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Strategy and Dynamics in Contests
Abstract
This book describes the theory structure underlying contests, in which players expend effort and/or spend money in trying to get ahead of one another. Uniquely, this effort is sunk and cannot be recovered, regardless of whether a player wins or loses in the competition. Such interactions include diverse phenomena such as marketing and advertising by firms, litigation, relative reward schemes in firms, political competition, patent races, sports, military combat, war and civil war. These have been studied in the field of contest theory both within these specific contexts and at a higher level of abstraction. The purpose of this book is to describe the fundamental common properties of these types of interactions and to uncover some common properties or laws that govern them. The book begins by describing the properties of static contests and tournaments. Aspects such as timing, entry, sabotage and delegation are added and contest design issues such as the admission or exclusion of players and the structure of prizes are discussed. Further, structures are analysed in which players interact repeatedly in the same or different contest environments. Examples are inter-group conflict followed by intra-group rivalry, elimination tournaments and other dynamic contest structures.
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Citations
Cited by
Incentives and Problem Uncertainty in Innovation Contests: An Empirical Analysis
Boudreau, K. J., Lacetera, N., & Lakhani, K. R. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1322 · Cited by 830
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
Quitters Never Win: The (Adverse) Incentive Effects of Competing with Superstars
Brown, J. (2011) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/663306 · Cited by 380
Intergroup conflict and Intra-Group punishment in an experimental contest game
Abbink, K., Brandts, J., Herrmann, B., & Orzen, H. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.1.420 · Cited by 264
Collective action and the evolution of social norm internalization
Gavrilets, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1703857114 · Cited by 275
Metadata
- Authors
- Konrad, K. A.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2009-03-05
- OpenAlex
- W99529319
- Cited by
- 991
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 38.05
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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