The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme
Abstract
Davidson attacks the intelligibility of conceptual relativism, i.e. of truth relative to a conceptual scheme. He defines the notion of a conceptual scheme as something ordering, organizing, and rendering intelligible empirical content, and calls the position that employs both notions scheme‐content dualism. He argues that such dualism (the ‘third, and perhaps, last dogma of empiricism’) is untenable since: (1) not only can we not parcel out empirical content sentence per sentence (as Quine's rejection of the analytic‐synthetic distinction had shown) but also (2) the notion of uninterpreted content to which several schemes are relative, and the related notion of a theory ‘fitting the evidence’, can be shown to lack intelligibility too. Davidson argues further that belief in incommensurable schemes or non‐intertranslatable languages is possible only on violating a correct understanding of interpretability (developed in Essays 9 and 10): if we succeed in interpreting someone else then we have shown there is no need to speak of two conceptual schemes, while if we fail ‘there is no ground for speaking of two.’
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Cites
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Hall, M. B., & Kuhn, T. S. (1963) · The American Historical Review · doi:10.2307/1847040 · Cited by 7,479
Davidson, D. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199246270.001.0001 · Cited by 6,119
Self-citationMind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers
(1975) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625251 · Cited by 3,918
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
Quine, W. V. (1969) · doi:10.7312/quin92204 · Cited by 3,593
Buhr, R., & Dummett, M. (1983) · Language · doi:10.2307/414091 · Cited by 3,368
Strawson, P. F. (2002) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203221303 · Cited by 2,127
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.
Black, M., Nagel, E., Suppes, P., & Tarski, A. (1963) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183047 · Cited by 1,949
Williams, C. J. F. (1979) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1979.tb01788.x · Cited by 1,906
The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of Semantics
Tarski, A. (1944) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2102968 · Cited by 1,640
Cited by
Burgess, A., & Plunkett, D. (2013) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12086 · Cited by 278
Metadata
- Authors
- Davidson, D.
- Venue
- Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2001-09-27
- Pages
- 183-198
- OpenAlex
- W4248421565
- Cited by
- 276
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 122.88
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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