Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence: the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
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Citations
Cites
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
(2013) · A Realist Theory of Science · doi:10.4324/9780203090732-9 · Cited by 7,731
(2010) · Mind, Language and Reality · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625251.014 · Cited by 3,767
Lewis, D. (1979) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184843 · Cited by 1,941
The Character of Consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.001.0001 · Cited by 911
Self-citationDoes Conceivability Entail Possibility?
Chalmers, D. J. (2002) · Conceivability and Possibility · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198250890.003.0004 · Cited by 894
Self-citationThe Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
Joyce, J. M. (1999) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498497 · Cited by 811
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance
Lewis, D. (1980) · IFS · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_14 · Cited by 799 · cited 2×
“Cases like this are familiar from the work of Perry (1979) and Lewis (1983). The following variant on Lewis’s ‘two gods’ case makes the point clearest for our purposes. 6This sort of strategy is reminiscent of the appeal to metalinguistic propositions by Stalnaker (1984).”
BackgroundOn a new axiomatic theory of probability
Rényi, A. (1955) · Acta Mathematica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae · doi:10.1007/bf02024393 · Cited by 710
Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation
Chalmers, D. J., & Jackson, F. (2001) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-110-3-315 · Cited by 691
Self-citationSalmón, N. (1986) · Cited by 495
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- 2000, NOS, 34, 203
- Chalmers, 2001, Philosophical Review, 110, 315, 10.1215-110-3-315
- 2008, OXFORD STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY, 2, 3
Cited by
Dasgupta, S. (2016) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12082 · Cited by 265
Chalmers, D. J. (2011) · Epistemic Modality · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.003.0003 · Cited by 211
Self-citationThe Combination Problem for Panpsychism
Chalmers, D. J. (2016) · Panpsychism · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0008 · Cited by 231
“It seems introspectively obvious that we are aware of qualities (indeed, I think we are aware of our awareness of qualities; see Chalmers 2013 for an argument). Further, our awareness of qualities plays a natural role in explaining our knowledge of qualities. We can conceive of a situation with qualities that no one i…”
BackgroundSelf-citationQuitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief
Titelbaum, M. G. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658305.001.0001 · Cited by 49
The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference
Biggs, S. D., & Geirsson, H. (2020) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003111894 · Cited by 64
“According to Chalmers (2011), beliefs can be associated with (at least) two contents: a primary intension and a secondary intension.”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Chalmers, D. J.
- Affiliations
- Australian National University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Chalmers, D. J.
- ORCID
- Chalmers, D. J.
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-07-01
- Volume
- 120
- Issue
- 479
- Pages
- 587-635
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W2168749096
- Cited by
- 113
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 28
- FWCI
- 92.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Mind (publishedVersion)
- ANU Open Research (Australian National University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Keywords
- Frege's puzzle, referentialism, epistemic modality
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