The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
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A given system of rules might only count as a moral system if it agrees with a sufficiently large number of moral fixed points.
“Moreover, asCuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) emphasize, a given system of rules might only count as a moral system if it agrees with a sufficiently large number of claims that they call 'moral fixed points'”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Cuneo and Shafer-Landau 2014
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- Authors
- Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R.
- Affiliations
- University of Vermont (US)
- ORCID
- Cuneo, Terence
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2014-01-09
- Volume
- 171
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 399-443
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W2019272718
- Cited by
- 270
- References
- 136
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 23 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 20 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 3 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 87.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
- Keywords
- moral realism, moral propositions, moral norms, moral metaphysics, moral epistemology
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