The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Value, Reality, and Desire
Abstract
This book presents an extended argument for a robust realism about value. The robust realist affirms the following distinctive theses. There are genuine claims about value which are true or false — there are facts about value. These value-facts are mind-independent — they are not reducible to desires or other mental states, or indeed to any non-mental facts of a non-evaluative kind. And these genuine, mind-independent, irreducible value-facts are causally efficacious. Values, quite literally, affect us. These are not particularly fashionable theses, and taken as a whole they go somewhat against the grain of quite a lot of recent work in the metaphysics of value. Further, against the received view, this book argues that we can have knowledge of values by experiential acquaintance, that there are experiences of value which can be both veridical and appropriately responsive to the values themselves. Finally, these value-experiences are not the products of some exotic and implausible faculty of ‘intuition’. Rather, they are perfectly mundane and familiar mental states — namely, desires. This view explains how values can be ‘intrinsically motivating’, without falling foul of the widely accepted ‘queerness’ objection. There are, of course, other objections to each of the realist's claims. In showing how and why these objections fail, the book introduces a wealth of interesting and original insights about issues of wider interest — including the nature of properties, reduction, supervenience, and causation.
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Citations
Cites
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
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Lewis, D. (1983) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048408312341131 · Cited by 3,140
Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays
Kim, J. (1993) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625220 · Cited by 1,532
The Humean Theory of Motivation
SMITH, M. (1987) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/xcvi.381.36 · Cited by 1,005
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Yablo, S. (1992) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185535 · Cited by 687
Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge
COHEN, S. (2002) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00204.x · Cited by 543
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Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility
Wolf, S. (1988) · Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625411.003 · Cited by 456
Rational Consensus in Science and Society
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The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5 · Cited by 270
Enoch, D. (2010) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9333-6 · Cited by 224
Metadata
- Authors
- Oddie, G.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2005-03-10
- OpenAlex
- W1555838252
- Cited by
- 415
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 4.51
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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