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Only All Naturalists Should Worry About Only One Evolutionary Debunking Argument
Open accessAbstract
Evolutionary debunking arguments abound, but they’re all murky where it counts most: exactly which epistemic principle combines with the facts of evolution to undermine moral realism? I’ll identify some possible principles but show that most are false, spoiling the arguments built upon them. And every argument threatens only “representationalist” views of moral psychology, on which moral judgments rely on mental intermediaries, for example, sentiments. Only one argument remains a menace: a new “Argument from Symmetry.” But it should worry only all naturalists, pressing a trilemma: abandon moral realism, accept a rationalism incongruous with naturalism, or reject naturalism. Nonnaturalists are free and clear.
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“Tomás Bogardus (2016) has challenged safety as a requirement for knowledge or justified belief, as many of our beliefs seem justified, yet are formed in an unsafe way.”
From The Challenge of Evolution to Religion (2019) · cites this paper as Bogardus, 2016
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A Vindication of the Equal-Weight View
Bogardus, T. (2009) · Episteme · doi:10.3366/e1742360009000744 · Cited by 108
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Cited by
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Sauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
The Challenge of Evolution to Religion
De Smedt, J., & De Cruz, H. (2019) · Cambridge University Press · doi:10.1017/9781108685436 · Cited by 33
Metadata
- Authors
- Bogardus, T.
- Venue
- Ethics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2016-04-01
- Volume
- 126
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 636-661
- ISSN
- 0014-1704 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-297X
- OpenAlex
- W2313806620
- Cited by
- 48
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 3
- FWCI
- 60.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Ethics (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- evolutionary debunking arguments, moral realism, naturalism, representationalism, moral psychology, moral sentiments, epistemic principles, moral rationalism
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