The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Market for Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs
Open accessAbstract
This paper considers the costs of reducing consumption of a good by making its production illegal and punishing apprehended illegal producers. We use illegal drugs as a prominent example. We show that the more inelastic either demand for or supply of a good is, the greater the increase in social cost from further reducing its production by greater enforcement efforts. So optimal public expenditures on apprehension and conviction of illegal suppliers depend not only on the difference between the social and private values from consumption but also on these elasticities. When demand and supply are not too elastic, it does not pay to enforce any prohibition unless the social value is negative. We also show that a monetary tax could cause a greater reduction in output and increase in price than optimal enforcement against the same good would if it were illegal, even though some producers may go underground to avoid a monetary tax. When enforcement is costly, excise taxes and quantity restrictions are not equivalent.
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Citations
Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Self-citationA Theory of Rational Addiction
Becker, G. S., & Murphy, K. M. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261558 · Cited by 3,823
Self-citationWeitzman, M. L. (1974) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296698 · Cited by 2,071
Sourcebook of criminal justice statistics
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42sup-0669 · Cited by 832
A Simple Theory of Advertising as a Good or Bad
Becker, G. S., & Murphy, K. M. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118455 · Cited by 728
Self-citationDrug War Heresies: Learning from Other Vices, Times, and Places
MacCoun, R. J., & Reuter, P. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511754272 · Cited by 675
Saffer, H., & Chaloupka, F. (1999) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1999.tb01439.x · Cited by 338
The demand for cocaine by young adults: a rational addiction approach
Grossman, M., & Chaloupka, F. J. (1998) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/s0167-6296(97)00046-5 · Cited by 284
Self-citationThe Price Elasticity of Hard Drugs: The Case of Opium in the Dutch East Indies, 1923-1938
OURS, J. C. V. (1995) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261983 · Cited by 141
A Reason for Quantity Regulation
Glaeser, E. L., & Shleifer, A. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.2.431 · Cited by 128
Cited by
Does liberalizing cannabis laws increase cannabis use?
Williams, J., & Bretteville-Jensen, A. L. (2014) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.03.006 · Cited by 95
Economists’ Contribution to the Study of Crime and the Criminal Justice System
Bushway, S., & Reuter, P. (2008) · Crime and Justice · doi:10.1086/524283 · Cited by 71
Metadata
- Authors
- Becker, G. S., Murphy, K. M., & Grossman, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2006-02
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 38-60
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2057062690
- Cited by
- 254
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 24.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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