The DOI matches its Crossref record; 77 of the 77 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Extending Ourselves: Computational Science, Empiricism, and Scientific Method
Abstract
Computational science, especially computer simulations, is now the dominant procedure in many areas of science. This book contains the first systematic philosophical account of this new scientific method, and draws a parallel between the ways in which such computational methods have enhanced our abilities to mathematically model the world, and the more familiar ways in which scientific instruments have expanded our access to the empirical world. This expansion forms the basis for a new kind of empiricism better suited to the needs of science than the older anthropocentric forms of empiricism. Human abilities are no longer the ultimate standard of correctness within epistemology. The book includes arguments for the primacy of properties rather than objects, for how technology interacts with scientific methods, and a detailed account of how the path from a computational template or model to a scientific application is constructed and revised. This last feature allows us to hold a form of selective realism in which anti-realist arguments based on abstract reconstructions of theories can be avoided. One important consequence of the rise of computational methods is that the traditional organization of the sciences is being replaced by an organization founded on computational templates.
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Cites
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Cited by
Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress
Chang, H. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195171276.001.0001 · Cited by 883
The philosophical novelty of computer simulation methods
Humphreys, P. (2009) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9435-2 · Cited by 362
Self-citationResnik, D. B., & Hosseini, M. (2025) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-024-00493-8 · Cited by 228
JUSTIFIED BELIEF IN A DIGITAL AGE: ON THE EPISTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF SECRET INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES
Miller, B., & Record, I. (2013) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2013.11 · Cited by 153
Alvarado, R. (2023) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-023-00451-3 · Cited by 137
Metadata
- Authors
- Humphreys, P.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2004-08-12
- OpenAlex
- W4246062337
- Cited by
- 548
- References
- 77
- FWCI
- 18.65
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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