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On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence
Abstract
Recent literature on optimal sanctions for corporations has focused on coordination and refinement of criminal, civil, and market‐based sanctions. This paper contributes to emerging evidence on the reputational penalties that public corporations pay for federal crimes. First, it is shown that offenses harming only private parties and not government tend to be addressed through civil or market‐based and not criminal sanctions. Second, when criminal allegations do arise, they are often surrounded by reports of terminated or suspended customer relationships and of management or employee turnover. These reports are more frequent if damaged parties are customers, as in fraud, than if they are third parties, as in environmental crime, and if stock prices decline significantly at the first news of crime. All of these features are consistent with characterizations of reputational penalties found in the literature. Findings on the nonatomistic nature of damaged parties suggest directions for future research.
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Cites
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Cited by
The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books
Karpoff, J. M., Lee, D. S., & Martin, G. S. (2008) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109000004221 · Cited by 1,301
Organizations Gone Wild: The Causes, Processes, and Consequences of Organizational Misconduct
Greve, H. R., Palmer, D. A., & Pozner, J. (2010) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416521003654186 · Cited by 800
The Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence
Karpoff, J. M., Lott, Jr., & Wehrly, E. W. (2005) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/430806 · Cited by 777
The consequences to managers for financial misrepresentation
Karpoff, J. M., Scott Lee, D., & Martin, G. S. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.06.003 · Cited by 761
Public and private enforcement of securities laws: Resource-based evidence
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The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation
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Amiram, D., Bozanic, Z., Cox, J. D., Dupont, Q., Karpoff, J. M., & Sloan, R. (2018) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-017-9435-x · Cited by 422
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Gatzert, N. (2015) · European Management Journal · doi:10.1016/j.emj.2015.10.001 · Cited by 256
Effects of Ethics and Performance Management on Organizational Performance in the Public Sector
Khaltar, O., & Moon, M. J. (2020) · Public Integrity · doi:10.1080/10999922.2019.1615163 · Cited by 45
Metadata
- Authors
- Alexander, C. R.
- Venue
- The Journal of Law and Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1999-04
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- S1
- Pages
- 489-526
- ISSN
- 0022-2186 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5285
- OpenAlex
- W3122175738
- Cited by
- 179
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 5.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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