A political-economic model of police administration
Abstract
A primary challenge for the administration of public safety is the implementation of policy that facilitates effective policing and satisfies political pressure over outcomes. I develop a model of police administration that captures the tension between policing outcomes and policing tactics. The model evaluates how police officers’ incentives to violate policy limits on their behavior complicate delegation by leaders. Police leaders are motivated to provide discretion so officers may use appropriate tactics for whatever situation they face but also motivated to ensure that police do not abuse discretion and comply with limits on their behavior. I use the model to study the effects of political control of policing policy and insulation of police officers from accountability.
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Police chiefs are institutionally inclined to clear most misconduct allegations.
“Chiefs are institutionally inclined to clear most misconduct allegations (11)”
From Does civilian oversight impact police legitimacy? (2025) · cites this paper as [11]
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Does civilian oversight impact police legitimacy?
Schiff, K. J., Schiff, D. S., Moy, B. J., McCrain, J., Mourtgos, S. M., & Adams, I. T. (2025) · PNAS Nexus · doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf267 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“Chiefs are institutionally inclined to clear most misconduct allegations (11), yet the presence of a CRB could highlight disagreements that cast doubt on the overall fairness of the process (12).”
- Authors
- Clark, T. S.
- Affiliations
- University of Chicago (US)
- Corresponding author
- Clark, Tom S.
- ORCID
- Clark, Tom S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2024-10-01
- Volume
- 86
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1462-1478
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W4391886412
- Cited by
- 4
- References
- 31
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 2
- FWCI
- 6.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Politics (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Policing Practices and Perceptions
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Keywords
- police administration, police discretion, police accountability, delegation, police tactics, policy compliance, public safety policy
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