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Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism
Abstract
This chapter discusses the following statements: a materialist holds that every concrete phenomenon is wholly physical or material and a realistic materialist is a full-fledged realist about consciousness. Therefore it follows that a realistic materialist must hold that consciousness is a wholly physical phenomenon, and that at least some arrangements of matter are conscious or constitute consciousness. The chapter asks: what follows from this? It must be assumed in a standard way that all matter is made of the same stuff (leptons and quarks, or strings, or...) and it must follow that all matter can be arranged in a consciousness-constituting way. It is then argues that for certain things A, you cannot get A from non-A, and that consciousness is one of those things. Therefore no matter can be wholly non-conscious in its ‘intrinsic’ or ‘ultimate’ nature. If so, any realistic — any truly serious — materialist must be a panpsychist.
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“In doing so, Aurobindo adumbrated Galen Strawson (2008), who has recently argued for panpsychism on the basis of the principle of ex nihilo nihil fit.”
From The Playful Self-Involution of Divine Consciousness: Sri Aurobindo's Evolutionary Cosmopsychism and His Response to the Individuation Problem (2022) · cites this paper as Strawson (2008)
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Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism
Chalmers, D. J. (2016) · Panpsychism · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0002 · Cited by 432
Insects have the capacity for subjective experience
Klein, C., & Barron, A. B. (2016) · Animal Sentience · doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1113 · Cited by 243
The Combination Problem for Panpsychism
Chalmers, D. J. (2016) · Panpsychism · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0008 · Cited by 231
The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence
Coleman, S. (2014) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9431-x · Cited by 206
“Cosmopsychism: A Holistic Approach to the Metaphysics of Experience
Shani, I. (2015) · Philosophical Papers · doi:10.1080/05568641.2015.1106709 · Cited by 165
Why panpsychism doesn’t help us explain consciousness
Goff, P. (2009) · dialectica · doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01196.x · Cited by 163
A landscape of consciousness: Toward a taxonomy of explanations and implications
Kuhn, R. L. (2024) · Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology · doi:10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2023.12.003 · Cited by 135
The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory
Cerullo, M. A. (2015) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004286 · Cited by 114
Beyond Combination: How Cosmic Consciousness Grounds Ordinary Experience
SHANI, I., & KEPPLER, J. (2018) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2018.30 · Cited by 91
Evolving across the explanatory gap.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2019) · Philosophy Theory and Practice in Biology · doi:10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0011.001 · Cited by 55
Banks, E. C. (2010) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515081003690418 · Cited by 44
Medhananda, S. (2022) · The Monist · doi:10.1093/monist/onab025 · Cited by 37
Wiest, M. C. (2025) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niaf011 · Cited by 34
“However, it is important to note that contemporary philosophers have proposed varied deviations from this traditional use of the term, in which the term “physical” allows for fundamental mental properties such as phenomenal consciousness (Strawson 2006, Stoljar 2024).”
Panpsychism and Russellian Monism
Alter, T., & Coleman, S. (2019) · The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism · doi:10.4324/9781315717708-20 · Cited by 27
Cosmopsychism, Coherence, and World-Affirming Monism
Shani, I. (2022) · The Monist · doi:10.1093/monist/onab020 · Cited by 23
Metadata
- Authors
- Strawson, G.
- Corresponding author
- Strawson, Galen
- ORCID
- Strawson, Galen
- Venue
- Real Materialism
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2008-05-29
- Pages
- 53-74
- OpenAlex
- W1487704329
- Cited by
- 558
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 31 · 2023: 63 · 2022: 87 · 2021: 47 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 66 · 2018: 43 · 2017: 28 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 20 · 2012: 11
- FWCI
- 37.42
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Critical Realism in Sociology
- Keywords
- panpsychism, physicalism, materialism, consciousness, monism
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