Cited by 2,083Financial Markets and Investment StrategiesCorporate Finance and GovernanceFinancial Analysis and Corporate Governance

Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets

Berk, Jonathan B., Green, Richard C.·2004·Journal of Political Economy

Abstract

We develop a simple rational model of active portfolio management that provides a natural benchmark against which to evaluate observed relationship between returns and fund flows. We show that many effects widely regarded as anomalous are consistent with this simple explanation. In the model, investments with active managers do not outperform passive benchmarks because of the competitive market for capital provision, combined with decreasing returns to scale in active portfolio management. Consequently, past performance cannot be used to predict future returns, or to infer the average skill level of active managers. The lack of persistence in active manager returns does not imply that differential ability across managers is nonexistent or unrewarded, that gathering information about performance is socially wasteful, or that chasing performance is pointless. A strong relationship between past performance and the ow of funds exists in our model, indeed this is the market mechanism that ensures that no predictability in performance exists. Calibrating the model to the fund flows and survivorship rates, we find these features of the data are consistent with the vast majority (80%) of active managers having at least enough skill to make back their fees.

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Crossref · 10.1086/424739

Cites

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  • If the market was largely comprised of investors who solely maximized profits, they would undo the effects of investors with a preference for sustainability, resulting in zero net flows.

    “If the market was largely comprised of the investors of Berk and Green (2004) who solely maximized prots, these investors who did not value sustainability would undo the eects of investors with a preference for sustainability, resulting in zero net ows.”

    From Do Investors Value Sustainability? A Natural Experiment Examining Ranking and Fund Flows (2019) · cites this paper as Berk and Green 2004

    The Introduction (page unavailable) describes a model of rational, self-interested investors, and §2 explains that their fund flows compete away expected excess returns. The paper does not address sustainability preferences or say that profit-seeking investors would offset sustainability-driven investment to produce zero net flows. Its zero refers to expected excess returns, not flows. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • If a small subset of investors had strong preferences for sustainability while most investors did not directly value sustainability, under standard models there would be no effect of the ratings on net flows.

    “If a small subset of investors had strong preferences for sustainability while most investors did not directly value sustainability, under standard models (e.g.Berk and Green 2004) we would not nd an eect of the ratings on net ows.”

    From Do Investors Value Sustainability? A Natural Experiment Examining Ranking and Fund Flows (2019) · cites this paper as Berk and Green 2004

    Section 3, “The Model,” describes fund flows responding to expected excess returns, supporting the citation as an example of a rational fund-flow model. It does not consider sustainability ratings or investors with differing sustainability preferences, so it does not establish that ratings would have no effect on net flows in the stated scenario. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Funds have decreasing returns to scale.

    “Berk and Green (2004) assume that funds have decreasing returns to scale which is empirically supported by the ndings of Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Chen et al. (2004), Pástor et al. (2015) (though Reuter and Zitzewitz (2010) do not nd such an eect).”

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Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Brown, K., W. Harlow and L. Starks (1996), 'Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry,' Journal of Finance , 51 : 85-100.
  2. Brown, S.J. and W.H. Goetzmann, (1995), 'Performance Persistence,' Journal of Finance , 50 : 679-698.
  3. Chevalier, J. and G. Ellison (1999), 'Are Some Mutual Fund Managers Better than Others? Cross-Sectional Patterns in Behavior and Performance,' Journal of Finance , 54 : 875900.
  4. Chordia, T., (1996), 'The structure of mutual fund charges,' Journal of Financial Economics , 41 : 3-39.
  5. Ippolito, R. (1989), 'Efficiency with costly information: a study of mutual fund performance,' Quarterly Journal of Economics , 104 : 1-23.
  6. Ross, S.A., R.W. Westerfield and J.F. Jaffe, Corporate Finance (6th edition), McGraw-Hill Irwin (2002).
  7. Wermers, R. (2000), 'An Empirical Decomposition into Stock-Picking Talent, Style, Transaction Costs and Expenses,' Journal of Finance , 55 : 1655-1694.

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Authors
Berk, J. B., & Green, R. C.
Affiliations
  • National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
  • Carnegie Mellon University (US)
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Published
2004-12
Volume
112
Issue
6
Pages
1269-1295
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
OpenAlex
W3022326679
Cited by
2,083
References
16
Citations by year
2026: 118 · 2025: 123 · 2024: 179 · 2023: 135 · 2022: 128 · 2021: 130 · 2020: 130 · 2019: 105 · 2018: 106 · 2017: 97 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 93 · 2014: 72 · 2013: 92 · 2012: 105
FWCI
54.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Financial Analysis and Corporate Governance
Keywords
mutual fund flows, fund performance, active portfolio management, rational expectations, performance persistence, active vs passive investing, financial intermediaries, information aggregation

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