posner, R. A. (1974) · Stanford Law Review · doi:10.2307/1227682 · Cited by 2,239
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
JENSEN, M. C. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2329018 · Cited by 1,666
Stock prices and top management changes
Warner, J. B., Watts, R. L., & Wruck, K. H. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90054-2 · Cited by 1,568
Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Jarrell, G. (1997) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/s0929-1199(96)00013-2 · Cited by 1,526
Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals
DENIS, D. J., & DENIS, D. K. (1995) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04049.x · Cited by 1,010
The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers
Jarrell, G., & Peltzman, S. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261313 · Cited by 638
The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud
Karpoff, J. M., & Lott (1993) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467297 · Cited by 555
Self-citationFinancial Policy and Reputation for Product Quality
Maksimovic, V., & Titman, S. (1991) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/4.1.175 · Cited by 533
CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis
GILSON, S. C., & VETSUYPENS, M. R. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04722.x · Cited by 484
The reputational penalty firms bear from committing criminal fraud
Karpoff, J. M., & Lott, J. R. (1996) · The Economics of Organised Crime · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511751882.018 · Cited by 434
Self-citationThe Impact of Industry Classifications on Financial Research
Kahle, K. M., & Walkling, R. A. (1996) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2331394 · Cited by 376
Environmental Violations, Legal Penalties, and Reputation Costs
Karpoff, J. M., Lott, J. R., & Rankine, G. (1998) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.137952 · Cited by 285
Self-citationInsider Trading, Equity Issues, and CEO Turnover in Firms Subject to Securities Class Action
Niehaus, G., & Roth, G. (1999) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3666303 · Cited by 179
Defense Procurement Fraud, Penalties, and Contractor Influence
Karpoff, J. M., Lee, D. S., & Vendrzyk, V. P. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250080 · Cited by 164
Self-citationCrisis in the Cockpit? The Role of Market Forces in Promoting Air Travel Safety
Mitchell, M. L., & Maloney, M. T. (1989) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467180 · Cited by 136
Why do corporations become criminals? Ownership, hidden actions, and crime as an agency cost
Alexander, C. R., & Cohen, M. A. (1999) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/s0929-1199(98)00015-7 · Cited by 132
Mitchell, M. L. (1989) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1989.tb00792.x · Cited by 114
On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: EvidencePreprint
Alexander, C. R. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1522519 · Cited by 47
Outside Directors, Politics, and Firm PerformancePreprint
Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. R. (1998) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.85310 · Cited by 24
Self-citation
Cited by
The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001 · Cited by 1,494
The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books
Karpoff, J. M., Lee, D. S., & Martin, G. S. (2008) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109000004221 · Cited by 1,301
Self-citationRestoring Trust after Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter?
Farber, D. B. (2005) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2005.80.2.539 · Cited by 1,239
Erkens, D. H., Hung, M., & Matos, P. (2012) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.01.005 · Cited by 1,202
SRINIVASAN, S. (2005) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2005.00172.x · Cited by 1,044
Metadata
- Authors
- Agrawal, A., Jaffe, J. F., & Karpoff, J. M.
- Venue
- The Journal of Law and Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1999-04
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- S1
- Pages
- 309-342
- ISSN
- 0022-2186 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5285
- OpenAlex
- W1977464646
- Cited by
- 314
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 11.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.