The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bayesian Epistemology
Abstract
Probabilistic models have much to offer to epistemology and philosophy of science. Arguably, the coherence theory of justification claims that the more coherent a set of propositions is, the more confident one ought to be in its content, ceteris paribus. An impossibility result shows that there cannot exist a coherence ordering. A coherence quasi-ordering can be constructed that respects this claim and is relevant to scientific-theory choice. Bayesian-Network models of the reliability of information sources are made applicable to Condorcet-style jury voting, Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda puzzle, the variety-of-evidence thesis, the Duhem–Quine thesis, and the informational value of testimony.
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Cites
Causation, Prediction, and Search
Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., & Scheines, R. (2001) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/1754.001.0001 · Cited by 4,521
The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change
Kuhn, T. S. (1977) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226217239.001.0001 · Cited by 3,861
Cited by
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker, M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 · Cited by 9,198
Bahrami, B., Olsen, K., Latham, P. E., Roepstorff, A., Rees, G., & Frith, C. D. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1185718 · Cited by 738
The Bias That Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking
Stanovich, K. E. (2021) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/13367.001.0001 · Cited by 152
Self-imposed filter bubbles: Selective attention and exposure in online search
Ekström, A. G., Niehorster, D. C., & Olsson, E. J. (2022) · Computers in Human Behavior Reports · doi:10.1016/j.chbr.2022.100226 · Cited by 45
Williams, M. N., Marques, M. D., Kerr, J. R., Hill, S. R., Ling, M., & Clarke, E. J. R. (2025) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.3153 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Bovens, L., & Hartmann, S.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2004-01-08
- OpenAlex
- W4247172179
- Cited by
- 635
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 33.31
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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