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Cited by 240

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Pyramidal Groups and the Separation Between Ownership and Control in Italy

Open access
Bianchi, Marcello, Bianco, Magda, Enriques, Luca·2002·The Control of Corporate Europe

Abstract

The Italian corporate governance system features a high concentration of direct ownership, for both listed and unlisted companies. The analysis of direct ownership and of the identity of owners reveals that a major role is played by families, coalitions, the State, and above all by other companies. The largest stake in listed and unlisted companies is held by other non‐financial or holding companies. The amount held by financial institutions is limited. More than 50% of all Italian industrial companies belong to pyramidal groups. The main reason for this structure, especially among listed companies, is the possibility of controlling vast resources with a limited amount of capital.

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Crossref · 10.1093/0199257531.003.0006

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Metadata

Authors
Bianchi, M., Bianco, M., & Enriques, L.
Venue
The Control of Corporate Europe
Published
2002-10-10
Pages
154-187
OpenAlex
W4245172725
Cited by
240
References
1
FWCI
125.11
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Pyramidal Groups and the Separation Between Ownership and Control in Italy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/0199257531.003.0006
The paper
Bianchi, M., Bianco, M., & Enriques, L. (2002). Pyramidal Groups and the Separation Between Ownership and Control in Italy. The Control of Corporate Europe. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199257531.003.0006

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.