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Cited by 264

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Executive pay and shareholder litigation

Peng, Lin, Röell, Ailsa·2008·Review of Finance

Abstract

The paper examines the impact of executive compensation on private securities litigation. We find that incentive pay in the form of options increases the probability of securities class action litigation, holding constant a wide range of firm characteristics. We further document that there is abnormal upward earnings manipulation during litigation class periods and that insiders exercise more options and sell more shares during class periods, but that this activity is largely driven by pre-existing option holdings of the managers. Our results suggest that option-based compensation may have the unintended side effect of giving executives an incentive to focus excessively on the short term share price.

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Crossref · 10.1093/rof/rfl003

Cites

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Metadata

Authors
Peng, L., & Röell, A.
Venue
Review of Finance
Published
2007-01-31
Volume
12
Issue
1
Pages
141-184
ISSN
  • 1382-6662 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-692X
  • 1572-3097
OpenAlex
W2024711075
Cited by
264
References
53
FWCI
45.76
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Executive pay and shareholder litigation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/rof/rfl003
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Peng, L., & Röell, A. (2008). Executive pay and shareholder litigation. Review of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfl003

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.