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Firm Value and Managerial Incentives: A Stochastic Frontier Approach*
Open accessAbstract
We provide a direct estimate of the magnitude of agency costs in publicly held corporations. We compute an explicit performance benchmark that compares a firm's actual Tobin's Q to the Q* of a hypothetical value-maximizing firm having the same inputs and characteristics as the original firm. The Q of the average sample firm is around 16% below its Q*, equivalent to a $1,432 million reduction in its potential market value. We relate the shortfall to the incentives provided CEOs. Boards appear to grant CEOs too few shares and too many options that are insufficiently sensitive to firm risk.
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Citations
Cites
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Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia
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Cited by
Fixed and Random Effects in Stochastic Frontier Models
Greene, W. (2005) · Journal of Productivity Analysis · doi:10.1007/s11123-004-8545-1 · Cited by 1,116
The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The Impact of Prices on Takeovers
EDMANS, A., GOLDSTEIN, I., & JIANG, W. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01738.x · Cited by 674
A Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium
Edmans, A., Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn117 · Cited by 559
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958 · Cited by 542
Conceptualizing and measuring capabilities: methodology and empirical application
Dutta, S., Narasimhan, O., & Rajiv, S. (2005) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.442 · Cited by 507
Financial Intermediation and the Costs of Trading in an Opaque Market
Green, R. C., Hollifield, B., & Schürhoff, N. (2007) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhl012 · Cited by 378
CEO compensation and corporate risk: Evidence from a natural experiment
Gormley, T. A., Matsa, D. A., & Milbourn, T. (2013) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.08.001 · Cited by 378
Does Size Matter in Firm Performance? Evidence from US Public Firms
Lee, J. (2009) · International Journal of the Economics of Business · doi:10.1080/13571510902917400 · Cited by 336
How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance?
Hoechle, D., Schmid, M., Walter, I., & Yermack, D. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025 · Cited by 315
Executive pay and shareholder litigation
Peng, L., & Röell, A. (2008) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfl003 · Cited by 264
Metadata
- Authors
- Habib, M. A., & Ljungqvist, A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Business
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2005-11
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2053-2094
- ISSN
- 0021-9398 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5374
- OpenAlex
- W3121869535
- Cited by
- 214
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 33.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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