Towards eXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) in Tax Law: The Need for a Minimum Legal Standard
Open accessAbstract
Tax administrations globally increasingly rely on artificial intelligence (AI) systems for automation. However, automation has a huge potential impact on the rights of taxpayers subject to algorithmic assessments, which is compounded by the opacity of complex AI systems. This article argues that adequate protection of taxpayers’ rights demands the use of eXplainable AI (XAI) technologies that can render the functioning and decisions of tax AI systems understandable for taxpayers, administrative appeal bodies and the courts. This demand follows from the constitutional principles that guide taxation. Still, it is insufficiently addressed by soft and hard law instruments on AI, which do not address the particular information needs of the tax domain. To address this gap, the authors conclude the article by mapping technical and legal challenges for the proper application of explanation techniques to tax AI to ensure that automation does not come at the expense of taxpayers’ rights.
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AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The article argues that tax administrations’ growing use of opaque AI threatens taxpayer rights and constitutional principles, making explainable AI (XAI) necessary in tax law. It concludes that current constitutional, EU hard-law, and international soft-law instruments do not provide a minimum legal standard for XAI in tax and maps the legal and technical challenges to creating one.
Key findings
- Tax AI use is widespread and consequential: an OECD Forum on Tax Administration survey of 59 advanced and emerging economies found almost 75% of surveyed tax administrations using or implementing cutting-edge data techniques that reduce human intervention; the UK HMRC’s Connect triggered over 90% of tax compliance risk enquiries and helped recover more than GBP 3 billion in taxes since 2010; the Dutch childcare benefits scandal involved a risk assessment system that infringed the fundamental rights of an estimated 35,000 welfare recipients.
- Constitutional and human rights law already pushes toward explainability: the Slovak Constitutional Court in *eKasa* (17 Dec. 2021) held that law restricting fundamental rights must be predictable and that AI in public administration cannot produce inexplicable decisions; the Hague District Court in *SyRI* (5 Feb. 2020) found an opaque risk model violated Article 8 ECHR and was not necessary or proportionate.
- Current EU law is insufficient: GDPR explanation rights are limited to natural persons and automated decision-making under Article 22, excluding many corporate-tax and anonymised-data applications; the proposed AI Act covers only narrow tax-related high-risk uses and directs transparency to system users rather than taxpayers, so it does not create a general right to explanation of tax decisions.
- Soft-law instruments require explainability and contestability but are non-binding: the OECD AI Recommendation and Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 support explanations for affected persons, yet tax secrecy and trade secrecy remain obstacles; the authors conclude there is no minimum legal standard for XAI in tax law and that regulation is fragmented.
Methods
- Doctrinal and conceptual legal analysis; no empirical sample, experiment, or statistical model is reported.
- Sources analysed include constitutional principles, ECHR case law and provisions, EU law (GDPR and the proposed AI Act), international soft law (OECD AI Recommendation and Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1), and technical XAI literature.
- The main analysis assesses whether current and prospective law provides a minimum legal standard for XAI in tax, and maps technical and legal challenges and stakeholder-specific explanation needs for taxpayers, tax authorities, and judges.
Limitations
- Stated: the authors do not exhaustively debate the proper contours of algorithm audits in the tax domain, and they exclude changes in legal procedures crucial to implementing AI into tax administration workflow because those fall outside the article’s scope.
- Stated: future research is needed to design suitable mechanisms for auditing tax AI systems and to select and develop XAI techniques best suited to taxpayers and judges.
- Evident from the text: the analysis is primarily legal-doctrinal and focused on European/ECHR/EU instruments and selected examples; it does not empirically test XAI adoption or outcomes, and its AI Act analysis is based on the 2021 Commission proposal rather than final law.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
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Cites
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Claims the paper makes
0 of 222 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingcitation
The case law does not give a clear answer on what degree of human involvement is required to avoid classification as automated decision-making and its consequences.
“the case does not provide a clear-cut answer as to what degree of human involvement is needed to avoid the label of automated decision-making and its implications.205”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
AI Act transparency requirements apply only to high-risk systems, a classification that excludes tax-domain applications beyond those described in the paper.
“By design, they only apply to high-risk systems, 232 a classification that excludes applications in the tax domain beyond those described above.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
Many AI Act transparency requirements are directed at the user of the system, so taxpayers cannot invoke them to obtain information about systems used by tax authorities.
“This means taxpayersindividual or otherwise -cannot invoke the transparency requirements laid down in the AI Act to obtain information about the systems used by tax authorities.234”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
The AI Act imposes no obligation to provide local post hoc explanations of specific decisions made with the involvement of an AI system.
“There is no obligation to provide local post hoc explanations of specific decisions made with the involvement of an AI system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
Current data protection law does not establish a general duty of explanation for AI systems, even where those systems rely on personal data.
“From the analysis above, the authors conclude that current data protection law does not establish a general duty of explanation for AI systems, even when these systems depend on personal data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingreasoning
The broad set of transparency measures in the AI Act does not require explanations of high-risk AI systems or of their output.
“Yet, this broad set of transparency measures does not require explanations of high-risk AI systems or their output.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
Explanation under the AI Act is directed at the users who deploy AI systems for tax applications, not at the taxpayer.
“Explanation under the AI Act is directed towards the users who deploy AI systems for tax applications, not the taxpayer.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The authors found no jurisdiction that extends the right to an explanation to corporations and other non-natural entities.
“Nevertheless, the authors were not able to find any jurisdiction that extends the right to an explanation to corporations and other non-natural entities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The authors' search across jurisdictions was comprehensive enough that not finding any jurisdiction extending the right to an explanation to legal persons indicates that no such jurisdiction exists.
- Findingnone given
Initiatives of individual countries and international organizations on XAI in tax law are close to nil.
“the initiatives of individual countries and international organizations in that field are close to nil.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingcitation
The OECD AI Recommendation and Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 require deployers and users of AI systems, in all settings including tax matters, to ensure that everyone affected by the systems' outcomes receives a relevant explanation and can effectively challenge a negative outcome.
“The OECD AI Recommendation and Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec (2020)1 266 both require deployers and users of AI systems -in all settings, including tax matters -to ensure that everybody affected by the outcomes produced by such systems receives a relevant explanation and has the right to effectively challenge a negative outcome.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites OECD AI Recommendation
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- cites Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec (2020)1
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- Findingnone given
There is a glaring lack of regulations devoted to tax law, particularly regarding XAI.
“There is, however, a glaring lack of regulations devoted to the field of tax law, particularly in respect of XAI.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingnone given
The GDPR applies more broadly, covering all non-law-enforcement contexts in which the personal data of natural-person taxpayers is processed.
“while the GDPR is more broadly applicable, covering all non-law enforcement contexts in which the personal data of natural person taxpayers is processed.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingnone given
The European Union's main legal instruments on AI make no explicit mention of tax matters.
“The European Union is generally deemed to be at the forefront of global AI regulation, yet its main legal instruments in that field make no explicit mention of tax matters.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingnone given
A general right to explanation is found in the GDPR.
“a general right to explanation is to be found in the GDPR”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingcitation
The OECD promotes the use of AI systems under the motto of seamless and frictionless tax administration.
“Instead, the use of AI systems is promoted by the OECD under the motto of “seamless and frictionless tax administration”.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites OECD, supra n. 8
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- Findingown data
In many cases, secrecy can ensue from the law just as easily as from technical complexity.
“Indeed, section 2.2.shows that, in many cases, secrecy can just as easily ensue from the law as from technical complexity.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
AI systems might be employed in ways that remove taxpayers' ability to challenge decisions that may be wrong.
“or they may be used in ways that deprive taxpayers of their right to contest potentially wrongful decisions.11”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [11] source
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- Rests on an assumption: Taxpayers have a right to contest potentially wrongful tax decisions.
- Interpretationnone given
Existing soft and hard law instruments on AI do not sufficiently address XAI in tax law because they fail to address the tax domain's particular information needs.
“Still, it is insufficiently addressed by soft and hard law instruments on AI, which do not address the particular information needs of the tax domain.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
After these effects were revealed, the backlash led Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte to resign.
“Once these effects were revealed, the backlash prompted Mark Rutte, Prime Minister of the Netherlands, to resign.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [60] source
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- Premisecitation
The Dutch childcare benefits scandal exposed systematic discrimination affecting tens of thousands of welfare recipients.
“A strong example comes from the Netherlands, in which the so-called childcare benefits scandal (toeslagenaffaire) has unveiled systematic discrimination against tens of thousands of welfare recipients.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [57]
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- Premisecitation
Global and supranational bodies, particularly the OECD, openly urge tax administrations worldwide to adopt AI systems for their tasks as they move from Tax Administration 2.0 to 3.0.
“International and supranational organizations, notably the OECD, explicitly encourage tax administrations from all over the world to implement AI systems in support of their tasks as part of the transformation from Tax Administration 2.0 to 3.0.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [46]
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- Interpretationnone given
No matter how efficient and accurate a tax law AI system is, it will still make occasional prediction errors that may seriously affect taxpayers.
“Even the most efficient and accurate tax law AI system will still be plagued by the occasional prediction error, which could trigger serious consequences for the taxpayer.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A major rise in tax administrations' use of AI is strongly disrupting the tax profession.
“At the same time, the significant increase in the use of AI by tax administrations dramatically disrupts the tax profession.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Two obstacles may hinder the uptake of XAI techniques for tax AI systems.
“Two challenges could hamper the adoption of XAI techniques for tax AI systems.26”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [26] source
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- Interpretationcitation
Maximizing AI use by tax administrations worldwide appears to be a necessity rather than a choice because of personnel shortages relative to workload and the intertwined digital-physical reality of the tax world.
“The maximization of the use of AI systems by tax administrations around the world would seem to be a necessity rather than a choice due to personnel shortages in that public domain relative to the volume of work 48 and the intertwined digital-physical reality of the tax world.”
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- cites [49]
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- Premisecitation
A decision based on statistically relevant correlations may be legally unacceptable despite the relevance of facts, because it lacks legal grounds.
“Although facts are relevant for the lawfulness of a decision, a decision based on statistically relevant correlations might nevertheless be unacceptable due to a lack of legal grounds.27”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [27] source
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- Interpretationreasoning
The precise causal relationship between the data an AI system takes in and the decision it produces is often unclear.
“Thus, it is not always obvious how the system's input affects its output -in other words, what is the exact causal link between the data ingested by the system and the decision it makes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Explainable AI can help make tax-sector AI systems accountable by ensuring their operations and results are understandable to people.
“XAI can contribute to accountability in the tax domain by providing explainability to the AI systems in the tax sector, that is, by ensuring that the functioning and the outputs of these systems can be explained in a way that a human observer can understand.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
It follows that tax administrations employ AI systems for many purposes.
“Consequently, it is not surprising that tax administrations use AI systems for various purposes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In 2021, reports showed that the Dutch tax authority's risk assessment system violated the fundamental rights of about 35,000 welfare recipients.
“In 2021, it came to light that Dutch tax authorities were using a risk assessment system that infringed the fundamental rights of an estimated 35,000 welfare recipients.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [58]
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- Premisecitation
To prevent harmful AI outcomes and offer redress when they happen, researchers and practitioners have created several methods for algorithmic accountability.
“To prevent AI from having such undesirable consequences -and to provide some redress should those consequences come to pass -scholar and practitioners have developed various approaches to ensure algorithmic accountability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [53]
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- Premisecitation
Tax administrations have an advantage over private sector stakeholders because they can access huge volumes of tax-sensitive data when implementing AI systems.
“One of the big advantages tax administrations have over private sector stakeholders is that the former can rely on having access to huge volumes of tax-sensitive data as they implement their AI systems.29”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [29] source
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- Premisecitation
Additional explainability requirements may apply where the decision-making process of tax authorities is automated.
“Furthermore, additional explainability requirements may apply whenever the decision-making process of tax authorities is automated.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites FR: Code on the relationships between the public and the administration, art.R. 311-3-1-2.
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- Premisereasoning
Taxpayers cannot determine when a case will be treated as high or low risk, either before or after assessment.
“As a result, taxpayers cannot ascertain the circumstances under which a case will be classified as high or low risk, whether before or after the tax assessment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [88] source
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- Interpretationreasoning
A tax decision cannot be justified if it is not explainable, for example where it follows the recommendations of a non-explainable AI system.
“Such justification is impossible if tax decisions are not explainable, e.g. when they follow the recommendations of non-explainable AI systems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The algorithms behind the STIR risk indicator are never revealed to the taxpayer or to courts, including during litigation.
“The AI algorithms used to determine such risk are never disclosed to the taxpayer or the courts, even during litigation between the taxpayer and the NRA”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [84] source
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- Premisecitation
Tax secrecy for AI systems is justified by the need to keep tax inspections uniform and effective.
“Tax secrecy in connection with AI systems is justified by the need to ensure the uniformity and effectiveness of tax inspections.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [89] source
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- The authors state this as an assumption: Taxpayers who learn the risk-assessment criteria or the algorithms' modes of functioning could circumvent the filters and escape tax inspection despite being involved in tax fraud or non-compliance.
- Premisecitation
In simple cases decided on objective conditions, such as the participation exemption once the holding conditions are met, the required explanation is weaker: the tax authority need only state that the conditions set by the applicable legal text are fulfilled.
“The tax authority only has to explain in its decision that the conditions required by the applicable legal text are fulfilled.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Art. 3 Council Directive 2011/96/EU
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- Interpretationreasoning
Tax secrecy therefore affects taxpayers unequally.
“This shows that tax secrecy does not affect all taxpayers equally.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
Using AI in government-to-citizen (tax authority-to-taxpayer) relations generates stronger legal explainability obligations than using it in B2C or B2B relations.
“In consequence, using AI in G2C relations creates stronger legal obligations of explainability than in B2C and B2B relationships.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bibal et al., supra n. 17, at sec.2.2.
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- Premisecitation
To satisfy the principle of formal motivation, tax authorities must mention and explain all factual and legal grounds on which the decision is based.
“To comply with this principle, all factual and legal grounds on which the decision is based should be mentioned and explained by the tax authorities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Id., at sec.2.2.1.
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- Premisecitation
Decisions of tax authorities must comply with the principle of formal motivation.
“In particular, the decisions of tax authorities must comply with the principle of formal motivation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bibal et al., supra n. 17, at sec.2.2.
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- Premisecitation
Poland's STIR system computes a risk indicator for each entrepreneur using undisclosed AI algorithms based on financial-sector criteria for combating VAT fraud.
“In Poland, the Clearing House System (System Teleinformatyczny Izby Rozliczeniowej, STIR) establishes a risk indicator for each entrepreneur, which is calculated using secret AI algorithms based on criteria used by the financial sector to combat VAT fraud.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [83]
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- Premisecitation
The level of explanation required rises in proportion to the degree of discretionary power held by the tax authorities.
“The bar for explanation is raised proportionally to the level of discretionary power enjoyed by the tax authorities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites J.-L.Autin, La motivation des actes administratifs unilatéraux
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- Premisereasoning
The limits of constitutionally compliant use of AI systems in tax law are set by the constitutional requirement that taxes be levied only under a statutory law in a precise and predictable manner (the principle of no taxation without representation), which follows from the rule of law in taxation.
“the limits for constitutionally compliant use of AI systems in tax law are set by the constitutional requirement that taxes only be levied employing a statutory law in a precise and predictable manner (the principle of”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites J. Hattingh, The Multilateral Instrument from a Legal Perspective: What May Be the Challenges?
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- Interpretationreasoning
Without an explainable AI system, whether because of tax or trade secrecy or technological complexity, it would not be possible to determine whether the use of AI systems conflicts with constitutional principles, for instance through arbitrary or discriminatory treatment.
“However, without an explainable AI system -either due to tax or trade secrecy and/or technological complexity -it would not be possible to determine whether the use of AI systems contradicts constitutional principles, e.g.due to its arbitrary or discriminatory character.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Such problems will grow more common unless those who design, deploy, apply, and oversee AI systems act quickly to make them explainable to stakeholders.
“Problems of this sort will only become more frequent unless proper actions are taken promptly by entities involved in designing, deploying, applying and supervising AI systems to ensure their explainability in ways relevant to their stakeholders.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [61]
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- Premisecitation
Taxpayers receive no meaningful description of how the AI algorithms basically function.
“Nor are they afforded an even marginal description of the basic functioning of the AI algorithms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [88] source
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- Premisecitation
Several Latin American tax administrations (Chile, Peru, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Argentina, Mexico) lack procedures letting taxpayers obtain information about how AI systems used in tax audits work.
“Scholars from South America have identified a lack of procedures for taxpayers to obtain information about the functioning of AI systems in tax audits to detect tax fraud and measure the risks of compliance with tax obligations by Latin American tax administrations, such as those of Chile, Peru, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Argentina and Mexico.”
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- Premisecitation
Where AI tax-oriented systems are used only in business-to-consumer or business-to-business relations, the applicable explainability requirements remain weak and narrow.
“As long as AI tax-oriented systems are used only in B2C or B2B relations, explainability requirements will remain weak and narrow.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Directive 2011/83
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- cites Regulation 2019/1150
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- cites Directive 2014/65
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- Interpretationreasoning
A sufficient level of explainability of an AI system is a building block towards making its use compatible with the constitutional principles of legal certainty and statutory taxation, which embody legal precision and predictability of taxation.
“level of AI system explainability constitutes a building block towards the compatibility of its use with the constitutional principles of legal certainty and statutory taxation that embodies the principle of legal precision and predictability of taxation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Explanation is always required when AI systems are used to render decisions in tax authority-to-taxpayer relationships.
“This shows that explanation is always required when AI systems are used to render decisions in TA2T relationships.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The great majority of relationships in the tax domain are between tax authorities and taxpayers.
- Premisecitation
Tax secrecy does not stop large tax consultancy firms from systematically reviewing their cases to gain insight into how the system works, in exchange for payment.
“Tax secrecy does not prevent large tax consultancy firms, before such reverse engineering takes place, from systematically evaluating cases in which they have been involved to provide insights into the system's functioning in exchange for monetary remuneration.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [90]
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- Interpretationreasoning
The constitutional principle of no taxation without representation can be regarded as a constitutional requirement for explainable AI in tax law.
“The constitutional principle of”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
The OECD, backed politically by the G20, has pushed nearly 100 countries and jurisdictions to adopt a minimum standard against tax treaty abuse.
“the OECD -with political support from the G20 -has pushed nearly 100 countries and jurisdictions to implement a minimum standard to prevent tax treaty abuse.”
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- Premisecitation
The principle of legal certainty, as recognized by EU law in ECJ case law, imposes similar requirements.
“The principle of legal certainty, as recognized by EU law in Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) case law, sets similar requirements.133”
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- Premisecitation
In democratic countries, constitutions require that the calculation and levying of any tax be precisely and comprehensively regulated by statutory law.
“In principle, constitutions in democratic countries ensure that the calculation and levying of any tax must be precisely and comprehensively regulated by statutory law.129”
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- Interpretationreasoning
XAI technologies may therefore be necessary in practice to make constitutional rights effective when AI is used.
“Consequently, XAI technologies might be de facto necessary to ensure the effectiveness of constitutional rights when AI is used.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Direct interpretability is not always feasible for tax AI.
“However, direct interpretability is not always feasible for tax AI.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Explainability makes AI systems function more easily, cheaply, quickly and accurately by helping to find and remove software bugs.
“explainability contributes to the easier, cheaper, faster and more accurate functionality of such systems by enhancing the identification and elimination of bugs in the software used to run these systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [104]
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- Premisecitation
Explaining only some rather than all vital elements of an AI system may mislead judges and taxpayers.
“Focusing on only some, rather than all, vital elements of an AI system may lead both judges and taxpayers astray.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [100]
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- Premisereasoning
AI applications in tax, which must handle large volumes of taxpayer data and achieve high accuracy in tasks like fraud detection, tend to use machine learning models that are not transparent by design.
“applications of AI to the tax domain -which need to deal with large volumes of taxpayer data and, in applications such as tax fraud detection, achieve high levels of accuracy -tend to rely on machine learning models that are not transparent by design.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [111] source
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- Premisecitation
Any decision by a tax authority that affects taxpayers must be issued in a sufficiently clear, precise and predictable manner.
“For that purpose, any decisions by a tax authority that have an impact on taxpayers must be issued in a sufficiently clear, precise and predictable manner.132”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [132] source
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- Interpretationreasoning
Using opaque AI technologies in tax administration may create obstacles to complying with the constitutional requirements of legal certainty and accountability.
“Consequently, the use of opaque AI technologies in a tax context might introduce obstacles to compliance with the constitutional requirements of legal certainty and accountability surrounding the activities of tax authorities.135”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [135]
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- Interpretationreasoning
From a normative perspective, merely introducing AI technologies does not remove the constraints to which tax authorities are subject.
“As these are general provisions of tax law, the mere introduction of AI technologies into the fold is not enough -at least from a normative perspective -to void the constraints to which tax authorities are subject.134”
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- Premisecitation
Failing to identify bugs at late stages typically causes severe and sometimes irreversible harm to stakeholders, including society.
“The lack of such identification at the mentioned late stages typically causes severe and sometimes even irreversible consequences to various stakeholders, including society as a whole.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [106]
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- Interpretationreasoning
Several provisions of the ECHR could be seen as requirements for the explainability of AI systems.
“Several provisions of the ECHR could be seen as requirements for the explainability of AI systems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In these cases, the right to a fair trial ensures that taxpayers have an effective review of the information on which the tax authorities base their decisions.
“In these cases, the right to a fair trial ensures taxpayers have an effective review of the information on which the tax authorities base their decisions.154”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [154]
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- Interpretationreasoning
Non-explainable AI systems cannot be effectively supervised in the sense specified by the Slovak Constitutional Court.
“In light of these requirements, non-explainable AI systems cannot be effectively supervised in the sense specified by the Slovak Constitutional Court.140”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [140]
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- Interpretationreasoning
The court made an implicit connection with the right to a fair trial under article 6 of the ECHR, because the inability to lodge an effective defence stems from the same features of the SyRI legislation, namely its lack of transparency, which rendered the system inexplainable by law.
“This reveals that the court made an implicit connection with the right to a fair trial in article 6 of the ECHR, since the inability to lodge an effective defence stems from the same features of the SyRI legislation, i.e. its lack of transparency in respect of the functioning of SyRI, thereby rendering that system inexplainable by law.159”
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- Premisecitation
The proportionality requirement also requires determining the patterns used for automated assessment and the models or other databases that lead to a particular decision.
“Also, the mentioned proportionality requires the determination of patterns used for automated assessment and models or other databases that lead to a particular decision (paragraphs 137-138).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [137] source
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- Premisecitation
The Slovak Constitutional Court found that legislation permitting AI systems without effective supervision is incompatible with the constitution because it fails to ensure proportional application of the technology.
“The Slovak Constitutional Court was also vocal about the incompatibility with the constitution of legislation that permits the use of AI systems without effective supervision, thereby failing to ensure the proportional application of the technology (paragraph 129).139”
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- cites [139]
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- Premisecitation
As confirmed by the ECJ in Fransson, the EU Charter does not cover purely domestic situations or situations not caused by an application of EU law by the EU Member States.
“Consequently, as confirmed by the ECJ in Fransson (C-617/10), the EU Charter does not cover purely domestic situations or situations that are not caused by an application of EU law by the EU Member States.152”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [152]
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- Interpretationcitation
Any legislation that provides for the use of an AI system without granting its addressees, such as taxpayers, the right to receive a sufficient explanation of its functioning would not appear to pass the muster of legality in a democratic country.
“Indeed, any legislation that provides for the use of an AI system without granting to its addressees (e.g.taxpayers) the right to receive a sufficient explanation of its functioning would not appear to pass the muster of legality in a democratic country.160”
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- Interpretationreasoning
Accordingly, article 6 of the ECHR is a relevant legal source ensuring the right to a fair trial in disputes triggered by applying AI systems to tax law only when they arise out of the imposition of tax surcharges on taxpayers.
“Accordingly, article 6 of the ECHR constitutes a relevant legal source that ensures the right to a fair trial in disputes triggered by applying AI systems to tax law only when they arise out of the imposition of tax surcharges on taxpayers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Hence, the right to a fair trial under the ECHR provides limited assistance in ensuring the explainability of AI systems in tax law, even within its geographical scope of application.
“Hence, the right to a fair trial under the ECHR is of limited assistance in ensuring the explainability of AI systems in tax law, even within its geographical scope of application.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In eKasa, the Slovak Constitutional Court implicitly underscored the need for explainability of AI systems in light of constitutional principles.
“In eKasa (17 Dec. 2021), 137 the Slovak Constitutional Court implicitly underscored the need for the explainability of AI systems in light of constitutional principles.138”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [137] source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [138]
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The reason for this limited assistance is not that the right to a fair trial lacks merit for XAI in tax law, but its limited personal, substantive and territorial scope of application.
“The reason for this does not lie in the inadequate merits of that right to XAI in tax law but in its limited personal, substantive and territorial scope of application.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Sufficient explainability appears to be a pivotal feature of all constitutionally compliant AI systems in the tax domain.
“Accordingly, sufficient explainability appears to be a pivotal feature of all constitutionally compliant AI systems in the tax domain.141”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [141] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationnone given
The right to respect for private and family life under article 8 of the ECHR is connected to explanation requirements in the ECHR.
“Another ECHR right connected to explanation requirements in the ECHR is the right to respect for private and family life, enshrined in article 8 of the Convention.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Article 8 of the ECHR has become one of the key fundamental rights affecting the legality of using AI systems in tax law due to the SyRI judgment of the Hague District Court.
“In fact, it has become one of the key fundamental rights affecting the legality of the use of AI systems in tax law due to the seminal and widely debated 156 judgment of the Hague District Court in the Netherlands in SyRI (Systeem Risico Indicatie) (5 Feb. 2020).157”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [156]
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [157] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Failure to provide adequate explanations regarding the processing of this information and the uses of the outputs might violate the positive obligation to protect private and family life.
“Failure to provide adequate explanations regarding the processing of this information and the uses of the outputs of this processing might therefore violate the positive obligation of protection of private and family life.161”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [161]
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Article 8(1) of the ECHR also establishes positive obligations on the state.
“In addition to the non-interference requirement found by the Dutch court in this case, article 8(1) of the ECHR also establishes positive obligations to the state.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [161]
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
In Ferrazzini v. Italy, the ECtHR Grand Chamber significantly restricted the applicability of article 6 of the ECHR to tax law cases.
“Regarding the right to a fair trial in the ECHR, its applicability to tax law cases was significantly restricted by the ECtHR (Grand Chamber) in Ferrazzini v. Italy (12 July 2001).144”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [144]
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Parties to the ECHR retain the power to extend their understanding of the right to a fair trial beyond the minimum required by the ECHR.
“However, parties to the convention still retain the power to extend their understanding of the right to a fair trial beyond the minimum required by the ECHR.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [155]
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Many uses of AI in the tax domain fall outside the explanation requirements contained in the GDPR.
“This movement is necessary because many uses of AI in the tax domain are not covered by the explanation requirements present in the GDPR.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Current international and national law does not establish legally binding requirements for XAI in tax.
“Current international and national law does not establish legally binding requirements for XAI in tax, 173 but some soft law instruments engage with matters of AI and explanation, which are scrutinized in section 4.2.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [173] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
AI systems that process only anonymized data or aggregate statistical data are not subject to GDPR-related explanation requirements.
“systems that only process anonymized data 193 or deal with statistical data at an aggregate level are not dealing with information that can be associated with a specific natural person.194 Therefore, they are not subject to any GDPR-related explanation requirements.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Some soft law instruments engage with matters of AI and explanation.
“Current international and national law does not establish legally binding requirements for XAI in tax, 173 but some soft law instruments engage with matters of AI and explanation, which are scrutinized in section 4.2.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [173] source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The GDPR locates explanation at the level of the individual decision rather than at the level of the system.
“As a result, the GDPR situates explanation at the level of the decision and not at the level of the system.199”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The prohibition of discrimination in article 14 of the ECHR does not seem to provide a solid legal basis for ensuring the explainability of AI systems in tax law.
“-the prohibition of discrimination in article 14 of the ECHR does not seem to provide a solid legal basis for ensuring the explainability of AI systems in tax law.169”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [169]
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
The proposed AI Act regulates AI systems as products placed on the European single market, regardless of whether they rely on personal data.
“The second approach, which has its centre in the proposed AI Act, regulates AI systems as products put on the European single market, regardless of their reliance on personal data.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites AI Act (Commission Proposal) (2021)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
The EU data protection law approach to explainability for AI is limited to processing data associated with natural persons.
“The first approach to such regulation within the EU data protection law framework is restricted to situations involving the processing of data that can be associated with natural persons”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Regulation (EU) 2016/679
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
The European Union exercises considerable influence over the regulation of digital technologies even beyond its borders.
“Since the European Union exercises considerable influence over the regulation of digital technologies even beyond its borders, 172 an analysis of the European approach to XAI regulation provides insights on the limited extent to which existing law creates requirements for explanation in tax AI systems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [172]
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Where data about natural persons is used in decision-making, those natural persons hold the right to request an explanation of the decision.
“To the extent that data about natural persons is used in decision-making, the natural persons to which this data refers have the right to request an explanation of the decision.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites articles 13-15 of the GDPR
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Some sources of hard and soft law could have important implications for adopting XAI in a given jurisdiction, not least by sketching the contours of a prospective minimum legal standard for XAI in tax law.
“Some of these sources of hard and soft law could have important implications for adopting XAI in a given jurisdiction, not least by sketching the contours of a prospective minimum legal standard for XAI in tax law.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Many tax-domain AI applications, especially those involving corporate taxpayers, fall outside the scope of EU data protection law.
“meaning that many applications in the tax domain do not fall within its scope, notably those related to corporate taxpayers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In many other tax-related cases, the ECtHR either declared the applications inadmissible or found no violation of article 14 in conjunction with other ECHR provisions or Protocols.
“In many other tax-related cases, the ECtHR either declared that the applications were inadmissible or found no violation of the invoked article 14 of the ECHR in conjunction with other provisions of the ECHR or the Protocols.167”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [167]
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
A significant number of tax-law AI uses are not covered by either the EU data protection rules or the proposed AI Act.
“Although we will see that many applications of AI in the tax domain fall outside the scope of either of these regulations, their examination provides useful insights for designing explanation systems in tax contexts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
AI regulation is not exhausted by data governance issues.
“Yet, data governance matters do not exhaust the role of AI regulation, 180 which is why the European Commission recently proposed a Regulation for a European Approach to AI. 181”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Lehr & Ohm
Not checked in the free run.
- cites AI Act (Commission Proposal) (2021)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
Any processing of personal data for tax purposes is covered by the GDPR, even where the actual outcome does not amount to personal data.
“any processing of personal data for tax purposes, even if the actual outcome does not amount to personal data, is covered by the GDPR.192”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites LV: ECJ (Fifth Chamber), 24 Feb. 2022, Case C-175/20, SIA "SS" v. Valsts ieņēmumu dienests
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Because data processing must comply with all applicable legal requirements, the design of data processing must account for requirements arising from the tax domain as well as those from data protection law.
“Since data processing must comply with all applicable legal requirements, the design of data processing must account not just for those requirements stemming from data protection law but also for those derived from the tax domain.207”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Any explanation drawn from AI Act technical documentation is global, addressing the AI system as a whole rather than specific decisions.
“Still, such an explanation will be global, as it focuses on the AI system in its entirety and not any specific decisions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The AI Act does not provide grounds for a general right to an explanation of tax decisions concerning a taxpayer.
“Consequently, the AI Act does not provide grounds for a general right to an explanation of tax decisions concerning a taxpayer.235”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Identifying whether meaningful human participation exists in a decision-making process can be difficult given the practical conditions under which the decision occurs.
“Identifying the existence or absence of meaningful human participation in a decision-making process can also be difficult in light of the conditions under which a decision happens in practice.203”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Almada, supra n. 188
Not checked in the free run.
- cites B. Wagner, Liable, but Not in Control?Ensuring Meaningful Human Agency in Automated Decision-Making Systems
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Under article 11 of the AI Act, a system's technical documentation must provide its design specifications, including the general logic of the AI system and of the algorithms.
“Under article 11 of the AI Act, a system's technical documentation must provide its design specifications, including but not limited to "the general logic of the AI system and of the algorithms".230”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
Article 14(3)(a) of the AI Act requires the identification and construction of technically feasible measures ensuring effective human oversight before a high-risk system is placed on the market or put into service.
“Likewise, article 14(3)(a) requires the identification and construction of technically feasible measures to ensure effective human oversight before a high-risk system is placed on the market or put into service.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The GDPR's focus on individual decisions may be insufficient to capture systemic patterns in decision-making, such as those leading to algorithmic discrimination.
“This focus on individual decisions might, however, be insufficient to capture systemic patterns in decision-making, such as those leading to algorithmic discrimination.198”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pałka, supra n. 174
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Adopting local post hoc explanations can be useful for complying with the AI Act's monitoring requirements.
“Nevertheless, the adoption of local post hoc explanations can be useful for complying with monitoring requirements.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Post hoc explanation measures are required only where no other way exists to address risk in a particular context of application.
“Therefore, post hoc explanation measures are only required if there is no other way to address risk in a particular context of application.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Prior use of soft law on AI in interpretation has been demonstrated by the Slovak Constitutional Court's eKasa judgment, which referred to Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1.
“At the level of interpretation, soft law regarding AI has already proved to be useful, as follows, for example, from the Slovak Constitutional Court's judgment in eKasa, in which the Court broadly referred to non-legally binding Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the human rights impacts of algorithmic systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Austria's Data Protection Act extends a narrow set of data protection legal rights to legal persons.
“indeed Austria's Data Protection Act (DSG) (BGBI.I 165/99) extends a narrow set of data protection legal rights to legal persons.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Austria's Data Protection Act (DSG) (BGBI.I 165/99)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
From an instrumental perspective, data protection law gives natural persons in the tax domain, i.e. individual taxpayers, mechanisms to assert their rights only to the extent that decisions are based on their personal data.
“an instrumental perspective, it provides natural persons in the tax domain (individual taxpayers) with mechanisms they can use to assert their rights, but only to the extent that decisions are based on their personal data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A sufficiently detailed description of the system's logic might amount to an explanation.
“A sufficiently detailed description of this logic might amount to an explanation, as discussed in the context of the GDPR above.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Data controllers have considerable leeway to avoid explaining, provided they offer alternative mechanisms that adequately protect data subject rights.
“Data controllers therefore have considerable leeway to avoid explaining so long as they provide alternative mechanisms that ensure the adequate protection of data subject rights.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Explainable AI techniques are particularly useful for challenging decisions involving AI systems, because contesting a decision depends on suitable information about what was decided.
“They are particularly useful when it comes to challenging decisions involving AI systems -through the courts, administrative authorities, or other channels for complaint -as exercising the right to contest a decision depends on the existence of suitable information about what has been decided in the first place.208”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Member States are not prevented from establishing norms governing the processing of data referring to identified or identifiable legal persons.
“However, Member States are not blocked from establishing norms to govern the processing of data referring to identified or identifiable legal persons”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Recital 14
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Because article 14(4)(c) requires human overseers to be able to interpret AI output correctly, post hoc explanations can be used to satisfy that requirement.
“Since article 14(4)(c) states that human overseers must be able to correctly interpret AI output, post hoc explanations can be used to meet this requirement.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
Under article 9(2) of the AI Act, high-risk AI systems must be accompanied by an effective risk management system allowing identification and analysis of known and foreseeable risks and estimation and evaluation of risks arising during operation.
“Under article 9(2) of the AI Act, high-risk AI systems must be accompanied by an effective risk management system that allows for the identification and analysis of known and foreseeable risks, as well as for the estimation and evaluation of risks that arise during operation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The exclusion of legal persons from the GDPR is not a legislative oversight but a constitutive property of the EU data protection regime.
“As Recital 14 states, this decision is not an oversight by the legislator, but a constitutive property of the EU data protection regime.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Recital 14
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
International legal standards have not yet caught up with the constitutional diagnosis that AI in tax matters threatens taxpayer rights.
“However, international legal standards have yet to catch up with the constitutional diagnosis presented above.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 demands high explainability standards when algorithmic systems make decisions that pose significant human rights risks.
“As far as contestability is concerned, Council of Europe Recommendation CM/REC (2020)1 requires that the explainability of processes and output be held to high standards where algorithmic systems are used in decision-making processes that carry high human rights risks.261”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [261]
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
XAI in tax law lacks a minimum legal standard.
“No Minimum Legal Standard for XAI in Tax Law and Fragmentation of the AI Legal Environment”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Human rights frameworks can contribute to shaping a minimum legal standard for the use of XAI in tax matters.
“even the well-established reticence to apply ECHR provisions to tax law matters is not enough to dispel the relevance of XAI for the lawful use of AI in the tax domain, which suggests that human rights frameworks can play a role in the development of a minimum legal standard for the use of XAI in tax matters.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Tax secrecy will continue to be a problem when AI systems are used for tax purposes.
“Moreover, where AI systems serve tax purposes, the problem of tax secrecy will remain.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: AI systems are used in tax matters.
- Premisecitation
Ferrazzini indicates the ECtHR hesitates to apply ECHR fair trial guarantees in tax cases.
“While the Ferrazzini ruling shows the ECtHR is reluctant to extend the fair trial provisions of the ECHR to tax matters,”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Constitutional and human rights frameworks are strained by inexplainable AI in tax matters, since missing explanations can undermine the precision, transparency, and predictability that tax law and its administration require.
“As section 3. shows, current constitutional and human rights frameworks come under strain when inexplainable AI systems are used in tax matters, as the lack of explanation potentially erodes the precision, transparency and predictability expected of tax law and its execution.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
The AI legal environment is fragmented.
“No Minimum Legal Standard for XAI in Tax Law and Fragmentation of the AI Legal Environment”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Because inexplainable AI in tax matters affects taxpayers' ability to protect themselves from adverse tax authority decisions, adopting technical explanation measures appears necessary for the ECHR to be effective.
“deemed to impact the rights of taxpayers to effectively protect themselves from the adverse effects of tax authority decisions, and the adoption of technical explanation measures would therefore appear to be a requirement for ensuring the effectiveness of the ECHR itself.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The same problem extends to all recommendations in national instruments that, to varying degrees, address the need for explainability of AI systems at the technological level.
“This problem also extends to all recommendations found in national instruments that, to varying extents, deal with the need for the explainability of AI systems at the technological level.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
XAI guidelines are pertinent to tax contexts.
“Therefore, the guidelines established for XAI can be considered relevant in tax matters, meaning that AI systems used by tax authorities should be capable of technical explainability as well as legal explainability.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: AI systems are used in tax matters.
- Interpretationreasoning
EU law imposes only a limited obligation to adopt explanation in tax contexts.
“Consequently, these laws impose only a limited obligation to adopt explanation in tax contexts”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The Dutch first-instance SyRI ruling links breaches of private and family life with fair trial breaches, citing a common feature of AI legislation: lack of explainability.
“the SyRI judgment by a Dutch court of first instance finds an implicit connection between the violation of the right to respect for private and family life and the violation of the right to a fair trial because of a feature common to all legislation governing the use of AI systemstheir lack of explainability.265”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [265]
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
Until that Recommendation provision becomes hard law, displacing trade secrecy to enable AI explainability will likely remain hard.
“That is indeed very important for the effective explainability of AI systems, but as long as this point of the Recommendation is not implemented as hard law, it will prove difficult to displace trade secrecy for purposes of the explainability of AI systems.263”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [263]
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 is not implemented as hard law.
- Premisecitation
Trade secrecy cannot stand in the way of ensuring that affected persons receive explanations, as acknowledged in Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1.
“Trade secrecy cannot stay in the way of achieving this end, as acknowledged in Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec (2020)1.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec (2020)1
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The OECD and Council of Europe recommendations could create tensions with tax and trade secrecy.
“The aforementioned recommendations could trigger tensions in terms of tax and trade secrecy, as discussed in section 2.2.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
ECHR case law gives reason to hold that legislators must ensure AI use does not violate fair trial, private and family life, or non-discrimination principles.
“Indeed, various judicial decisions within the framework of the ECHR provide grounds to maintain that legislators are obliged by case law to ensure that the use of AI does not interfere with principles such as the right to a fair trial, respect for private and family life and non-discrimination.264”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [264]
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
XAI will not solve every issue introduced by the opacity of AI in tax applications.
“This is not to say that XAI will solve every issue introduced by the opacity of AI in tax applications.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The safeguards of Section III of the AI Act apply to judicial activity in tax-related cases.
“which means the safeguards of Section III of the AI Act apply to judicial activity in tax-related cases.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Because the AI Act rests on the single-market competence rather than data protection law, it applies to contexts that fall outside the scope of data protection law.
“This change in legal grounds ensures that the AI Act applies to contexts that fall outside the scope of data protection law.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 165
- May combine two claims. 107
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Findingnone givenThe main task of the court was to assess whether the SyRI legislation met the requirements of necessity and proportionality under article 8(2) of the ECHR in light of the aims it pursues.
“The main task of the court was to assess whether the SyRI legislation met the requirements of necessity and proportionality pursuant to article 8(2) of the ECHR in light of the aims it pursues.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
FindingcitationThe addressees of the SyRI legislation were neither able to defend themselves against the fact that a risk report concerning them had been submitted nor could they be sure that their data had been processed on proper grounds.
“As a result, the addressees of the SyRI legislation were neither able to defend themselves against the fact that a risk report concerning them had been submitted nor could they be sure that their data had been processed on proper grounds (paragraph 6.90).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
FindingcitationThe court focused its analysis on whether the SyRI legislation met the conditions under article 8(2) of the ECHR.
“Accordingly, the court focused its analysis on whether the SyRI legislation met the conditions under article 8(2) of the ECHR, which lays down restrictions on the right to respect for private life.158”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [158]
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
FindingcitationThe risk model, the type of algorithm used in the model, and the risk analysis method were also salient.
“Also salient were the risk model, the type of algorithm used in the model, and the risk analysis method (paragraphs 6.87 and 6.89).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
FindingreasoningThe court explained which characteristics of the SyRI legislation failed to comply with article 8(2) of the ECHR.
“In that regard, the court explained, inter alia, which characteristics of the SyRI legislation failed to comply with article 8(2) of the ECHR.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
FindingcitationIn the SyRI case, the focal point of the claimants' arguments was the alleged violation of article 8 of the ECHR.
“In that case, the focal point of the arguments of the claimants (NJCM et al.) was the alleged violation of article 8 of the ECHR.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [157] source
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Findingnone givenThe objective factual data that could lead to a justifiable conclusion that there was an increased risk of tax fraud was fully opaque and thus non-explainable.
“Notably, the objective factual data, which could lead to the justifiable conclusion that there was an increased risk of tax fraud, was fully opaque and thus non-explainable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningThe AI Act's explanation measures do not apply to all uses of AI in the tax domain and offer little recourse for taxpayers.
“Such measures, however, do not apply to all uses of AI in the tax domain, and they offer little recourse for taxpayers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningNone of the rubrics in Annex III of the AI Act cover the use of AI to calculate the amount of tax owed in a given context or the use of AI by taxpayers.
“None of the rubrics under Annex III of the AI Act cover, for example, the use of AI to calculate the amount of tax owed in a given context or the use of AI by taxpayers, which is likely to account for a substantial share of tax AI applications.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The use of AI by taxpayers accounts for a substantial share of tax AI applications.
May combine two claims.
Findingnone givenNational documents include reviews of the state of the art in XAI, frameworks for explanation and proposals for technical standards for explainability, but none of them focuses on the specific challenges of AI in the tax sector.
“In addition to these general principles, national documents have included reviews of the state of the art in XAI, 242 frameworks for explanation 243 and proposals for setting up technical standards for explainability, 244 although none of these focuses on the specific challenges of AI in the tax sector.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningThere is no general obligation to adopt post hoc explanation measures, because risk-based approaches do not mandate specific measures.
“There is no general obligation to adopt such measures, however: as discussed in section 4.1.1.concerning data protection by design, these riskbased approaches do not mandate the adoption of specific measures.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningThe AI Act requires general ex ante explanations of high-risk systems and stimulates local post hoc explanations as part of its high-risk management system.
“To sum up the previous discussion, the AI Act requires general ex ante explanations of highrisk systems and stimulates local post hoc explanations as part of its high-risk management system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingnone givenTax and trade secrecy legislation that adversely affects tax XAI is the only clear-cut type of legislation to have gained purchase worldwide.
“Tax and trade secrecy legislation that adversely affects tax XAI is the only clear-cut type of legislation to have gained purchase worldwide.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingnone givenAs of March 2022, the proposed AI Act covered only a narrow set of tax-related applications, including criminal prosecutions but not the everyday tasks of tax administrations.
“As of March 2022, the proposed AI Act applies only to a narrow set of tax-related applications, which include criminal prosecutions but not the everyday tasks of tax administrations”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Findingnone givenAI regulations are currently highly fragmented, with the European Union at the forefront of legal initiatives.
“Currently, we observe huge fragmentation in AI regulations, with the European Union at the forefront of legal”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
FindingreasoningNon-legally binding guidelines do not address tax secrecy, perhaps because none of them deals specifically with AI systems in tax law.
“Non-legally binding guidelines do not address the issue of tax secrecy, perhaps because none of them deals specifically with AI systems in tax law.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Findingnone givenLittle has been done to regulate the use of AI in the least harmful way for all interested parties, including taxpayers, tax authorities and AI developers.
“little has been done yet in terms of regulating the use of AI in the least harmful way (harmful to all interested parties, including taxpayers, tax authorities and the developers of AI systems).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingnone givenNeither the proposed AI Act nor the GDPR explicitly requires any form of post hoc explanation.
“While neither legal instrument explicitly requires any form of post hoc explanation”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Findingnone givenThere is currently little pressure on tax administration organizations and legislators to formulate standard procedures.
“Currently, there is little pressure on tax administration organizations and legislators to formulate standard procedures.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationAI systems could reduce time and cost for taxpayers and governments alike.
“they have the potential to save time and money for both taxpayers and governments.8”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [8] source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe requirement for XAI in tax law follows from the constitutional principles that guide taxation.
“This demand follows from the constitutional principles that guide taxation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationTax administrations increasingly use AI systems for automation, and AI systems are becoming more important for modern taxation.
“Tax administrations globally increasingly rely on artificial intelligence (AI) systems for automation.”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
“Artificial intelligence (AI) systems 1 are increasingly important for modern taxation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [2]
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [3]
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [4]
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- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
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PremisecitationTax authorities use AI systems for enforcement tasks including obtaining information about taxpayer behaviour, guiding tax inspections, assessing fraud risks, and automating asset seizure in fraud cases.
“Others are used by tax authorities in their enforcement work: to obtain information about taxpayer behaviour, 4 guide tax inspection practices, 5 assess fraud risks 6 or even automate the procedures involved in seizing assets in cases of fraud.7”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [5]
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InterpretationreasoningProtecting taxpayers' rights adequately requires XAI technologies that make the operation and decisions of tax AI systems intelligible to taxpayers, appeal bodies, and courts.
“This article argues that adequate protection of taxpayers' rights demands the use of eXplainable AI (XAI) technologies that can render the functioning and decisions of tax AI systems understandable for taxpayers, administrative appeal bodies and the courts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: It is possible to develop XAI methods that make tax AI systems intelligible to taxpayers, appeal bodies, and courts.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationAI systems might be applied for aims outside the legitimate scope for which they were introduced.
“they may be used for purposes beyond the legitimate scope that motivated their introduction, 10”
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PremisecitationAI systems are not error-proof and can produce biased decisions.
“AI systems are not error-proof, which means that they can produce biased decisions; 9”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [9]
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Interpretationnone givenAutomation of tax administration through AI has a substantial potential impact on the rights of taxpayers subject to algorithmic assessments, and this impact is worsened by the opacity of complex AI systems.
“However, automation has a huge potential impact on the rights of taxpayers subject to algorithmic assessments, which is compounded by the opacity of complex AI systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationTax administrations' abundance of data favours AI use: the volume is too large for humans to examine directly, and random errors tend to cancel out, leaving a clear pattern for AI models to learn.
“In this data-rich environment, tax administrations enjoy conditions that are very favourable to the use of AI technologies: 31 (i) the volume of data is so great that its direct examination is not feasible through human labour; 32 and (ii) the large amounts of data mean that any”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationBig data and mathematical complexity make AI systems opaque: their models are hard for humans, even experts, to understand; their scale is difficult to grasp; and trade and industrial secrets block disclosure of detailed explanations.
“This combination of big data and mathematical complexity renders AI systems opaque in various ways: the mathematical models that underpin such systems are scientifically backed but difficult to understand for humans, even those with expert training -the sheer scale of the data and computing operations involved in these models is hard to grasp, and trade and industrial secrets prevent disclosure of”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [15]
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PremisecitationUK tax authority HMRC has used social media data since 2010, cross-checking it with other databases to detect fraudulent activity.
“In the United Kingdom, the HMRC has already been relying on data from social media since 2010, cross-checking it with data from a plethora of other databases 42 to detect fraudulent activity.”
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PremisecitationMany tax AI applications are powered by machine learning, especially deep learning, and make decisions by applying complex mathematical models to large volumes of data.
“applications such as those described above are often powered by machine learning methods, deep learning in particular, which make decisions based on applying complex mathematical models to large volumes of data.14”
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PremisecitationAI systems can cause harm for reasons including inadequate design, reliance on biased data, or use for an illegitimate purpose.
“AI systems could also bring about harm due to various other reasons, such as inadequate design, reliance on biased data or the application thereof for an illegitimate purpose.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [52] source
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PremisecitationThe UK's Connect AI system, introduced in 2010 and developed with BAE Systems, performs this task.
“This task is performed by an AI system known as Connect, which was introduced in 2010 and developed with the help of BAE Systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [43]
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InterpretationreasoningLocal post hoc explanations appear best suited to taxpayers' need to know how they are individually affected by tax authority decisions.
“For example, taxpayers need to know how they have been individually affected by decisions made by tax authorities.Local post hoc explanations appear to be best suited to such needs.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Taxpayers require information about how tax authority decisions affect them personally.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationcitationConnect is worth its cost.
“Although Connect allegedly cost GBP 100 million, it is worth that price insofar as it has helped recover more than GBP 3 billion in taxes since its launch date.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [44] source
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InterpretationreasoningCourts may need both local and global post hoc explanation tools to assess the lawfulness of tax decisions that stem from or are facilitated by AI systems.
“Courts, in turn, might need both local and global post hoc tools in order to assess the lawfulness of tax decisions stemming from -or facilitated by -AI systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Courts assess the lawfulness of tax decisions.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningWithout explanation, taxpayers may be concerned about whether automated decisions produce fair and non-discriminatory results.
“Without such an explanation, taxpayers might be concerned about whether automated decisions yield fair and non-discriminatory results.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationProviding explanations for decisions in the legal field can raise difficult technical issues.
“From a technical perspective, explaining decisions in the legal domain can pose difficult problems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [27] source
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PremisecitationOpacity surrounding AI systems worsens these risks and can stop taxpayers from learning how a tax decision was made or even that an AI-based decision exists.
“All these risks are compounded by the various forms of opacity that surround AI systems, which may preclude taxpayers from learning about the tax decision-making procedure or even about the existence of a decision based on an AI system in the first place.12”
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Premisenone givenAI systems seem to receive the most attention for how they help tax professionals in both sectors become more efficient and accurate.
“The strongest attention to AI systems appears to be given to their contribution to increasing the efficiency and accuracy of tax people in both the private and public sectors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone givenAttention of those developing and using AI systems in tax law has so far been predominantly focused on efficiency and accuracy.
“So far, however, the attention of people engaged in the development and use of AI systems in tax law appears to be predominantly focused on the efficiency and accuracy of such systems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationMaking tax AI systems explainable allows decisions involving them to be contested through the same channels as human decisions, giving taxpayers the same legal protections as for human decisions.
“By rendering tax AI systems explainable, tax authorities ensure that the decisions made with their involvement can be contestable through the same channels used to contest human decisions, thus affording taxpayers the same legal protections they enjoy in respect of a decision made by a human.”
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PremisecitationThe system wrongfully accused recipients of welfare fraud, causing considerable financial harm to innocent people and sometimes health issues.
“By wrongfully accusing these recipients of welfare fraud, the system inflicted considerable financial harm on innocent people, sometimes even causing them to suffer health issues.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [59] source
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PremisecitationXAI techniques include local post hoc explanations that clarify factors and their relevance for a particular decision, global post hoc approaches that build simplified models from many decisions, and ex ante approaches that build the AI system so humans can assess its inner workings.
“Some of these approaches focus on identifying the factors that an AI system takes into account when making decisions: local post hoc explanations clarify which factors were considered and their relevance for each particular decision, 22 whereas global post hoc approaches observe a large range of decisions and build simplified models of how the original AI system operates.23 This idea of”
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- cites [23]
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- cites [24] source
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- Rests on an assumption: XAI research has produced methods that make AI decisions intelligible to people.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationOver 90% of current tax compliance risk enquiries are triggered by information and analyses generated by Connect.
“Enquiries are currently triggered in the vast majority of tax compliance risk cases (over 90%) by information and analyses generated by Connect.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [44] source
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InterpretationreasoningTax explanations must account for the normative dimension of tax-related decisions, which requires new techniques that are still under development.
“Hence, tax explanations also need to account for the normative dimension of tax-related decisions, a task that requires new techniques still under development.28”
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PremisecitationThe large datasets available to tax administrations expand rapidly and come from diverse, often high-quality sources that only tax authorities can access.
“This big data grows substantially by the day, drawing from a variety of sources, many of which are high in quality and can only be obtained by tax authorities.30”
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InterpretationreasoningThe examples demonstrate that AI systems have wide-ranging applicability in taxation.
“These examples showcase the wide-ranging applicability of AI systems in taxation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone givenEven successful development of XAI techniques may have little practical impact if tax authorities and other stakeholders do not adopt them.
“Even if these techniques are successfully developed, they might have little practical effect if they are not adopted by tax authorities and other stakeholders using AI for tax purposes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationConnect allegedly cost GBP 100 million.
“Although Connect allegedly cost GBP 100 million, it is worth that price insofar as it has helped recover more than GBP 3 billion in taxes since its launch date.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [44] source
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InterpretationreasoningThe need to satisfy current legal duties to justify tax decisions might encourage tax authorities and other stakeholders to adopt XAI techniques.
“this article examines one potential factor that could push tax authorities and other stakeholders towards using XAI techniques: the need to comply with existing legal requirements for justifying tax-related decisions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
PremisereasoningSuch protection is necessary since automated decisions may substantially affect taxpayers' rights.
“This protection is needed because automated decisions can have a considerable impact on taxpayers' rights.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenConnect searches for correlations between declared income and lifestyle, comparing them with multivariate statistical models using AI.
“Connect searches for correlations between declared income (e.g. the tax records of businesses and individuals) and lifestyle (e.g.social media, the Charity Commission, flight sales and passenger information), comparing it with multivariate statistical models using AI.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningExisting binding and non-binding instruments fail to set a minimum legal standard for XAI in tax law, largely because they address few tax-specific issues, leaving a fragmented regulatory landscape in which administrative efficiency overrides taxpayer rights.
“section 5. argues that, currently, binding and non-binding instruments do not provide a minimum legal standard for XAI in tax law, especially as they have little to say about tax-specific issues, leading to a fragmented regulatory scenario in which taxpayer rights are trampled in the name of administrative efficiency.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationA recent trend appears to be continuing: AI systems are spreading rapidly and increasingly across public administrations, including tax administrations.
“A recent trend -the rapid and steadily increasing global spread of AI systems in public administrations, including tax administrations -would seem to be ongoing.”
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PremisecitationDifferent XAI approaches can be useful for different purposes.
“Each of these approaches can be useful for different purposes.25”
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- Rests on an assumption: XAI research has produced methods that make AI decisions intelligible to people.
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PremisecitationConnect has recovered over GBP 3 billion in taxes since it was launched.
“Although Connect allegedly cost GBP 100 million, it is worth that price insofar as it has helped recover more than GBP 3 billion in taxes since its launch date.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [44] source
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InterpretationreasoningXAI techniques are evolving to meet the needs of various stakeholders.
“Consequently, XAI techniques are developing in ways that address the needs of multiple stakeholders.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningTax law and its execution must at a minimum be subject to express and clear legal safeguards protecting taxpayer rights, which means the execution of tax law must be maximally transparent and precise for taxpayers.
“Tax law and its execution must at least be subject to express and clear legal safeguards for protecting taxpayer rights, meaning that the execution of tax law must be maximally transparent and precise for taxpayers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenFor private-sector AI decisions in B2C and B2B settings, an explanation is needed only if a particular law mandates it, which is a weak or narrow reason for XAI.
“In the private sector, where the AI-supported decision-making process takes place in business-to-consumers (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) relationships, decisions require explanation only when a specific law requires it (weak/narrow XAI motivation).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningIn light of constitutional principles, explainability must be the essential feature of an AI system used in tax matters.
“In other words, the essential feature of an AI system in tax matters must, in light of constitutional principles, be its explainability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAI systems in tax law that lack explainability fail the proportionality test for ensuring the effective prevention of tax fraud, because they are not necessary to achieve that purpose and remain too invasive of taxpayers' fundamental rights.
“If AI systems in tax law are deprived of explainability, they do not pass the proportionality test when it comes to ensuring the effective prevention of tax fraud, insofar as they are not necessary to achieve that purpose and remain too invasive to the fundamental rights of taxpayers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThis undermines both the rationale for tax secrecy and equality of access to information, and increases distrust in tax authorities.
“This compromises both the rationale of tax secrecy and equality of access to information, thereby exacerbating the distrust in tax authorities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationFor B2C relationships, data protection law and consumer protection law mandate explainability.
“In B2C relations, explainability is required under data protection law 63 and consumer protection”
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PremisecitationThere is a fundamental relationship between explainable AI and transparency, fairness and accountability.
“Furthermore, there is a fundamental relationship between XAI and transparency, fairness and accountability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites D.D. Shin, The effects of explainability and causability on perception, trust, and acceptance
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PremisecitationTrade secrecy aims to protect the data model functionality of AI systems from theft.
“Beyond that, trade secrecy's goal is to protect the data model functionality of AI systems from being stolen.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [93]
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InterpretationreasoningWhere tax decisions are automated and stem from significant discretionary power of the tax authorities, the highest possible level of explainable AI should be ensured.
“If such decisions are automated and stem from a significant discretionary power of the tax authorities, the highest possible level of XAI should be ensured.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationFrench and German tax administrations use AI systems for automated risk assessment (such as scoring returns for audit) that are concealed from taxpayers by tax secrecy.
“AI systems used by the French 85 and German 86 tax administrations for automation-based risk assessment purposes (e.g., risk-scoring tax returns for audits) are hidden from the taxpayer behind a veil of tax secrecy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [85] source
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PremisecitationFour levels of machine learning explainability have been proposed: revealing only the model's main features; providing all the model's features; providing the set of features that led to the specific outcome; and sharing the whole model.
“Scholars have suggested four levels of machine learning explainability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites A. Bibal et al., Impact of Legal Requirements on Explainability in Machine Learning
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InterpretationreasoningThe fourth level of explainability, sharing the whole model, could serve the purpose of explainability because it would let practitioners evaluate predictions and thoroughly test models deployed in the legal environment, enabling the scientific and business communities to improve those models.
“The last level could serve the purpose of explainability as it would allow practitioners to evaluate predictions and thoroughly test the models deployed in the legal environment, thus allowing the scientific and business communities to improve the models.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningClients of large tax consultancy firms can afford to anticipate how tax administrations' AI systems function, while other taxpayers cannot.
“Taxpayers who are clients of large tax consultancy firms can bear the costs of anticipating the functioning of AI systems used by tax administrations, while other taxpayers cannot.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningGreater trust allows model creators to gather more data, which produces better and more reliable results for predictive systems.
“As trust increases, it allows model creators to gather more data, which yields better and more reliable results for the predictive systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisereasoningWhere tax authorities hold wide discretion, as in tax avoidance cases governed by general anti-abuse clauses, they must explain their choices and legal reasoning meticulously.
“they must meticulously explain their choices and legal reasoning.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Art.6 (general anti-avoidance rule, GAAR) Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164
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- cites Art.7(1) (principal purposes test, PPT) Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS (MLI)
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PremisecitationTrade secrecy, like tax secrecy, hides how AI systems work internally, which can let small changes to input data produce different outcomes.
“To some extent, trade secrecy plays a similar role to tax secrecy, i.e. preventing the discovery of the inner functioning of AI systems, thus potentially allowing minimal changes to the input data to bring about different outcomes”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [92]
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PremisecitationExplainable AI systems are regarded as more trustworthy and reliable, which leads to their wider adoption irrespective of the environment in which they are deployed.
“Explainable AI systems are considered more trustworthy and reliable, which leads to their wider adoption regardless of the environment in which they are deployed.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites D.B. David, Y.S. Resheff & T. Tron, Explainable AI and Adoption of Financial Algorithmic Advisors: An Experimental Study
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PremisecitationThe EU has worked considerably to steer AI development through the draft AI regulation recently issued by the European Commission.
“The European Union has shown considerable effort in guiding the creation of AI systems in the draft AI regulation recently published by the European Commission.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [62] source
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PremisecitationThe justification of tax authority decisions must be clear and precise and must reflect the real motives behind the decision.
“The justification for such decisions must be clear and precise and reflect the real motives behind the decision.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Art.41 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the EU Charter)
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InterpretationreasoningExplainability of AI systems is a step towards the constitutionality of their use but cannot by itself ensure that compatibility, because even a perfectly explainable AI system could still be used arbitrarily by tax authorities, making taxation unpredictable.
“The explainability of AI systems is a step towards the constitutionality of its use, but it cannot ensure such compatibility on its own because even a perfectly explainable AI system could nevertheless be arbitrarily used by tax authorities, thus rendering taxation unpredictable.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThere is no room for using inexplainable AI systems for taxation purposes, including tax-related practices such as identifying which taxpayers will be subjected to a tax inspection.
“Accordingly, there is no room for using inexplainable AI systems for taxation purposes, including tax-related practices such as identifying which taxpayers will be subjected to a tax inspection.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationTax authorities worldwide increasingly use AI technologies and often rely on systems made by a few large corporations.
“tax authorities worldwide increasingly rely on AI technologies for their operation, and, in doing so, they often rely on systems and technical solutions produced by a handful of large corporations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [120]
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PremisecitationData accuracy is only one of many qualities an algorithmic system needs, and it says nothing about how the algorithm produces results or handles input data.
“Data accuracy is an important quality for purposes of data science, but it is still only one among many various qualities an algorithmic system must have.In particular, data accuracy does not provide us with information about how the algorithm delivers results or deals with input data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [103]
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PremisecitationTax authorities must be accountable.
“In particular, tax authorities must be accountable.131”
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InterpretationreasoningExplaining AI decisions is necessary to assess whether tax authorities comply with the constitutional principles binding them, so that automated taxation remains within the rule of law.
“In this context, explaining AI decisions becomes necessary 136 to assess whether tax authorities comply with the constitutional principles that bind their activities, thus ensuring that automated taxation remains within the domain of the rule of law.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [136] source
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PremisereasoningLocal post hoc explanation methods appear most suitable for taxpayers.
“For these stakeholders, therefore, local post hoc explanation methods -such as individual conditional explanation (ICE) plots, Shapley values, local interpretable model-agnostic explanations (LIME) or other alternative local surrogate methods, case-based explanations or counterfactual explanations -appear to be most suitable”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [116]
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InterpretationreasoningThat successful example shows the potential of minimum standards as a global governance tool.
“This successful example shows the potential of minimum standards as a tool for global governance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAn appropriate explanation from tax authorities when they use AI systems would increase taxpayer trust and would also help judges deciding disputes involving AI systems.
“Receiving an appropriate explanation from the tax authorities whenever they rely on AI systems would contribute to the taxpayer's trust in the functioning of such systems.It would also be informative for judges when they resolve disputes between stakeholders that use AI systems and the”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe state's power to establish and collect taxes is subject to constitutional limits that unchecked AI use could erode.
“As shown in section 2.1.,such limits could be eroded by the unchecked use of AI.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationMost constitutions set out the legal contours of taxation in considerable detail, and constitutions and international human rights texts include provisions requiring due process for decisions that restrict rights.
“most constitutions establish the legal contours of taxation to a considerable level of detail.Those constitutions -and the international legal texts on human rights that were adopted starting in the second half of the 20th century -also include several provisions on the need for due process regarding decisions that restrict the rights of natural and legal persons.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [125]
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Interpretationnone givenThe ECHR is not global and its reach into tax matters is limited, but it has been invoked in cases involving AI and related technologies.
“While that convention is not a global document, and its applicability to tax issues is somewhat limited, it has been invoked in various cases involving AI and related technologies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone givenTaxpayers and their advisers mainly ask why questions, such as why a system computed a particular tax value or placed a taxpayer in a particular category.
“Taxpayers -as the subjects/addressees of decisions rendered fully or in part by AI systems -and their tax advisers are primarily concerned with why questions: why did a system calculate this value of due tax and not something smaller (or bigger)?Why was a taxpayer classified into a particular category?”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationEven when information is disclosed, the technical skill needed to understand AI systems means disclosure alone is insufficient; individuals and small businesses need some explanation of how AI systems work.
“Even if such information is provided, the technical skills required to understand the operation of AI systems mean that the mere disclosure of the information is not enough: 126 individuals and small businesses -in fact, anyone but the very largest companies -need some form of explanation of how AI systems operate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [126]
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PremisecitationExpert systems in tax make decisions from explicit rules built by modelling tax professionals' knowledge into a computer-processable form.
“expert systems in the tax domain make decisions based on explicit rules obtained by modelling the knowledge of tax professionals into a form that a computer can process.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [108]
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InterpretationcitationFew stakeholders have deep technical knowledge of an AI system's inner workings, so explanations must be accessible.
“Few, if any, of these stakeholders have a high level of technical knowledge about an AI system's inner workings, meaning that explanations must provide information in an accessible format.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [113]
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PremisecitationInternational bodies such as the OECD and the Council of Europe propose guidelines and legal standards for global AI governance.
“international organizations such as the OECD and the Council of Europe propose guidelines and legal standards for global AI governance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [121]
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PremisecitationFor black-box models, XAI uses post hoc explanation approaches that explain how opaque models such as neural networks reach their decisions.
“Faced with black-box models, XAI adopts post hoc approaches to explanation, 112 which build techniques to explain how opaque models such as neural networks arrive at their decisions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [112] source
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PremisecitationLocal post hoc explanation models may also serve tax authorities for why questions, while what questions are best answered by global post hoc explanation models.
“For these authorities, the local post hoc explanation models mentioned above may also work well to answer the why questions.118 In contrast, what questions are most suitably answered using global post hoc explanation models”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [118]
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InterpretationreasoningImplementing and enforcing a minimum XAI standard country by country could produce extreme global divergences, which could seriously weaken explainability as a safeguard and lead to unfair AI competition.
“implementing and enforcing such a standard on a country-by-country basis could lead to extreme divergences across the globe.These divergences, in turn, could severely undermine explainability as a safeguard regarding AI systems and even lead to unfair AI competition”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenNot all legal systems have faced constitutional challenges to tax automation, but such challenges have already been brought in a few European countries.
“not all legal systems have dealt with constitutional challenges to tax automation.However, such challenges have already been lodged in a few European countries”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenTax authorities both operate and execute tax AI systems and are responsible for making and justifying individual decisions based wholly or partly on AI outputs.
“Tax authorities are both operators and executors of AI systems for tax purposes.In such roles, they are responsible for making and justifying individual decisions based solely or in part on outcomes rendered by AI systems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBecause those rules come directly from human knowledge and are written in formal language, human observers can in principle assess them, making errors easier to find and contest in court.
“Since these rules are derived directly from human knowledge and written in formal language, they can -at least in theory -be assessed by human observers, making it easier to identify errors and, if need be, contest them in court.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningMost of the information judges need is likely to come from global post hoc explanations, though some cases may turn on how a system reached a particular decision, where local post hoc explanations could help.
“For the most part, this information is likely to come from global post hoc explanations, which might be consumed by the judges themselves or by expert witnesses.However, it is not inconceivable that certain judicial cases might hinge upon how a system arrived at a decision in a particular case.In these cases, judges might also benefit from the outputs of local post hoc explanations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThe different scope of explanation for courts and taxpayers is justified because courts must give judgments supported by reasonable and persuasive arguments, a burden taxpayers do not carry.
“This differentiation in the scope and content of the explanation of AI systems is justified by the obligation of the court to deliver a judgment backed up by reasonable and persuasive arguments in support thereof.Taxpayers bear no such burden.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationLegal literature has criticized the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Loomis v. Wisconsin for upholding a conviction based on a COMPAS risk assessment report.
“the legal literature has rightly criticized the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the United States for confirming a conviction based on a risk assessment report derived from the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) in the judgment in Loomis v. Wisconsin (13 July 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [101]
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- cites [102] source
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationAlgorithm auditing has been argued to be useful for evaluating the rules and practices of a given AI system.
“it has been argued that algorithm auditing can be useful for evaluating the rules and practices adopted in any given AI system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [95]
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenIn litigation between a taxpayer and tax authorities, judges will need information about the relevant AI system.
“In the case of litigation between a taxpayer and the tax authorities, judges will need information about the relevant AI system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationDeveloping XAI can slow things down early because it needs extra software development, but it can later save considerable time by finding bugs that would otherwise surface only at a late stage.
“Although developing XAI can severely impact the pace early on in the process, as it requires additional software development, the explanation may save a considerable amount of time by identifying bugs that otherwise would not be identified until a later stage.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [105] source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningOver time, disputes over AI explainability will decrease.
“In the long run, disputes of that nature will decrease because the number of disputes in that sphere is inversely proportional to the AI systems' degree of explainability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The number of disputes over AI explainability is inversely proportional to the degree of explainability of AI systems.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe threats from non-explainable AI systems in tax law are at least as real and serious as those from tax avoidance, even if tax policymakers have not seen or analysed them.
“The threats posed by non-explainable AI systems in tax law are no less real and serious than those stemming from tax avoidance, 124 even if they remain unseen and under-analysed by tax policymakers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [124]
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PremisecitationInterpretability and the scale at which a model operates trade off directly, since interpretable models tend to perform much worse on large datasets and become too complex even for experts.
“there is a direct trade-off between interpretability and the scale on which a model operates, as interpretable models tend to perform significantly worse when dealing with large datasets and become complex to the point that even experts struggle to make sense of them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [110] source
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PremisecitationThe rationale is that the level of protection guaranteed by the ECHR and the EU Charter in terms of defence rights is similar, but only the EU Charter is not confined to disputes relating to civil rights and obligations.
“The rationale is that the level of protection guaranteed by the ECHR in comparison to the EU Charter in terms of defence rights is similar, 149 but only the latter is not confined to disputes relating to civil rights and obligations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [149]
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningA legislative black-box AI system is far from striking such a fair balance.
“A legislative black-box AI system is far from striking such a balance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenTax AI systems frequently deal with information regarding the private and family lives of taxpayers, and the outputs of these systems are used to guide decisions that interfere with taxpayers' lives.
“As shown above, tax AI systems frequently deal with information regarding the private and family lives of taxpayers, and the outputs of these systems are used to guide decisions that interfere with taxpayers' lives.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationTax proceedings with criminal connotations concern the imposition of penalties (tax surcharges or criminal tax sanctions) on citizens in their capacity as taxpayers, essentially as punishment to discourage reoffending.
“Tax proceedings with criminal connotations concern the imposition of penalties (tax surcharges/criminal tax sanctions) on citizens in their capacity as taxpayers, essentially as punishment to discourage them from reoffending (a deterrent and a punitive purpose).146”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [146]
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InterpretationreasoningSince the SyRI legislation permitted such a black-box system for risk profiling purposes in the Netherlands, the court was correct to decide that this legislation violates article 8(2) of the ECHR and consequently the right to protection of private life under article 8(1).
“Since the SyRI legislation permitted such a black-box system for risk profiling purposes in the Netherlands, the court was, in the authors' view, correct to decide that this legislation violates article 8(2) of the ECHR and, consequently, the right to protection of private life enshrined in article 8(1) of the ECHR.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisereasoningAccording to the ECtHR, article 6 applies to tax disputes only insofar as they are triggered by tax surcharges imposed on taxpayers for behaviour of a criminal nature, typically offences of lack of tax compliance.
“In other words, according to the ECtHR, article 6 applies to tax disputes only insofar as they are triggered by tax surcharges imposed on taxpayers for their behaviour of a criminal nature, typically regarding offences of lack of tax compliance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenRequirements for explanation can be read into these ECHR provisions, and national courts of parties to the ECHR increasingly do so.
“Nevertheless, requirements for explanation can be read into these provisions, and national courts of parties to the ECHR increasingly do so.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationcitationAny compromise between transparency and precision in tax law execution and effectiveness in preventing tax fraud must be well-justified, taking into account not only the public interest in combating fraud but also other interests of taxpayers and authorities proportionally.
“However, any compromise between these desiderata has to be well-justified, not just attending to the public interest in combating fraud but also taking into account in a proportional way the various other interests of taxpayers and authorities.142”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [142]
Not checked in the free run.
- Rests on an assumption: Transparency and precision in executing tax law are not absolute values and must be weighed against effectiveness in preventing tax fraud.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
PremisereasoningThe execution of tax law should be maximally transparent and precise for taxpayers.
“This conclusion, exclusively from a legal perspective, stems from the fact that the execution of tax law shall be maximally transparent and precise for taxpayers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisereasoningThe fundamental building blocks include the system inputs or assessment criteria and the logic of the decision or individual assessment.
“These blocks include, inter alia, the system inputs or assessment criteria and the logic of the decision or individual assessment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningExtending the understanding of the right to a fair trial with regard to tax AI might avoid the constraints described above.
“Doing so with regard to tax AI might avoid the constraints described above.155”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [155]
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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationcitationIn the context of an information society, such positive measures may require establishing rules that mandate the adoption of technical measures enforcing the protection of private life.
“In the context of an information society, such positive measures may require establishing rules that mandate the adoption of technical measures that enforce the protection of private life.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [161]
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Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe three ECHR provisions discussed are the requirement of proper justification as part of the right to a fair trial (article 6), the right to respect for private and family life (article 8), and the prohibition of discrimination in conjunction with protection of property (article 14 and Protocol 12).
“This section discusses three such provisions: (i) the requirement of proper justification, which is part of the right to a fair trial (article 6 of the ECHR); (ii) the right to respect for private and family life (article 8 of the ECHR); and (iii) the prohibition of discrimination in conjunction with protection of property (article 14 and Protocol 12 of the ECHR).143”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [143]
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationWhether a tax dispute enters the ambit of article 6 is circumstantial and subject to vast discretion on the part of the ECtHR.
“A determination of whether a tax dispute enters the ambit of article 6 is circumstantial and subject to vast discretion on the part of the ECtHR.147”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [147] source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningNone of these ECHR provisions explicitly mentions XAI, and the ECtHR case law has not yet engaged with matters of AI in the tax domain.
“Given their general character, none of these provisions explicitly mentions XAI, and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is yet to engage with matters of AI in the tax domain.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn such cases, the two elements of the right to a fair trial most relevant to tax AI systems are the minimum guarantees of equality of arms and the right of defence.
“In such cases, the two following elements of the right to a fair trial seem to be most relevant in respect of tax AI systems: (i) the minimum guarantees of equality of arms; and (ii) the right of defence.153”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [153]
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningEU data protection law gives no protection to non-natural entities, and the GDPR does not grant legal persons or non-personified entities a right to an explanation of decisions produced by an AI system.
“EU data protection law does not offer any form of protection to non-natural entities.195”
- Also stated in: § 4.1.1. Data protection law and the right to an explanation · plain
“Since data subject rights are directly associated with the status of a data subject -that is, of the person to whom the data pertains -the GDPR does not provide legal persons or non-personified entities with the right to obtain an explanation for decisions produced by an AI system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 4.1.1. Data protection law and the right to an explanation · plain
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningAn analysis of the European approach to XAI regulation provides insights into the limited extent to which existing law creates requirements for explanation in tax AI systems.
“Since the European Union exercises considerable influence over the regulation of digital technologies even beyond its borders, 172 an analysis of the European approach to XAI regulation provides insights on the limited extent to which existing law creates requirements for explanation in tax AI systems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [172]
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Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationUnder the GDPR, processing of personal data is a necessary condition for the Regulation to apply, and personal data is information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.
“A first hurdle to deriving the right to an explanation from data protection law comes from article 2(1) of the GDPR, which stipulates that the processing of personal data is a necessary condition for the application of the Regulation.191”
- Also stated in: § 4.1.1. Data protection law and the right to an explanation · plain
“Since article 4(1) further specifies that personal data is information relating to an identified -or an identifiable -natural person”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites article 2(1) of the GDPR
Not checked in the free run.
- cites article 4(1)
Not checked in the free run.
- Also stated in: § 4.1.1. Data protection law and the right to an explanation · plain
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationConstitutional requirements could provide the grounds for a minimum global standard on XAI, but implementing it is unlikely to take the form of constitutional amendments.
“Constitutional requirements could provide the grounds for a minimum global standard on XAI, but its implementation is unlikely to take the form of constitutional amendments.170”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [170]
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenXAI can help combat discriminatory tax treatment stemming from the use of AI tax-related systems by identifying discriminatory features of such systems, such as biased data or factors decisive to deliver a decision in a discriminatory way.
“Thus, although XAI can help combat discriminatory tax treatment stemming from the use of AI tax-related systems by identifying the discriminatory features of such systems -such -as biased data and/or factors decisive to deliver a decision in a discriminatory way”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningBecause the right to an explanation is held by the data subject, a legal person cannot directly exercise it even when the legal person is the ultimate target of the data processing.
“But, since this right is held by the data subject, it cannot be directly exercised by a legal person, even if the latter is the ultimate target of data processing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningArmed with such information, people affected by automated decisions could assess whether their rights and interests were properly considered and, if not, pursue remedies such as human intervention or administrative and judicial review.
“Equipped with such information, data subjects would then be able to evaluate whether their rights, liberties and interests have been properly attended to in the processing and, if that is not the case, seek redress through instruments such as the right to human intervention in the decision-making process 186 or administrative and judicial proceedings.187”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Art.22(3) GDPR
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- cites Arts.77 and 79 GDPR
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationEU data protection instruments have frequently been presented as foundations for AI regulation, which aligns with the central role of large datasets in modern machine learning.
“These instruments have often been touted as the foundations of AI regulation, 178 a claim that is consistent with the role that large datasets play in modern machine learning technologies.179”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Nemitz
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationRecitals do not have binding force under EU law.
“But, since a recital is not a binding instrument of EU law, 183 there has long been debate on whether such a right exists in the GDPR, 184 and, if so, what its legal grounds would be.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Klimas & Vaiciukaite
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe ECtHR has found violations of the prohibition of discrimination in unusual tax cases, including discriminatory tax treatment of a non-resident compared to residents regarding church tax opt-out, differentiation between persons unfit for military service who were exonerated from a tax and those obliged to pay it, and failure to consider the needs of a child with disabilities when determining a
“The ECtHR has found violations of the prohibition of discrimination in quite unusual tax cases, such as those regarding (i) the discriminatory tax treatment of a non-resident in comparison to residents due to the possibility for only the latter to opt out of the payment of church tax (a violation of article 14 in conjunction with article 1 Protocol 1 of the ECHR); 164”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [164] source
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- cites [165]
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- cites [166]
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe European Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on a European approach to AI.
“which is why the European Commission recently proposed a Regulation for a European Approach to AI. 181”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites AI Act (Commission Proposal) (2021)
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe GDPR explanation provisions require meaningful information about the logic involved in the decision-making process, not an explanation of the systems used to make the decision.
“the relevant provisions require the provision of”
- Also stated in: § 5. Pseudonymisation, in General Data Protection Regulation. Article-by-Article Commentary · plain
“in the decision-making process rather than an explanation of the systems used for making the decision.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), and 15(1)(h) GDPR
Not checked in the free run.
- Also stated in: § 5. Pseudonymisation, in General Data Protection Regulation. Article-by-Article Commentary · plain
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationIn this setting, explanation acts as a foundation for challenging automated decisions, an idea that courts have also recognized.
“Explanation, in this context, provides a stepping stone to ensure the contestability of automated decisions, 188 a rationale that found its way into case law.189”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Kaminski & Urban
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- cites Sarra
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- cites Almada
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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationUnder GDPR articles 13-15, the right to an explanation applies only where there is automated decision-making under article 22.
“Under articles 13-15 of the GDPR, the right to an explanation applies only to situations in which there is automated decision-making under article 22 of the GDPR.196”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites articles 13-15 of the GDPR
Not checked in the free run.
- cites article 22 of the GDPR
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationEU law recognizes an autonomous right to data protection, which is governed by a limited set of EU-level instruments, most notably the GDPR.
“omous right to data protection 175 governed by a handful of legal instruments defined at the EU level, 176 notably the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).177”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Regulation (EU) 2016/679
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationNot all AI applications qualify as automated decision-making, because article 22(1) GDPR applies only to decisions based solely on the automated processing of personal data.
“The second consequence is that not all AI applications qualify as automated decision-making.Article 22(1) of the GDPR states that the provisions of this article are applicable only for decisions solely based on the automated processing of personal data.200”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Article 22(1) of the GDPR
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAn AI system that handles information about a corporation is not processing personal data, so the GDPR gives that corporation no right to an explanation even when the decision adversely affects it.
“Hence, the GDPR provides no right to an explanation to the corporation, even if this non-personal information is used to make a decision that adversely affects this legal person, such as flagging potentially unpaid tax.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationStarting in the 1970s, jurisdictions worldwide developed sophisticated legal frameworks for governing the automated storage and use of information about individuals in a digital format.
“Starting in the 1970s, jurisdictions worldwide developed sophisticated legal frameworks for governing the automated storage and use of information about individuals in a digital format.174”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [174]
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningThere has long been debate about whether the GDPR contains a right to an explanation and, if so, what its legal grounds are.
“But, since a recital is not a binding instrument of EU law, 183 there has long been debate on whether such a right exists in the GDPR, 184 and, if so, what its legal grounds would be.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Casey, Farhangi & Vogl
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- cites Kaminski
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- cites Wachter et al.
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May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe selected sources can be regarded as soft law that can influence law-making bodies and inspire the interpretation of hard law.
“Those sources can be seen as”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [250]
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone givenUnder article 25(1) of the GDPR, data controllers must adopt technological and organizational measures to implement data protection principles and safeguards protecting data subjects' rights.
“Under article 25(1) of the GDPR, data controllers must adopt technological and organizational measures to implement data protection principles and safeguards to protect the rights of data subjects.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationExcluding data from the definition of personal data requires full anonymization; mere pseudonymization is not enough to avoid the application of EU data protection law.
“Exclusion from the definition of personal data requires full anonymization.Mere pseudonymization of the data is insufficient to avoid the application of EU data protection law”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites M. Almada, J. Maranhão & G. Sartor, Article 4 Para., Oxford University Press 2020
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningFor explanations in tax, data protection law should be treated not as a direct source of law but as a fellow traveller in ensuring the lawful use of AI systems.
“When it comes to explanations in tax, therefore, data protection law should not be seen as a direct source of law but as a fellow traveller in the mission of ensuring the lawful use of AI systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationWhat counts as anonymized data must be assessed in light of the risks of the data processing and the current technological capacity for re-identification.
“the standard for what counts as anonymized data must be evaluated in light of the risks associated with data processing and the current technological capabilities for re-identifying data”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites M. Almada, J. Maranhão & G. Sartor, Article 4 Para., Oxford University Press 2020
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningAdopting explainable AI techniques could be a way to implement the design measures required under article 25(1) of the GDPR.
“As such, the adoption of explainable AI techniques could be a way to implement the design measures required under article 25(1) of the GDPR.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn SyRI, the court declined to assess whether SyRI constitutes automated decision-making under the GDPR and instead grounded its judgment on the merits in article 8 ECHR.
“The court, however, refrained from assessing whether SyRI constitutes automated decision-making under the GDPR (paragraph 6.60), relying instead on article 8 of the ECHR as the grounds for its judgment on the merits”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe Hague Court held that the SyRI legislation did not afford sufficient insight into the risk model and indicators, which blocked evaluation of the decision-making process.
“the Hague Court pointed out that the SyRI legislation did not afford sufficient insight into the risk model and indicators (paragraph 6.89), thus blocking the evaluation of the decision-making process (paragraph 6.90).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationResearch on the right to an explanation under European data protection law indicates that explanations help ensure decisions involving AI can be challenged and proposes legal and technological mechanisms that might be transposed into tax contexts.
“From a conceptual perspective, research on the right to an explanation under European data protection law suggests that explanations are a useful tool for ensuring that decisions involving AI can be challenged and proposes legal and technological mechanisms that might be transposable into tax contexts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe OECD AI Recommendation calls on AI actors to commit to transparency and responsible disclosure for AI systems.
“The Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence 252 (the OECD AI Recommendation) emphasizes that AI actors 253 should commit to transparency and responsible disclosure regarding AI systems.254”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [252]
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- cites [253]
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- cites [254]
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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationA human overseer signing off on every machine-made decision does not amount to meaningful human involvement if the overseer cannot change the outcome of the process.
“having a human overseer sign off on every decision made by a machine is not enough if the overseer cannot change the outcome of the process.201”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Article 29 WP, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe GDPR contains provisions that attempt to address decision-making impacts beyond individual decisions, such as those governing Data Protection Impact Assessments.
“Yet, the GDPR includes provisions that attempt to provide a view of decision-making impacts beyond individual decisions, such as those governing Data Protection Impact Assessments”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites E. Kosta, Article 35.Data Protection Impact Assessment
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationArticle 49 of Brazil's General Data Protection Law requires technological measures applying to the data processing system itself, in addition to measures directed at specific processing operations.
“art.49 of Brazil's General Data Protection Law (LGPD) requires the adoption of technological measures that apply to the data processing system itself, in addition to those directed at specific data processing operations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites art.49 of Brazil's General Data Protection Law (LGPD)
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationAutomated decision-making in the GDPR refers to all situations in which humans are not meaningfully involved in producing a decision based on personal data.
“Automated decision-making in the GDPR therefore refers to all situations in which humans are not meaningfully involved in producing a decision based on personal data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites M. Brkan, Do Algorithms Rule the World?Algorithmic Decision-Making and Data Protection in the Framework of the GDPR and Beyond
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Article 29 WP, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSuch documentation gives an ex ante view of the overall logic as of the time it was written or last revised, which might not reflect the logic used for a specific decision.
“Furthermore, any such explanation provides an ex ante view of the overall logic applied when the documentation was written (or last revised), 231 which might not reflect the logic used for any specific decision.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningAny use of AI in the tax domain must include measures ensuring that introducing AI does not prevent compliance with existing transparency duties.
“Any use of AI in the tax domain must therefore include measures to ensure that the introduction of AI technologies does not prevent compliance with existing duties of transparency.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningSoft law fits well with how quickly AI systems evolve.
“Soft law is thus well-suited to the rapid evolution of AI systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationSeveral international and regional organizations and commissions, including the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and the OECD, have taken steps toward an AI regulatory framework.
“Internationally, various (inter)governmental organizations and commissions have taken steps toward a regulatory framework for AI, such as the African Commission on Human”
- Also stated in: § 4.2. Non-legally binding guidelines · plain
“and Peoples' Rights, 245 UNESCO, 246 the Council of Europe 247 and the OECD.248”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites [245]
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- cites [246]
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- cites [247]
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- Also stated in: § 4.2. Non-legally binding guidelines · plain
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationData protection by design does not mandate any specific measures but adopts a risk-based approach in which controllers map the risks to data subject rights produced by an operation and then adopt measures to address them.
“Nevertheless, data protection by design does not mandate the adoption of any specific measures, adopting instead a risk-based approach in which data controllers are required to map the risks to data subject rights that a given operation produces and then adopt technological and organizational measures to address those risks.209”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe broader interpretation of article 22 still excludes several forms in which AI systems are or can be used in the tax domain, because AI embedded in complex organizational structures splits decisions into smaller ones and the decision affecting a data subject is hard to map.
“This broader interpretation of article 22 nevertheless excludes several forms in which AI systems are used -or can be used -in the tax domain.In many applications, AI systems are embedded within complex organizational structures, which break down important decisions into multiple decisions on a smaller scale.Under such circumstances, it can be difficult to map out the decision that impacted a data”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe Council of Europe and OECD recommendations have received recognition in court proceedings and from the G20, respectively.
“Given that the recommendations made by the Council of Europe and the OECD have been recognized in judicial proceedings and by the G20, respectively, 249”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [249]
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningSoft law standards may eventually become hard law regulations if they prove effective.
“Over time, soft law standards could morph into hard law regulations once the former proves effective.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationA recent NIST report establishes explainability as a key requirement for trust in AI systems and defines four principles to guide XAI.
“a recent report from the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which establishes explainability as a key requirement for trust in AI systems 237 and defines four principles that should guide XAI.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBecause all references to automated decision-making point to article 22 GDPR and no explicit definition exists, the content of article 22(1) supplies an implicit definition of an automated decision for the Regulation.
“it follows that the contents of art.22(1) provide an implicit definition of what an automated decision is for the purposes of the Regulation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites art.22 GDPR
Not checked in the free run.
- cites art.22(1)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe NIST principles require XAI to give an explanation by delivering evidence or reasons for the output or process, to be meaningful to intended recipients, to depict the decision-making process accurately, and to identify and declare the limits of the knowledge guiding system operation.
“It should provide an explanation by delivering evidence or reasons for the output or processes at hand, 238 and such explanations should be meaningful for their intended recipients, 239 accurately depict the decision-making process and reasons why a system operates as it does or produces a given output 240 and identify and declare the limits of the knowledge that guides system operation.241”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationCouncil of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 stresses that IP and trade secrecy rules should not remove AI explainability.
“It is noteworthy that Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec (2020)1 emphasizes that legislative frameworks for intellectual property and trade secrecy should not deprive AI systems of their explainability.262”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [262]
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe OECD AI Recommendation obliges AI actors to give meaningful, context-appropriate information so that people understand AI systems, know when they interact with them, understand outcomes, and can challenge adverse outcomes.
“The OECD Recommendation requires AI actors to provide meaningful information appropriate to the context in which an AI system is used to (i) foster a general understanding of AI systems; (ii) make stakeholders aware of their interactions with AI systems; (iii) enable those affected by an AI system to understand the out-”
- Also stated in: § 4.2.1. Recommendation of the OECD Council on Artificial Intelligence · plain
“come; and (iv) enable those adversely affected by an AI system to challenge its outcome.255”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [255]
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- Also stated in: § 4.2.1. Recommendation of the OECD Council on Artificial Intelligence · plain
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe postulate that affected persons receive explanations may be honoured by some courts and ignored by others, especially non-Council of Europe courts, so long as legally binding rules do not displace trade secrecy for explainability purposes.
“Nevertheless, this postulate could end up being respected by some courts 267 while ignored by others, especially if they are non-European Council members, 268 as long as the legally binding rules do not displace trade secrecy for explainability purposes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationA central point in Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 is explainability of algorithmic processes and outputs, discussed alongside transparency and contestability of automated decisions.
“One of the pivotal points under this Recommendation refers to the explainability of the processes and output of algorithmic systems, 259 which is addressed in the context of the transparency of algorithmic systems and the contestability of automated decisions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [259]
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe problem of XAI in tax law is either completely overlooked, or the lack of transparency of tax authorities appears to matter more under the rule of law than the protection of fundamental human rights.
“The fact remains, however, that the problem of XAI in tax law is either completely overlooked, or the lack of transparency on the part of the tax authorities -and, thus, their efficiency -appears to be more important under the rule of law than the protection of fundamental human rights.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe G20 acknowledged the OECD AI Recommendation's importance and used it as a model for its own AI Principles.
“The relevance of the OECD AI Recommendation has been recognized by the G20, which has drawn inspiration from this recommendation to establish the G20 AI Principles.256”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [256]
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe XAI problem is worsened by the technical complexity of the most efficient AI systems, which rely on vast amounts of data and machine learning algorithms, typically deep neural networks.
“The problem with XAI is exacerbated by the technical complexity of the world's most efficient AI systems, which rely on vast amounts of data and machine learning algorithms, typically deep neural networks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThe OECD AI Recommendation's provisions bear on AI explainability because they oblige those who deploy and use AI to give affected people a relevant explanation in the situation.
“All these points appear relevant for the explainability of AI systems insofar as they require deployers and users of AI systems to ensure that everybody affected by the outcome of such systems receives a relevant explanation in the given circumstances.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningTax policymakers have most likely vastly overlooked and misunderstood the threats posed by inexplainable AI systems in tax law until now.
“The aforementioned threats have most likely been vastly overlooked and misunderstood by tax policymakers up until today.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The threats posed by inexplainable AI systems in tax law are as real and serious as those stemming from tax avoidance.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe legal and technical obstacles to XAI in tax law can be overcome, though only with major efforts by the international research community and national legislators.
“Our analysis shows, however, that these obstacles not only should be overcome but also can be overcome, albeit with major efforts on the part of the international research community and national legislators.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisereasoningCouncil of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 does not address the problem of tax secrecy.
“Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec (2020)1 does not address that problem at all.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThe path towards XAI in tax law appears cluttered with insurmountable legal and technical obstacles.
“The path towards XAI in tax law would therefore appear to be cluttered with unsurmountable legal and technical obstacles.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe eKasa judgment of the Slovak Constitutional Court showed that Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 matters for XAI in tax law, because the court cited it and set rules addressing XAI's legal side.
“The relevance of Council of Europe Recommendation CM/REC (2020)1 for XAI in tax law was demonstrated by the Slovak Constitutional Court in its judgment of 17 December 2021 in eKasa, which is discussed in section 3.1.By broadly referring to that Recommendation, the Court established a set of rules that directly deal with the legal aspects of XAI.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThere is no minimum legal standard of XAI in tax law, and one is probably far from being established.
“All in all, the analysis in sections 3. and 4. reveals that there is no minimum legal standard of XAI in tax law, and we are probably far away from having one.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenTax AI is one of the more conspicuous regulatory gaps.
“Tax AI is one of the more conspicuous regulatory gaps in that regard.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningPost hoc explanation models may be the only practical way to satisfy the transparency requirements imposed by the risk-based approaches of both the AI Act and the GDPR.
“with post hoc explanation models perhaps being the only practical means to meet the transparency requirements imposed by the risk-based approaches in both legal instruments.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationcitationSince every entity that deploys an AI system counts as an AI actor, private-sector providers of AI to tax authorities must make those systems understandable to both taxpayers and tax authorities.
“Since all deployers of AI systems are AI actors, entities from the private sector should ensure that the AI systems they provide to the tax authorities can be used in a way that is understandable both to taxpayers and the authorities themselves.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: AI systems are used in tax matters.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe Council of Europe Recommendation's guidelines do not exclude tax authorities.
“The formulated guidelines do not exclude tax authorities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationCouncil of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 says its guidelines are meant to advise States as well as public and private actors.
“Council of Europe Recommendation CM/REC (2020)1 explicitly states that the guidelines are designed to advise”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [260]
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThis finding aligns with the constitutional principles discussed in section 3.1.
“This is in line with the constitutional principles analysed in section 3.1.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSince the OECD AI Recommendation lacks binding force, unlike tax and trade secrecy rules, it probably will not work until enacted as hard law, which would mean lifting secrecy to allow explainability.
“Since they, as opposed to rules regulating tax and trade secrecy, are not legally binding, the OECD AI Recommendation is not likely to be effective until it is implemented as hard law, with the resultant lifting of secrecy for the benefit of explainability.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The OECD AI Recommendation is not legally binding.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationCouncil of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 provides guidelines covering how algorithmic systems are designed, developed, and deployed over time.
“Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec (2020)1 257 formulates a set of guidelines regarding the design, development and ongoing deployment of algorithmic systems.258”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [257] source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [258]
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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationcitationIf tax authorities employ AI to decide matters affecting taxpayers, the OECD AI Recommendation implies they should give each taxpayer an explanation they can understand, clarifying how the AI produced the tax decision.
“Thus, whenever the tax authorities rely on AI systems to reach decisions affecting taxpayers, the tax authorities should give each taxpayer an explanation understandable to the taxpayer that clarifies why and how the AI systems led to a particular tax decision.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: AI systems are used in tax matters.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe Council of Europe Recommendation's points matter for XAI because they oblige developers to make AI systems technically able to explain themselves and oblige users to let affected people effectively contest automated decisions.
“These points are relevant to XAI insofar as they require the developers of AI systems to develop AI systems that are technically capable of providing explanations and impose duties on the users of AI systems to ensure that those affected by an automated decision can effectively challenge those decisions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationcitationThe OECD AI Recommendation implies that taxpayers should be able to contest any adverse tax decision made by an AI system.
“Moreover, a taxpayer should have the right and the opportunity to challenge any negative tax decision based on an AI system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: AI systems are used in tax matters.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThis high-standard requirement matters for XAI in tax law because tax authorities deploy AI to uncover tax fraud, and explaining those systems protects fair trial rights.
“This is relevant for XAI in tax law insofar as tax authorities use AI systems to detect tax fraud, as the explainability of those systems safeguards the right to a fair trial, as analysed in section 3.2.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Tax authorities deploy AI to uncover tax fraud.
- Rests on an assumption: AI systems are used in tax matters.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThis overlooking may stem from the fact that XAI in tax matters can conflict with tax secrecy concerns and with the trend to increase tax administration efficiency through new technologies, including AI systems.
“This might follow from the fact that XAI in tax matters can conflict with tax secrecy concerns and the overall trend to increase the efficiency of tax administration via the use of new technologies, including AI systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThis explanation-and-challenge requirement aligns with constitutional rights and principles and with the ECHR fair trial right.
“This is in line with constitutional rights and principles and the right to a fair trial under the ECHR, as analysed in sections 4.1.and 4.2.1.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThe OECD AI Recommendation's explainability requirements apply to AI systems in all settings, including tax matters.
“This includes the use of AI systems in all possible settings, including tax matters.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: AI systems are used in tax matters.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationAnnex III to the AI Act establishes that a broad range of AI applications in law enforcement contexts imposes a high risk to fundamental rights.
“Annex III also establishes that a broad range of applications of AI in law enforcement contexts imposes a high risk to fundamental rights.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Point 6 of Annex III AI Act
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThe mere existence of this information in an organized form facilitates assessment of a system by judicial authorities and potentially by administrative bodies.
“The mere existence of this information in an organized form facilitates the assessment of a system by judicial authorities and potentially by administrative bodies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe same TFEU provision also precludes provisions relating to the rights and interests of employed persons, which are nevertheless present in Annex III of the AI Act.
“However, the same provision also precludes provisions”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites art.114(2) TFEU
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Annex III AI Act
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe AI Act defines as high-risk AI systems used to assist judicial authorities in researching and interpreting facts and the law and in applying the law to a concrete set of facts.
“Finally, the AI Act also defines as high-risk those AI systems used to assist judicial authorities in”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Point 8(a) of Annex III AI Act
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThere is an overall trend to increase the efficiency of tax administration through the use of new technologies, including AI systems.
“the overall trend to increase the efficiency of tax administration via the use of new technologies, including AI systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites OECD, Digital Transformation Maturity Model (OECD Maturity Model Series, OECD 2021)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites OECD, supra n. 8
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAlthough public assistance benefits are not necessarily tax-related, the Annex III point 5(a) formulation covers AI systems used to assess matters such as need-based tax credits.
“While such benefits are not necessarily related to taxation, this formulation covers the use of AI systems for assessing matters such as need-based tax credits.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenTax administrations worldwide will not be able to resist increasing their efficiency through AI systems.
“The authors appreciate that tax administrations worldwide will not be able to resist increasing their efficiency through AI systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationRecital 38 of the AI Act states that systems specifically intended for administrative proceedings by tax and customs authorities should not be considered as being used by law enforcement authorities for such purposes.
“Recital 38 of the AI Act states that systems”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Recital 38 AI Act
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBecause Recital 38 uses the word 'specifically', it does not exclude systems regularly used for law enforcement purposes, though it suggests that occasional data sharing with law enforcement does not render an AI system high-risk.
“Given the use of”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningExisting academic research into best practices in model training could contribute to creating procedures appropriate for legal decision-making and legal model training.
“This means that existing academic research into best practices in model training could contribute to creating procedures appropriate for legal decision-making and legal model training.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe AI Act also provides information to other actors: users of AI systems acquired or licensed from third-party providers and humans who act as overseers to decision-making processes involving AI systems.
“In addition, the AI Act also provides information to other actors: the users of AI systems acquired or licensed from third-party providers 228 and the humans who act as overseers to the decision-making processes involving AI systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Art. 13 AI Act
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Art. 14 AI Act
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationMany of these regulatory requirements aim to increase transparency of high-risk systems, such as automatically registering events during operation or registering technological properties like accuracy and risks in technical documentation.
“Quite a few of these provisions are directed at increasing the transparency of highrisk systems, such as the need to automatically register events that occur during a system's operation 226 or to register a system's technological properties -such as accuracy -and risks within its technical documentation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Art. 12 AI Act
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Art.11 AI Act
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationAI systems classified as high-risk must meet product compliance requirements that closely follow the EU's new legislative framework for harmonized product standards.
“AI systems that fall into the latter category of highrisk systems 214 are subject to product compliance requirements that closely follow the new legislative framework used to provide harmonized standards for products commercialized in the European Union.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Art.6 AI Act
Not checked in the free run.
- cites M. Veale & F.Z. Borgesius, Demystifying the Draft EU Artificial Intelligence Act
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe potential harm to taxpayers could be minimized by following XAI guidelines.
“The ultimate goal is to minimize the potential harm to taxpayers, which could be achieved by following XAI guidelines.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningAchieving a global minimum legal standard for XAI in tax law will require shared multilateral solutions.
“This ambitious goal is not impossible, but it will require shared multilateral solutions in the form of a global minimum legal standard for XAI in tax law.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningWithout a minimum legal standard, the large gaps and fragmentation in AI and tax law regulation will keep growing and will trigger more disputes and scandals, undermining society's trust in digitalized tax administration.
“Otherwise, the large gaps and fragmentation in regulations in the field of AI and tax law will continue to grow and steadily trigger even more ferocious disputes and scandals, thereby undermining society's trust in digitalized tax administration.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThe existence of non-technical sources of opacity does not make the technical opacity of AI any less real.
“However, the existence of non-technical sources of opacity does not make the technical opacity of AI any less real”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThe AI Act's definition of a high-risk system covers various forms through which states exercise their power in the tax domain.
“The definition of”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: For the purposes of the section's argument, 'fiscal provisions' in art.114(2) TFEU are read narrowly so as not to include the use of AI in tax administration.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationcitationThose law enforcement AI applications are relevant for taxation when AI systems are deployed in law enforcement action against tax crimes, such as profiling potential tax fraudsters.
“Those applications become relevant for taxation to the extent that AI systems are deployed as part of law enforcement action directed at tax crimes, for example, by profiling potential tax fraudsters.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Point 6(e) of Annex III AI Act
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningGiven the recent litigation, the pressure on tax administrations and legislators to formulate standard procedures is likely to change.
“Given the recent litigation, this is likely to change.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationClassification as a high-risk system leads to the application of specific regulatory requirements.
“Classification as a high-risk system leads to the application of specific regulatory requirements.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites AI Act
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationUnder art.114(2) TFEU, the residual competence for market harmonization does not extend to 'fiscal provisions', which might raise questions about the AI Act's applicability to fiscal matters.
“Under art.114(2) TFEU, the residual competence for market harmonization does not extend to”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites art.114(2) TFEU
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThere is an urgent need for a minimum legal standard of tax XAI.
“which means there is an urgent need for a minimum legal standard of tax XAI.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The threats posed by inexplainable AI systems in tax law are as real and serious as those stemming from tax avoidance.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe AI Act is based on the EU's single-market competence rather than the fundamental right to data protection, unlike the GDPR.
“Unlike the GDPR, the AI Act is not grounded on the fundamental right to data protection but on the European Union's competence to regulate the single market.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites AI Act (Commission Proposal) (2021), p. 7
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe AI Act uses a tiered, risk-based classification of AI applications, prohibiting some uses and treating some remaining applications as posing significant risks to health, safety and fundamental rights.
“It adopts a tiered, risk-based classification of AI applications: some uses are proscribed, 212 and some of the remaining applications are deemed to impose significant risks to the health, safety and fundamental rights of persons.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Art. 5 AI Act
Not checked in the free run.
- cites AI Act (Commission Proposal) (2021), p. 4
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationPoint 5(a) of Annex III to the AI Act classifies as high-risk AI systems intended for use by public authorities or on their behalf to evaluate natural persons' eligibility for public assistance benefits and services, and to grant, reduce, revoke or reclaim such benefits and services.
“Point 5(a) of this annex states that”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Point 5(a) of Annex III AI Act
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIt is possible to eliminate the current fragmentation in AI regulations and fill the regulatory vacuum in the tax field.
“This will make it possible to eliminate the currently huge fragmentation in AI regulations and fill the regulatory vacuum in the tax field.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
XAI methods can uncover the causal link between an AI system's input and its output.
“XAI methods aim to uncover this causal link, thus facilitating several aims.”
The paper relies on this without support.
When an AI system's operation is explained, confidence in its output increases.
“In general, explaining how a system works strengthens the trust in its result.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Knowing how an AI system works enables users to challenge its decisions or change their conduct to influence what it outputs.
“This understanding, in turn, allows end-users to contest the system's decision or -in some circumstances -to affect the system's output by altering their own behaviour.”
The paper relies on this without support.
XAI research has produced methods that make AI decisions intelligible to people.
“Over the past few years, the field of XAI has developed various techniques to explain AI decision-making processes in terms humans can understand.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Taxpayers require information about how tax authority decisions affect them personally.
“For example, taxpayers need to know how they have been individually affected by decisions made by tax authorities.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Taxpayers have a right to contest potentially wrongful tax decisions.
“or they may be used in ways that deprive taxpayers of their right to contest potentially wrongful decisions.11”
The paper relies on this without support.
Courts assess the lawfulness of tax decisions.
“Courts, in turn, might need both local and global post hoc tools in order to assess the lawfulness of tax decisions stemming from -or facilitated by -AI systems.”
The paper relies on this without support.
It is possible to develop XAI methods that make tax AI systems intelligible to taxpayers, appeal bodies, and courts.
“This article argues that adequate protection of taxpayers' rights demands the use of eXplainable AI (XAI) technologies that can render the functioning and decisions of tax AI systems understandable for taxpayers, administrative appeal bodies and the courts.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The great majority of relationships in the tax domain are between tax authorities and taxpayers.
“However, the vast majority of relationships in the tax domain are between tax authorities and taxpayers.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Taxpayers who learn the risk-assessment criteria or the algorithms' modes of functioning could circumvent the filters and escape tax inspection despite being involved in tax fraud or non-compliance.
“Presumably, if taxpayers were aware of the risk-assessment criteria or the algorithms' modes of functioning, they could circumvent these filters and thus escape tax inspection despite being involved in tax fraud or non-compliance.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The number of disputes over AI explainability is inversely proportional to the degree of explainability of AI systems.
“the number of disputes in that sphere is inversely proportional to the AI systems' degree of explainability.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Only legislators have the authority to determine the general principles of tax law and govern every detail of tax collection.
“As a result, it is assumed that only legislators have the authority to determine the general principles of tax law and govern every detail of tax collection”
The paper relies on this without support.
Transparency and precision in executing tax law are not absolute values and must be weighed against effectiveness in preventing tax fraud.
“Of course, transparency and precision of the execution of tax law are not absolute values and must be weighed with effectiveness in preventing tax fraud.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The authors' search across jurisdictions was comprehensive enough that not finding any jurisdiction extending the right to an explanation to legal persons indicates that no such jurisdiction exists.
“Nevertheless, the authors were not able to find any jurisdiction that extends the right to an explanation to corporations and other non-natural entities.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The use of AI by taxpayers accounts for a substantial share of tax AI applications.
“the use of AI by taxpayers, which is likely to account for a substantial share of tax AI applications”
The paper relies on this without support.
Tax authorities deploy AI to uncover tax fraud.
“insofar as tax authorities use AI systems to detect tax fraud”
The paper relies on this without support.
AI systems are used in tax matters.
“This includes the use of AI systems in all possible settings, including tax matters.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The OECD AI Recommendation is not legally binding.
“Since they, as opposed to rules regulating tax and trade secrecy, are not legally binding”
The paper relies on this without support.
Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2020)1 is not implemented as hard law.
“as long as this point of the Recommendation is not implemented as hard law”
The paper relies on this without support.
The threats posed by inexplainable AI systems in tax law are as real and serious as those stemming from tax avoidance.
“Although the threats posed by inexplainable AI systems in tax law are no less real and serious than those stemming from tax avoidance”
The authors state this as an assumption.
For the purposes of the section's argument, 'fiscal provisions' in art.114(2) TFEU are read narrowly so as not to include the use of AI in tax administration.
“For the sake of argument, this section assumes a narrow reading of”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Protecting taxpayers' rights requires the implementation of XAI technologies, which can make the operations and decisions of tax-related AI systems comprehensible to taxpayers, administrative appeal bodies, and the courts.
“Kuźniacki et al. [84] article contends that protecting taxpayers' rights requires the implementation of XAI technologies, which can make the operations and decisions of tax-related AI systems comprehensible to taxpayers, administrative appeal bodies, and the courts.”
From Recent Emerging Techniques in Explainable Artificial Intelligence to Enhance the Interpretable and Understanding of AI Models for Human (2025) · cites this paper as [84]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
eKasa court identified as both Slovak and Slovenian
MinorThe paper attributes the same eKasa judgment to the Slovak Constitutional Court in the main text but to the Slovenian Constitutional Court in its citation.
“In eKasa (17 Dec. 2021), 137 the Slovak Constitutional Court implicitly underscored the need for the explainability of AI systems in light of constitutional principles.”
“137.Slovenian Constitutional Court, 17 Dec. 2021, Ústavného súdu Slovenskej republiky PL.ÚS 25/2019-117 V mene Slovenskej republiky”
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Research works printed but not linked: 35
- B. Kuźniacki, M. Almada, K. Tyliński and Ł. Górski acknowledge that this article is based upon work supported in whole by the Notre Dame-IBM Tech Ethics Lab. Such support does not constitute an endorsement by the sponsor of the authors’ views expressed in this publication. B. Kuźniacki and Reza Zeldenrust further acknowledge that their work on this chapter has been developed within the framework of the Amsterdam Centre for Tax Law (ACTL) research project “Designing the tax system for a cashless, platform-based and technology-driven society” (CPT project). The CPT project is financed with university funding and funds provided by external stakeholders (i.e. businesses and governments) interested in supporting academic research to design fair, efficient and fraud-proof tax systems. For more information about the CPT project and its partners, please visit its website https://actl.uva.nl/cpt-project/cpt-project.html. The support received by the authors within the framework of the CPT project does not constitute an endorsement by the sponsors of the views expressed in this publication by the authors. Marco Almada would also like to thank Fundacion Carolina for granting him a doctoral scholarship, under which his work on this research was partially funded.
- See, e.g., J. Alm et al., New Technologies and the Evolution of Tax Compliance, 39 Virginia Tax Review 3 (2020).
- See, e.g., the MiDAS system adopted by the Michigan Unemployment Agency in 2013: R. Calo & D.K. Citron, The Automated Administrative State: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 70 Emory Law Journal 4, pp. 827-830 (2021).
- N. Mehdiyev & P. Fettke, Prescriptive Process Analytics with Deep Learning and Explainable Artificial Intelligence, in Proceedings of the 28th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) sec. 4.4 (AIS 2020).
- Comparing the Performance of Artificial Intelligence to Human Lawyers in the Review of Standard Business Contracts, LawGeex Artificial Intelligence (Feb. 2018), available at https://images.law.com/contrib/content/uploads/documents/397/5408/lawgeex.pdf.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [Netherlands’ 2nd Parliamentary Chamber], Eindverslag – Parlementaire ondervragingscomissie Kinderopvangtoeslag “Ongekend Onrecht”, pp. 3-7 (The Hague, 17 Dec. 2020).
- L. Kimbell et al., AI Readiness: A collaborative design toolkit for professional services firms (Oxford Brookes University & Practice Management International LLP 2021).
- A. Bibal et al., Impact of Legal Requirements on Explainability in Machine Learning, in ICML Workshop on Law and Machine Learning (10 July 2020). · DOI · Paper page
- Braun Binder, supra n. 9, at pp. 298-299.
- N. Braun Binder, Ausschließlich automationsgestützt erlassene Steuerbescheide und Bekanntgabe durch Bereitstellung zum Datenabruf, Deutsche Steuer-Zeitung (DStZ) pp. 526-535 (2016).
- Such attempts are called adversarial attacks and they have happened, for example, regarding the computer vision systems of autonomous vehicles. A minimal change in a stop signal, imperceptible to the human eye, led vehicles to misconstrue it as a 45-mph signal. R.S.S. Kumar et al., Legal Risks of Adversarial Machine Learning Research (ICML 2020).
- It is important to strike a pragmatic balance between disclosure obligations and legitimate commercial interests: H. Bloch-Wehba, Transparency’s AI Problem 8 (Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University 2021), available at https://knightcolumbia.org/content/transparencys-ai-problem (accessed 26 Feb. 2022). Trade secrecy should protect but not overprotect intellectual property, thereby failing to serve the purposes of either trade secret law or privilege law. “Withholding information from the accused because it is a trade secret mischaracterizes defense advocacy as a business competition”: R. Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 Stanford Law Review 5, p. 1429 (2018).
- For an example, see A.L. Washington, How to Argue with an Algorithm: Lessons from the Compas-ProPublica Debate, 17 Colorado Technology Law Journal 1 (2018).
- Braun Binder, supra n. 9, at pp. 300-301.
- See, e.g., A. Sajó & R. Uitz, The Constitution of Freedom: An Introduction to Legal Constitutionalism p. 290 (Oxford University Press 2017).
- To illustrate this point, we give four examples. Art. 34 of the French Constitution states that “Statutes shall determine the rules concerning the base, rates and methods of collection of all types of taxes; the issuing of currency”; see Constitution de la République française (4 Oct. 1958), available at https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp (accessed 9 Aug. 2022). Similarly, art. 217 of the Polish Constitution stipulates that “The imposition of taxes, other public levies, the determination of entities, subjects of taxation and tax rates, as well as the rules for granting reliefs and remissions and the categories of entities exempted from taxes shall be effected by statute”. Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws of 1997, No. 78, item 483). In the same vein, art. 265 of the Indian Constitution says that: “No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.” Finally, the Brazilian Constitution forbids the Union, States, the Federal District, and Municipalities from imposing or increasing taxes by means other than statutes (art. 150, I, with a few exceptions presented in the same article), a prohibition that encompasses any changes to the constitutive elements of a tax – such as the tax rate, the base, the triggering event or the applicable penalties (art. 97 National Tax Code). See also Hattingh, supra n. 78, at sec. 2.
- See, inter alia, Kuźniacki et al., supra n. 127; H. Ávila, Certainty in Law (Springer 2016).
- We do not distinguish here between taxpayers who are individuals (natural persons) and companies (legal persons), since art. 34 of the ECHR stipulates that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) “may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation” of the ECHR by the person’s or entity’s Member State. Thus, not only individual taxpayers but also companies have standing before the ECtHR if they are not “governmental organisations” within the meaning of art. 34 of the ECHR. For the relevant explanation and case law of the ECtHR, see ECtHR, Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria pp. 9-10 (European Court of Human Rights 1 Feb. 2022). However, claims of companies under the ECHR are not unproblematic for the ECtHR. See more in M. Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies: Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection (Oxford University Press 2006).
- As scholars have observed, the absence of justification for a tax decision constitutes a violation of art. 47(1) of the EU Charter and of the EU law principle of observance of the rights of the defence. See P. Pistone, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, General Principles of EU Law and Taxation, in European Tax Law 99-100 (P.J. Wattel et al. eds., Wolters Kluwer 2018). A mere statement by the tax authorities that their decision follows from the output of an AI system would not seem to differ from the complete absence of justification and thus appears to violate the aforementioned principles. The taxpayers are the addressees of tax decisions and whenever such decisions significantly affect their interests, “they must be placed in a position in which they can effectively make known their views as regards the information on which the authorities intend to base their decision”. See PT: ECJ, 18 Dec. 2008, Case C-349/07, Sopropé - Organizações de Calçado Lda v. Fazenda Pública, para. 37, Case Law IBFD.
- Constitutional principles are usually flexible enough to ensure their adaptation to new technological contexts; this happens mostly through changes in interpretation and case law, rather than changes to the constitution itself: R. Leenes et al., Constitutional Rights and New Technologies: A Comparative Study (T.M.C. Asser Press; Distributed by Cambridge University Press 2008). This is not to say, however, that constitutional amendments in response to technology are unheard of: both the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Brazilian Constitution have been amended to include a right to the protection of personal data.
- For a historical overview of these developments, see P. Pałka, Data Management Law for the 2020s: The Lost Origins and the New Needs, 68 Buffalo Law Review 2, sec. I (Apr. 2020).
- B. Koch et al., Reduced, Reused and Recycled: The Life of a Dataset in Machine Learning Research, in Proceedings of NeurIPS 2021 (8 Dec. 2021).
- For a legally oriented introduction to the various elements, other than data, that form an AI system, see D. Lehr & P. Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 University of California, Davis Law Review, pp. 653-717 (2017).
- This is not to say that recitals are deprived of all legal meaning, as their content is used to interpret ambiguities and uncertainties in the legal text itself, including by the Court of Justice itself: T. Klimas & J. Vaiciukaite, The Law of Recitals In European Community Legislation, 15 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 1 (Jan. 2008).
- ECJ case law only extends data protection law to legal persons to the extent that a legal person is, in fact, an official label to an identifiable individual or group – such as one-person and family-run enterprises. See, e.g., L.A. Bygrave & L. Tosoni, Article 4(1). Personal Data, in The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary (C. Kuner, L.A. Bygrave & C. Docksey eds., Oxford University Press 2020). As Recital 14 states, this decision is not an oversight by the legislator, but a constitutive property of the EU data protection regime. However, Member States are not blocked from establishing norms to govern the processing of data referring to identified or identifiable legal persons, and indeed Austria’s Data Protection Act (DSG) (BGBI. I 165/99) extends a narrow set of data protection legal rights to legal persons. Nevertheless, the authors were not able to find any jurisdiction that extends the right to an explanation to corporations and other non-natural entities.
- This article, titled “Automated individual decision-making, including profiling”, establishes a general right not to be subject to an automated decision that produces legal or otherwise significant effects upon a data subject. This right does not apply in certain cases listed by art. 22(2), but lawful decision-making in these circumstances requires the adoption of safeguards listed in art. 22(3). For an overview of art. 22 GDPR, see L.A. Bygrave, Article 22. Automated Individual Decision-Making, Including Profiling, in The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary (C. Kuner, L.A. Bygrave & Docksey, Christopher eds., Oxford University Press 2020).
- On the systemic dimension of the social impact of data and their lack of treatment in the GDPR, see Pałka, supra n. 174, at sec. II and III.B. Yet, the GDPR includes provisions that attempt to provide a view of decision-making impacts beyond individual decisions, such as those governing Data Protection Impact Assessments: E. Kosta, Article 35. Data Protection Impact Assessment, in The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary (C. Kuner, L.A. Bygrave & Docksey, Christopher eds., Oxford University Press 2020).
- On the interpretation of the lawfulness principle, see C. de Terwangne, Article 5. Principles Relating to Processing of Personal Data, in The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary (C. Kuner, L.A. Bygrave & C. Docksey eds., Oxford University Press 2020).
- For an overview of the risk-based approach adopted in art. 25 GDPR, see M. Almada, J. Maranhão & G. Sartor, Article 25. Data Protection by Design and by Default, in General Data Protection Regulation. Article-by-Article Commentary (I. Spiecker gen. Döhmann, V. Papakonstantinou, G. Hornung, et al. eds., Beck; Nomos; Hart Publishing 2022); L.A. Bygrave, Article 25. Data Protection by Design and by Default, in The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary (C. Kuner, L.A. Bygrave & C. Docksey eds., Oxford University Press 2020).
- Point 6 of Annex III to the AI Act. Recital 38 of the AI Act states that systems “specifically intended to be used for administrative proceedings by tax and customs authorities” should not be considered as being used by law enforcement authorities for such purposes. Given the use of “specifically” in this formulation, this recital does not exclude systems that are regularly used for law enforcement purposes, though it still suggests that occasional data sharing with law enforcement does not render an AI system a high-risk system.
- For comprehensive analyses of the governance system that Chapter 2 AI Act establishes for high-risk AI systems, see M. Ebers, Standardizing AI - The Case of the European Commission’s Proposal for an Artificial Intelligence Act, in The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence: Global Perspectives on Law and Ethics (L.A. DiMatteo, M. Cannarsa & C. Poncibò eds., Cambridge University Press 2022); N. Smuha et al., A Response to the European Commission’s Proposal for an Artificial Intelligent Act (LEADS Lasb @University of Birmingham 2021); Veale & Borgesius, supra n. 215.
- Id., at pp. 3-4.
- Id., at pp. 4-5.
- See, e.g., id., at pp. 6-29.
- Id., at pp. 13 and 15.
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- Authors
- Kuźniacki, B., Almada, M., Tyliński, K., Górski, L., Winogradska, B., & Zeldenrust, R.
- Venue
- World Tax Journal
- Publisher
- IBFD
- Published
- 2022-09-02
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 4
- ISSN
- 1878-4917 (ISSN-L)
- 2352-9237
- OpenAlex
- W4389987961
- Semantic Scholar
- 0ad03d663869634d749828f121499f5adc87663b
- Cited by
- 31
- References
- 76
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 1
- FWCI
- 1.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- orbilu.uni.lu
- Licence
- public-domain
- Locations
- World Tax Journal (publishedVersion)
- Open Repository and Bibliography (University of Luxembourg) (submittedVersion, public-domain)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
- Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Keywords
- explainable AI, tax law, taxpayer rights, tax administration automation, AI opacity, constitutional principles of taxation, AI regulation
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