Trustworthiness
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I present and defend an account of three-place trustworthiness according to which B is trustworthy with respect to A in domain of interaction D, if and only if she is competent with respect to that domain, and she would take the fact that A is counting on her, were A to do so in this domain, to be a compelling reason for acting as counted on. This is not the whole story of trustworthiness, however, for we want those we can count on to identify themselves so that we can place our trust wisely.
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“As Jones (2012) argues, however, being trustworthy also involves signalling to others what tasks one can (or cannot) be entrusted with, so others can calibrate their trust correctly.”
From A phenomenology and epistemology of large language models: transparency, trust, and trustworthiness (2024) · cites this paper as Jones (2012)
Citations
Cites
Baier, A. (1986) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/292745 · Cited by 2,567
Trust as an Affective Attitude
Jones, K. (1996) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/233694 · Cited by 1,227
Self-citationPETTIT, P. (1995) · Philosophy & Public Affairs · doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.1995.tb00029.x · Cited by 419
McGeer, V. (2008) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400801886413 · Cited by 357
Keller, S. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487590 · Cited by 216
A Virtue Ethical Account of Right Action
Swanton, C. (2001) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/322742 · Cited by 181
Two Arguments for Sentimentalism
D’Arms, J. (2005) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2005.00050.x · Cited by 115
Trust, Social Norms, and Motherhood
Mullin, A. (2005) · Journal of Social Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.2005.00278.x · Cited by 63
Research works printed but not linked: 8
- Haslanger Sally, 2000, Nos, 34, 31
- Pettit Philip, 1993, Society and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press
- Hume David, 1978, Clarendon, 367
- I, domain of interaction
- Baier, dependable habits
- Nevertheless, I think trust is not best seen as merely "counting on
- They give signs and assurances of their trustworthiness
- Royce Josiah, 1908, The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York: MacMillan
Cited by
Transparency and the black box problem: why we do not trust AI
von Eschenbach, W. J. (2021) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-021-00477-0 · Cited by 786
“What counts as good reasons for trusting is a matter of considerable debate, but at the very least that B is capable or competent to do X is necessary for A to trust B (Baier, 1986; Jones, 1996, 2012; Simpson, 2012).”
BackgroundTrustworthy journalism through AI
Opdahl, A. L., Tessem, B., Dang‐Nguyen, D., Motta, E., Setty, V., Throndsen, E., Tverberg, A., & Trattner, C. (2023) · Data & Knowledge Engineering · doi:10.1016/j.datak.2023.102182 · Cited by 203
Cognitive islands and runaway echo chambers: problems for epistemic dependence on experts
Nguyen, C. T. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1692-0 · Cited by 169
Trust as an Unquestioning Attitude
Nguyen, C. T. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192868978.003.0007 · Cited by 162
Trust and belief: a preemptive reasons account
Keren, A. (2014) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0416-3 · Cited by 156
Metadata
- Authors
- Jones, K.
- Corresponding author
- Jones, Karen
- Venue
- Ethics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2012-10
- Volume
- 123
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 61-85
- ISSN
- 0014-1704 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-297X
- OpenAlex
- W4255221555
- Cited by
- 244
- References
- 8
- Citations by year
- 2026: 38 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 34 · 2023: 25 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 26 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 3
- FWCI
- 14.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Ethics (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Keywords
- trustworthiness, trust, competence, reliance, reasons for action, identification
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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