EU ETS, Free Allocations, and Activity Level Thresholds: The Devil Lies in the Details
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
It is well known that discontinuous jumps or thresholds in tax or subsidies are socially inefficient, because they create incentives to make strategic behavioral changes that lead to substantial increases in private benefits. This paper investigates these distortions in the context of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, where activity level thresholds (ALTs) were introduced in Phase 3 to reduce the overallocation of free allowances to low-activity installations. Using installation-level data, we find evidence that cement producers indeed respond to such thresholds when confronted with low demand, by strategically adjusting output to obtain more free allocation. We estimate that in 2012, ALTs induced excess cement clinker production of 6.4 Mt (5% of total EU output), and in affected regions this further distorted trade patterns and reversed carbon intensity improvements. As intended, ALTs reduced free allocation by 4%; however, a linear scheme (output-based allocation) would have achieved a 32% reduction.
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Citations
Cites
Comparing policies to combat emissions leakage: Border carbon adjustments versus rebates
Fischer, C., & Fox, A. K. (2012) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2012.01.005 · Cited by 425
Demailly, D., & Quirion, P. (2006) · Climate Policy · doi:10.1080/14693062.2006.9685590 · Cited by 280 · cited 1×
“This assumption appears at odds with the economic literature (Demailly and Quirion 2006; Fischer and Fox 2007), which would clearly distinguish between ex ante free allocations and ex post OBA.”
Neuhoff, K., Martinez, K. K., & Sato, M. (2006) · Climate Policy · doi:10.1080/14693062.2006.9685589 · Cited by 246
Self-citationAddressing leakage in the EU ETS: Border adjustment or output-based allocation?
Monjon, S., & Quirion, P. (2011) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.04.020 · Cited by 145
New Entrant and Closure Provisions: How do they Distort?
Denny Ellerman, A. (2008) · The Energy Journal · doi:10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vol29-nosi-5 · Cited by 71
Cited by
The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Competitiveness
Dechezleprêtre, A., & Sato, M. (2017) · Review of Environmental Economics and Policy · doi:10.1093/reep/rex013 · Cited by 995
Self-citationKoch, N., & Basse Mama, H. (2019) · Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2019.04.018 · Cited by 148
Carbon pricing of basic materials: Incentives and risks for the value chain and consumers
Stede, J., Pauliuk, S., Hardadi, G., & Neuhoff, K. (2021) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107168 · Cited by 31
Carbon cost pass-through in industrial sectors
Neuhoff, K., & Ritz, R. (2019) · Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge · doi:10.17863/cam.46544 · Cited by 22
“This can motivate pricing below marginal cost and thus also reduce pass-through (Branger et al., 2015).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Branger, F., Ponssard, J.-P., Sartor, O., & Sato, M.
- Venue
- Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2015-09
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 401-437
- ISSN
- 2333-5955 (ISSN-L)
- 2333-5963
- OpenAlex
- W3121318650
- Cited by
- 39
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 8.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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