The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market
Abstract
We propose an estimation method to bound bidders’ marginal valuations in discriminatory auctions using individual bid-level data and apply the method to data from the Turkish Treasury auction market. Using estimated bounds on marginal values, we compute an upper bound on the inefficiency of realized allocations as well as bounds on how much additional revenue could have been realized in a counterfactual uniform price or Vickrey auction. We conclude that switching from a discriminatory auction to a uniform price or Vickrey auction would not significantly increase revenue. Moreover, such a switch would increase bidder expected surplus by at most 0.02 percent.
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Cites
An Introduction to the Bootstrap
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COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
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The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions
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Cited by
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
Ausubel, L. M., Cramton, P., Pycia, M., Rostek, M., & Weretka, M. (2014) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdu023 · Cited by 800
Hortaçsu, A., & Puller, S. L. (2008) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00005.x · Cited by 432
Self-citationMarket Mechanisms in Online Peer-to-Peer Lending
Wei, Z., & Lin, M. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2531 · Cited by 274
Metadata
- Authors
- Hortaçsu, A., & McAdams, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2010-10
- Volume
- 118
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 833-865
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2139800451
- Cited by
- 296
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 16.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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