The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Quitters Never Win: The (Adverse) Incentive Effects of Competing with Superstars
Abstract
Internal competition may motivate worker effort, yet the benefits of competition may depend critically on workers’ relative abilities: large skill differences may reduce efforts. I use panel data from professional golf tournaments and find that the presence of a superstar is associated with lower performance. On average, golfers’ first-round scores are approximately 0.2 strokes worse when Tiger Woods participates relative to when Woods is absent. The overall tournament effect is 0.8 strokes. The adverse superstar effect varies with the quality of Woods’s play. There is no evidence that reduced performance is attributable to media attention intensity or risky strategy adoption.
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Incentives and Problem Uncertainty in Innovation Contests: An Empirical Analysis
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Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes
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Guryan, J., Kroft, K., & Notowidigdo, M. J. (2009) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.1.4.34 · Cited by 431
Tournament Theory: Thirty Years of Contests and Competitions
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Metadata
- Authors
- Brown, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2011-10
- Volume
- 119
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 982-1013
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2171374112
- Cited by
- 380
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 45.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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