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Cited by 32Philosophical Ethics and TheoryClassical Philosophy and ThoughtFree Will and Agency

Akrasia, Collective and Individual

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Pettit, Philip·2003·Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality
DOI 10.1093/0199257361.003.0004
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Abstract

Examines what is necessary for a group to constitute an agent that can display akrasia, and what steps such a group might take to establish self‐control. The topic has some interest in itself, and the discussion suggests some lessons about how we should think of akrasia in the individual as well as in the collective case. Under the image that the lessons support, akrasia is a sort of constitutional disorder: a failure to achieve a unity projected in the avowal of agency. This image fits well with the constitutional model of the soul in Plato's Republic.

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  • There are no comparable accounts of social and collaborative irrationality, with little exception concerning self-deception and even less akrasia.

    “After all, in the face of great philosophical interest in analysing the possibility, structure and mechanisms of individual practical irrationality, with little exception concerning self-deception (Harré, 1988; Ruddick, 1988; Tenbrunsel and Messick, 2004; Deweese-Boyd, 2010) and even less akrasia (Pettit, 2003b), there are surprisingly no comparable accounts of social and collaborative irrationali”

    From Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation (2017) · cites this paper as Pettit, 2003b

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Authors
Pettit, P.
Corresponding author
Pettit, Philip
ORCID
Pettit, Philip
Venue
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Published
2003-09-04
Pages
68-96
DOI
10.1093/0199257361.003.0004
OpenAlex
W1159939140
Cited by
32
References
5
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 3 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 2
FWCI
0.00
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Locations
ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Classical Philosophy and Thought
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
akrasia, self-control, collective agency, constitutional disorders, unity of the soul, Plato's Republic

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