Kantian Consequentialism

Abstract

Kantians and Consequentialists alike have presumed that Kantian ethics is incompatible with all forms of consequentialism, and that it instead justifies a system of agent‐centered restrictions, or deontological constraints, on the maximization of the good. Unlike all forms of utilitarian theories, Kant's ethical theory is supposed to justify basic human rights, respect for which constrains the maximization of the good. Kantian Consequentialism argues that Kant's basic rationalist, internalist approach to the justification of normative principles, his conception of morality as a system of categorical imperatives, his account of the nature of the goodwill and the motive of duty, and his principle of universalizability are all compatible with normative consequentialism. In addition, the core moral ideal of the dignity of humanity, and the related conception of respect for persons, which is based on the intrinsic value of rational nature as an end‐in‐itself, support the widespread intuition that our rational nature is the basis of values that are higher than mere happiness. The result is a novel and compelling form of consequentialism that is based on, and that gives priority to, the unique and special value of rational nature itself.