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Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence

Chalmers, D. J. · 2011 · Mind

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence: the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.

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Crossref · 10.1093/mind/fzr046

Cites

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Citations

Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. 2000, NOS, 34, 203
  2. Chalmers, 2001, Philosophical Review, 110, 315, 10.1215-110-3-315
  3. 2008, OXFORD STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY, 2, 3

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Chalmers, D. J.
Affiliations
Australian National University (AU)
Corresponding author
Chalmers, D. J.
Venue
Mind
Published
2011-07-01
Volume
120
Issue
479
Pages
587-635
ISSN
  • 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
  • 1460-2113
OpenAlex
W2168749096
Cited by
113
References
30
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 28
FWCI
92.04
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Mind (publishedVersion)
  • ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
Keywords
Frege's puzzle, referentialism, epistemic modality

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/mind/fzr046
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Chalmers, D. J. (2011). Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence. Mind. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzr046

Data sources

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.