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The Theory of Morality
Abstract
Let us . . . nominate this the most important theoretical work on ethical or moral theory since John Rawls's Theory of Justice. If you have philosophical inclinations and want a good workout, this conscientious scrutiny of moral assumptions and expressions will be most rewarding. Donagan explores ways of acting in the Hebrew-Christian context, examines them in the light of natural law and rational theories, and proposes that formal patterns for conduct can emerge. All this is tightly reasoned, the argument is packed, but the language is clear. Christian Century The man value of this book seems to me to be that it shows the force of the Hebrew-Christian moral tradition in the hands of a creative philosopher. Throughout the book, one cannot but feel that a serious philosopher is trying to come to terms with his religious-moral background and to defend it against the prevailing secular utilitarian position which seems to dominate academic philosophy. Bernard Gert, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
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Citations
Cited by
Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands
Thompson, D. F. (1980) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1954312 · Cited by 651
Kagan, S. (1991) · doi:10.1093/0198239165.001.0001 · Cited by 637
Practical Intelligence and the Virtues
Russell, D. C. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565795.001.0001 · Cited by 582
Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making
Bartels, D. M. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.001 · Cited by 435
Osborne, C. (2007) · Dumb Beasts and Dead Philosophers · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282067.003.0003
Metadata
- Authors
- Donagan, A.
- Venue
- University of Chicago Press eBooks
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1977
- OpenAlex
- W2074151168
- Cited by
- 768
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 14.73
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Donagan, A. (1977). The Theory of Morality. University of Chicago Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226228419.001.0001
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.