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The Character of Consciousness
Abstract
What is consciousness? How does the subjective character of consciousness fit into an objective world? How can there be a science of consciousness? Here, Chalmers develops a unified framework that addresses these questions and many others.
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In the citing paper
“Chalmers ' s model, in which ' structural properties constrain experience without exhausting it ' ( ibid .), may also be found in S ā ṃ khya, in that consciousness can only witness what exists in materiality.”
From The hard problem of ‘pure’ consciousness: Sāṃkhya dualist ontology (2024) · cites this paper as Chalmers (2010)
In the citing paper
“Chalmers ' s question ' why is the performance of functions accompanied by experience ? ' (i.e. conscious experience) (Chalmers (2010), 8, original emphasis) might be reframed in S ā ṃ khya as ' why is the performance of functions accompanied by consciousness ? '”
From The hard problem of ‘pure’ consciousness: Sāṃkhya dualist ontology (2024) · cites this paper as Chalmers (2010)
In the citing paper
“We can argue that functional 43 concepts such as ' discrimination, integration, reaction and report ' ( ibid ., 33) are all found in buddhi , but not in puru ṣ a since this is a pure entity with no operative functions.”
From The hard problem of ‘pure’ consciousness: Sāṃkhya dualist ontology (2024) · cites this paper as Chalmers (2010)
In the citing paper
“When, in determining a fundamental theory of consciousness, Chalmers asserts a ' principle of coherence between the structure of consciousness and the structure of awareness ' ( ibid ., 20), we can assert a similar principle of coherence in S ā ṃ khya between the structure of consciousness ( puru ṣ a ) and the structure of awareness ( buddhi ).”
From The hard problem of ‘pure’ consciousness: Sāṃkhya dualist ontology (2024) · cites this paper as Chalmers (2010)
Citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Feinberg, T. E., & Mallatt, J. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00667 · Cited by 158
An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness
Storm, J. F., Klink, P. C., Aru, J., Senn, W., Goebel, R., Pigorini, A., Avanzini, P., Vanduffel, W., Roelfsema, P. R., Massimini, M., et al. (2024) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2024.02.004 · Cited by 114
Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence
Chalmers, D. J. (2011) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzr046 · Cited by 113
Self-citationFrancken, J. C., Beerendonk, L., Molenaar, D., Fahrenfort, J. J., Kiverstein, J. D., Seth, A. K., & van Gaal, S. (2022) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niac011 · Cited by 136
“…refers to (i.e. how it should be operationalized), what would constitute an explanation, and how valid experiments should be designed (Block 1995; Chalmers 1995, 2000; Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Dennett 2001; Lamme 2006; Tononi 2008; Dehaene and Changeux 2011; Doerig et al. 2020; Hohwy and Seth…”
BackgroundThe HOROR theory of phenomenal consciousness
Brown, R. (2015) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0388-7 · Cited by 83
Metadata
- Authors
- Chalmers, D. J.
- Corresponding author
- Chalmers, David J.
- ORCID
- Chalmers, David J.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2010-10-07
- OpenAlex
- W359752332
- Cited by
- 911
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 86 · 2025: 114 · 2024: 125 · 2023: 54 · 2022: 48 · 2021: 62 · 2020: 39 · 2019: 144 · 2018: 35 · 2017: 30 · 2016: 39 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 31 · 2013: 31 · 2012: 24
- FWCI
- 20.32
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Libraries (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), l'Université de Namur (UNamur) and the Université Saint-Louis (USL-B)) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- consciousness, mind-body problem, consciousness studies, philosophy of mind, qualia, unity of consciousness
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Character of Consciousness. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.001.0001
- The paper
- Chalmers, D. J. (2010). The Character of Consciousness. Oxford University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780195311105.001.0001
