The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The problem of defective desires
Abstract
This paper defends the actualist desire-satisfaction theory of welfare against a popular line of objection—namely, that it cannot accommodate the fact that, sometimes, it is bad for a person to get what he wants. Ill-informed desires, irrational desires, base desires, poorly cultivated desires, pointless desires, artificially aroused desires, and the desire to be badly off, are alleged by objectors to be defective in this way. I attempt to show that each of these kinds of desire either is not genuinely defective or else is defective in a way fully compatible with the theory.
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Citations
Cites
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition
Rawls, J. (1971) · doi:10.4159/9780674042605 · Cited by 9,496
Parfit, D. (1986) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.001.0001 · Cited by 5,045
(1994) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.31-3722 · Cited by 1,682
Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance.
Hamlin, A., & Griffin, J. (1987) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233100 · Cited by 1,471
Sidgwick, H. (1962) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-81786-3 · Cited by 1,443
Welfare, happiness, and ethics
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-5021 · Cited by 1,081
Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics
Sumner, L. W. (1999) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238782.001.0001 · Cited by 691
A Theory of the Good and the Right
Brandt, R. B. (1981) · Michigan Law Review · doi:10.2307/1288311 · Cited by 624
Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism
Feldman, F. (2004) · doi:10.1093/019926516x.001.0001 · Cited by 591
Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance.
Scanlon, T. M., & Griffin, J. (1991) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185313 · Cited by 580
Cited by
Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare
Hausman, D. M. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139058537 · Cited by 589
Cognitive Enhancement, Hyperagency, and Responsibility Explosion
Gordon, E. C. (2024) · The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine · doi:10.1093/jmp/jhae025 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Heathwood, C.
- Venue
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2005-12
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 487-504
- ISSN
- 0004-8402 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-6828
- OpenAlex
- W2057678712
- Cited by
- 282
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 6.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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