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Debunking Arguments in Ethics

Sauer, Hanno · 2018 · Cambridge University Press eBooks

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 308 of the 308 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

In this crisply written book, Hanno Sauer offers the first book-length treatment of debunking arguments in ethics, developing an empirically informed and philosophically sophisticated account of genealogical arguments and their significance for the reliability of moral cognition. He breaks new ground by introducing a series of novel distinctions into the current debate, which allows him to develop a framework for assessing the prospects of debunking or vindicating our moral intuitions. He also challenges the justification of some of our moral judgments by showing that they are based on epistemically defective processes. His book is an original, cutting-edge contribution to the burgeoning field of empirically informed metaethics, and will interest philosophers, psychologists, and anyone interested in how - and whether - moral judgment works.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/9781108529181

Cites

308 of 308 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Citations

Cites

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Metadata

Authors
Sauer, H.
Affiliations
Utrecht University (NL)
Corresponding author
Sauer, Hanno
Venue
Cambridge University Press eBooks
Published
2018-07-19
OpenAlex
W2787416218
Cited by
72
References
308
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 1
FWCI
14.24
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • Universitätsbibliographie, Universität Duisburg-Essen (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
debunking arguments, moral intuitions, moral cognition, moral judgment, epistemic justification, moral psychology

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How to cite

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Debunking Arguments in Ethics. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/9781108529181
The paper
Sauer, H. (2018). Debunking Arguments in Ethics. Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108529181

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.