Pyramidal Groups and the Separation Between Ownership and Control in Italy
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Abstract
The Italian corporate governance system features a high concentration of direct ownership, for both listed and unlisted companies. The analysis of direct ownership and of the identity of owners reveals that a major role is played by families, coalitions, the State, and above all by other companies. The largest stake in listed and unlisted companies is held by other non‐financial or holding companies. The amount held by financial institutions is limited. More than 50% of all Italian industrial companies belong to pyramidal groups. The main reason for this structure, especially among listed companies, is the possibility of controlling vast resources with a limited amount of capital.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bianchi, M., Bianco, M., & Enriques, L.
- Venue
- The Control of Corporate Europe
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2002-10-10
- Pages
- 154-187
- OpenAlex
- W4245172725
- Cited by
- 240
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 125.11
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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