Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism

Abstract

This chapter discusses the following statements: a materialist holds that every concrete phenomenon is wholly physical or material and a realistic materialist is a full-fledged realist about consciousness. Therefore it follows that a realistic materialist must hold that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon, and that at least some arrangements of matter are conscious or constitute consciousness. The chapter asks: what follows from this? It must be assumed in a standard way that all matter is made of the same stuff (leptons and quarks, or strings, or...) and it must follow that all matter can be arranged in a consciousness-constituting way. It is then argues that for certain things A, you cannot get A from non-A, and that consciousness is one of those things. Therefore no matter can be wholly non-conscious in its ‘intrinsic’ or ‘ultimate’ nature. If so, any realistic — any truly serious — materialist must be a panpsychist.