The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
You Can’t Save Alone: Commitment in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations in Kenya
Abstract
This article examines one reason why individuals develop and maintain local‐level financial savings organizations known as rotating savings and credit organizations, or Roscas. Economic theories suggest that individuals form Roscas to finance the purchase of a lumpy durable good, in response to intrahousehold conflict over savings, or to provide themselves with insurance. The article proposes an additional hypothesis for Rosca participation: saving requires discipline, and some Roscas may be formed to provide a collective mechanism for commitment in the presence of time‐inconsistent preferences. Data from 70 Roscas located in western Kenya indicate that the commitment hypothesis is plausible and broadly consistent with the design and patterns of participation in these Roscas. As many Rosca participants put it, “You can’t save alone.”
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Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence From a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines
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On Second-Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium Growth
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Women Empowerment and Economic Development
Duflo, E. (2012) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.50.4.1051 · Cited by 2,978
Savings Constraints and Microenterprise Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya
Dupas, P., & Robinson, J. (2013) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.5.1.163 · Cited by 959
Why Don't the Poor Save More? Evidence from Health Savings Experiments
Dupas, P., & Robinson, J. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.4.1138 · Cited by 683
Savings by and for the Poor: A Research Review and Agenda
Karlan, D., Ratan, A. L., & Zinman, J. (2014) · Review of Income and Wealth · doi:10.1111/roiw.12101 · Cited by 548
Female Empowerment: Impact of a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines
Karlan, D., Ashraf, N., Yin, W., Karlan, D., Ashraf, N., & Yin, W. (2006) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.28380 · Cited by 466
Metadata
- Authors
- Gugerty, M. K.
- Venue
- Economic Development and Cultural Change
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2007-01
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 251-282
- ISSN
- 0013-0079 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-2988
- OpenAlex
- W2028605648
- Cited by
- 346
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 18.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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