The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium
Open accessAbstract
Existing compensation models typically assume that e¤ort has additive e¤ects on CEO utility. This paper considers multiplicative speci…cations for the principal-agent problem, and further embeds the problem into a talent assignment model. The result is a uni-…ed framework endogenizing both incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. The predictions generated by multiplicative speci…cations match a number of stylized facts inconsistent with an additive model. First, the negative relationship between the CEO’s e¤ective equity stake and …rm size can be quantitatively explained by an optimal contracting model and thus need not re‡ect rent extraction. Second, our multiplicative setting predicts that the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in …rm value, scaled by annual pay, is independent of …rm size and thus a desirable empirical measure. This independence is con…rmed in the data. Third, incentive compensation is e¤ective at solving large agency problems, such as strategy choice, but smaller issues such
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261354 · Cited by 6,236
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
Epstein, L. G., & Zin, S. E. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913778 · Cited by 4,262
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913238 · Cited by 2,859
New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., & Stafford, E. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.103 · Cited by 2,798
(2008) · Corporate Financial Strategy · doi:10.4324/9780080942841-11 · Cited by 2,390
Jackson, E. L., Cohen, K. J., & Cyert, R. M. (1966) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1054885 · Cited by 2,288
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1983) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912246 · Cited by 2,095
Cited by
Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder value maximization: Evidence from mergers
Deng, X., Kang, J.-K., & Low, B. S. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.04.014 · Cited by 1,647
Does Stock Liquidity Enhance or Impede Firm Innovation?
FANG, V. W., TIAN, X., & TICE, S. (2014) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12187 · Cited by 1,339
Power Laws in Economics and Finance
Gabaix, X. (2009) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.142940 · Cited by 907
Self-citationGeneralists versus specialists: Lifetime work experience and chief executive officer pay
Custódio, C., Ferreira, M. A., & Matos, P. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.01.001 · Cited by 745
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958 · Cited by 542
Metadata
- Authors
- Edmans, A., Gabaix, X., & Landier, A.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2008-12-24
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 4881-4917
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2063503639
- Cited by
- 559
- References
- 57
- FWCI
- 111.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/rfs/hhn117
- The paper
- Edmans, A., Gabaix, X., & Landier, A. (2009). A Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium. Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn117
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.