Freedom as Independence
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Much recent philosophical work on social freedom focuses on whether freedom should be understood as noninterference, in the liberal tradition associated with Isaiah Berlin, or as nondomination, in the republican tradition revived by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner. We defend a conception of freedom that lies between these two alternatives: freedom as independence. Like republican freedom, it demands the robust absence of relevant constraints on action. Unlike republican, and like liberal freedom, it is not moralized. We showcase the virtues of this conception and offer a novel map of the logical space in which different conceptions of freedom are located.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citation
Cited by
Justice and Egalitarian Relations
Schemmel, C. (2021) · Justice and Egalitarian Relations · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190084240.003.0001 · Cited by 48
Metadata
- Authors
- List, C., & Valentini, L.
- Venue
- Ethics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2016-07
- Volume
- 126
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1043-1074
- ISSN
- 0014-1704 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-297X
- OpenAlex
- W1797175006
- Cited by
- 178
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 22.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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