The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory
Abstract
Abstract What makes an argument in a law case good or bad? Can legal decisions be justified by purely rational argument or are they ultimately determined by more subjective influences? These questions are central to the study of jurisprudence, and are critically examined in this book.
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Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
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In the citing paper
“Two challenges could hamper the adoption of XAI techniques for tax AI systems.26”
From Towards eXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) in Tax Law: The Need for a Minimum Legal Standard (2022) · cites this paper as [26]
Citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Orthodoxy and the Courts in Late Antiquity
Humfress, C. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198208419.001.0001 · Cited by 263
The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law
Klamert, M. (2014) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199683123.001.0001 · Cited by 196
A Modest Notion of Coherence in Legal Reasoning. A Model for the European Court of Justice
Soriano, L. M. (2003) · Ratio Juris · doi:10.1111/1467-9337.00238 · Cited by 129
Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law
Fadl, K. M. A. E. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511560163 · Cited by 98
Cultural evidence in courts of law
Good, A. (2008) · Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9655.2008.00492.x · Cited by 63
Metadata
- Authors
- MacCormick, N.
- Corresponding author
- MacCormick, Neil
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 1994-08-11
- OpenAlex
- W4230311549
- Cited by
- 291
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 16 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 32 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 6
- FWCI
- 1.07
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Comparative constitutional jurisprudence studies
- Social Sciences › Law › Legal processes and jurisprudence
- Social Sciences › Law › Legal Language and Interpretation
- Keywords
- legal reasoning, legal theory, justification of legal decisions, rational arguments, legal personality, legal argumentation
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198763840.001.0001
- The paper
- MacCormick, N. (1994). Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. Oxford University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780198763840.001.0001
