Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe

Abstract

Advances the thesis that legislative processes are increasingly influenced by constitutional judges and the discursive practices of constitutional adjudication. Parallel to this process, the ordinary judiciary has been carving out wide‐ranging powers of judicial review for itself, seeking to alter statutes deemed unconstitutional. As Stone Sweet argues forcefully, these phenomena have combined to undermine parliamentary sovereignty and to transform the very nature of European government and society. These arguments are illustrated by the detailed comparative examination of five pivotal cases: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the EU. The discussion of the immediate subject matter takes place, embedded into a wider set of concerns: what are the sources and consequences of judicial power? Why is judicial rule making often basic to institutionalization and political change? Already a classic in the ongoing debate about constitutional politics, this book offers important contributions to the literature on new institutionalism, rational choice theory, and the new constitutionalism in Continental legal theory.