The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives
Abstract
This paper examines a potential agency conflict between mutual fund investors and mutual fund companies. Investors would like the fund company to use its judgment to maximize risk‐adjusted fund returns. A fund company, however, in its desire to maximize its value as a concern, has an incentive to take actions that increase the inflow of investments. We use a semiparametric model to estimate the shape of the flow‐performance relationship for a sample of growth and growth and income funds observed over the 1982–92 period. The shape of the flow‐performance relationship creates incentives for fund managers to increase or decrease the riskiness of the fund that are dependent on the fund's year‐to‐date return. We examine portfolio holdings of mutual funds in September and December and show that mutual funds do alter the riskiness of their portfolios at the end of the year in a manner consistent with these incentives.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citation
Cited by
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets
Berk, J. B., & Green, R. C. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/424739 · Cited by 2,083
The Geography of Investment: Informed Trading and Asset Prices
Coval, J. D., & Moskowitz, T. J. (2001) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/322088 · Cited by 2,002
Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows
KAPLAN, S. N., & SCHOAR, A. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00780.x · Cited by 1,946
Asset fire sales (and purchases) in equity markets
Coval, J., & Stafford, E. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.09.007 · Cited by 1,672
Metadata
- Authors
- Chevalier, J., & Ellison, G.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1997-12
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1167-1200
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2033772453
- Cited by
- 2,290
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 49.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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