The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations
Abstract
Ten of the 15 seats on the U.N. Security Council are held by rotating members serving two‐year terms. We find that a country’s U.S. aid increases by 59 percent and its U.N. aid by 8 percent when it rotates onto the council. This effect increases during years in which key diplomatic events take place (when members’ votes should be especially valuable), and the timing of the effect closely tracks a country’s election to, and exit from, the council. Finally, the U.N. results appear to be driven by UNICEF, an organization over which the United States has historically exerted great control.
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Citations
Cites
Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset
GLEDITSCH, N. P., WALLENSTEEN, P., ERIKSSON, M., SOLLENBERG, M., & STRAND, H. (2002) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343302039005007 · Cited by 3,846 · cited 2×
“The first, representing “outlier” political activity, captures whether a war with at least 1,000 battle deaths was occurring in the recipient country; these data come from the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (Gleditsch et al. 2002).”
Burnside, C., & Dollar, D. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.847 · Cited by 3,728
Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?
Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/a:1009874203400 · Cited by 2,485
The Theory of Political Coalitions
Brazil, B. R., & Riker, W. S. (1963) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/445870 · Cited by 2,106
The Theory of Political Coalitions.
Hotz, A. J., & Riker, W. H. (1963) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109034 · Cited by 1,528
The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics
Mitra, D., & Easterly, W. (2002) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061505 · Cited by 1,493
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The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes
Levitt, S. D., & Snyder (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262064 · Cited by 367
Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947-1968
Reichard, G. W., & Ferejohn, J. A. (1975) · The Journal of American History · doi:10.2307/1901399 · Cited by 354
Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid during and after the Cold War
Meernik, J., Krueger, E. L., & Poe, S. C. (1998) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2648001 · Cited by 340
Cited by
US Food Aid and Civil Conflict
Nunn, N., & Qian, N. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.6.1630 · Cited by 2,032
The Design of International Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Dataset
Elsig, M., Dür, A., & Baccini, L. (2014) · doi:10.7892/boris.49460 · Cited by 745
The Logic of Political Violence
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr025 · Cited by 450
Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council
Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E., & Vreeland, J. R. (2009) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.03.002 · Cited by 441
de Mesquita, B. B., & Smith, A. (2009) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818309090109 · Cited by 395
Metadata
- Authors
- Kuziemko, I., & Werker, E.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2006-10
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 905-930
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2128823216
- Cited by
- 801
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 100.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
