The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism
Abstract
Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. The forms defended understand pleasure as intrinsic attitudinal pleasure. Rejects all forms of sensory hedonism. Defends preferred forms of hedonism against a barrage of classic objections derived from Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Moore, Ross, Rawls, and many others. Compares the author's forms of hedonism to the hedonistic views of Aristippus, Epicurus, Bentham, and Mill. Some views in value theory are typically thought to be anti‐hedonistic. Shows that some of these views are equivalent to forms of hedonism. Also defends the claim that all the allegedly hedonistic theories discussed in the book are properly classified as forms of ‘hedonism’. Near the end of the book, the author presents his vision of the Good Life and mentions some remaining problems.
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Citations
Cites
Sen, A. (1979) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2025934 · Cited by 899
Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant
Lemos, N. M. (1994) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511663802 · Cited by 228
Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy
Feldman, F. (1997) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174978 · Cited by 225
Self-citationKagan, S. (1992) · Social Philosophy and Policy · doi:10.1017/s0265052500001461 · Cited by 167
Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional, Intrinsic Values
Goldstein, I. (1989) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2107959 · Cited by 166
Fehige, C., & Wessels, U. (1998) · De Gruyter eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783110804294 · Cited by 116
Why People Prefer Pleasure to Pain
Goldstein, I. (1980) · Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0031819100049251 · Cited by 81
Goldstein, I. (1985) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00372406 · Cited by 42
Cited by
Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare
Hausman, D. M. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139058537 · Cited by 589
Broome, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/019924376x.001.0001 · Cited by 511
CRISP, R. (2006) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00551.x · Cited by 282
The problem of defective desires
Heathwood, C. (2005) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400500338690 · Cited by 282
Basl, J. (2014) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-013-0122-y · Cited by 51
Metadata
- Authors
- Feldman, F.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2004-03-25
- OpenAlex
- W2998208442
- Cited by
- 591
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 31.09
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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