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Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market
Abstract
We propose an estimation method to bound bidders’ marginal valuations in discriminatory auctions using individual bid-level data and apply the method to data from the Turkish Treasury auction market. Using estimated bounds on marginal values, we compute an upper bound on the inefficiency of realized allocations as well as bounds on how much additional revenue could have been realized in a counterfactual uniform price or Vickrey auction. We conclude that switching from a discriminatory auction to a uniform price or Vickrey auction would not significantly increase revenue. Moreover, such a switch would increase bidder expected surplus by at most 0.02 percent.
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Hortaçsu, A., & McAdams, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2010-10
- Volume
- 118
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 833-865
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2139800451
- Cited by
- 296
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 16.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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