The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S2 (checkable).

From ingredients entirely lacking in consciousness, consciousness cannot derive.

“According to panpsychists, the moral of anti--physicalist arguments like the knowledge argument and the zombie argument is that from ingredients entirely lacking in consciousness, consciousness cannot derive.”

• cites Strawson 2006Not checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites Nagel 1979Not checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites James 1890Not checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

The panpsychist explanatory project is well-motivated, and panpsychists are in the right ballpark for a here-and-now solution to the mind/body problem.

“I consider overall that the panpsychist explanatory project is well--motivated, and that panpsychists are in the right ballpark for a here--and--now solution to the mind/body problem.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Panpsychism harbors an unresolved tension, the seriousness of which has yet to be fully appreciated.

“Panpsychism harbors an unresolved tension, the seriousness of which has yet to be fully appreciated.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S2 (checkable).

To adequately account for the instantiation of consciousness in beings like us, we must take mental properties as part of the fundamental furniture of the material world.

“To adequately account for the instantiation of consciousness in beings like us, panpsychists aver, we must take mental properties as part of the fundamental furniture of the material world.”

• cites NagelNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites StrawsonNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Panpsychists are committed to the perspicuous explanation of macro-mentality in terms of micro-mentality.

“Panpsychists are committed to the perspicuous explanation of macro--mentality in terms of micro-mentality (in a sense of 'perspicuous explanation' to be elucidated).”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature not just mental properties, but also micro-subjects to whom these properties belong.

“But panpsychists take the micro--material realm to feature not just mental properties, but also micro--subjects to whom these properties belong.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Panpsychists hold that all matter possesses mental properties of some form.

“Panpsychists hold that all matter possesses mental properties of some form.”

• cites Stoljar 2006 sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

If a viable panpsychist theory could be described, it would represent at least an attractive option on the field of metaphysics of mind.

“I won't attempt to motivate panpsychism with respect to physicalism, but take it that if a viable panpsychist theory could be described, it would represent at least an attractive option on the field of metaphysics of mind.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Panpsychists shun emergentism, especially of the strong variety.

“Panpsychists shun emergentism, especially of the strong variety.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Nagel's key premise is the rejection of emergence: there are no truly emergent properties of complex systems, and all properties of complex systems that are not relations derive from the properties of constituents and their effects on each other when combined.

“there are no truly emergent properties of complex systems.All properties of complex systems that are not relations between it and something else derive from the properties of its constituents and their effects on each other when so combined.”

• cites [12] 12. Nagel, T. (1979) Panpsychism. In his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

To the extent one considers panpsychism committed to micro-subjects, one will conclude that the view is doomed: it suffers from an internal self-contradiction.

“To the extent one considers panpsychism committed to micro--subjects, one will conclude that the view is doomed: it suffers from an internal self--contradiction.”

May combine two claims.

The subject combination problem is insuperable, and traditional panpsychism runs aground on it.

“Unfortunately, this difficulty is also insuperable, and it is on this rock that traditional panpsychism runs aground.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: There really are human subjects, robustly real, and they are not merely splinters of a greater, universe-sized subject.

May combine two claims.

Concreteness and extension must emerge from abstraction and unextendedness.

“Thus concreteness and extension must emerge, in these cases.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

Neutral monism is somewhat closer to physicalistic respectability, since it does not assert that basic material ontology is rife with subjects of experience.

“This shift carries a further boon: as well as being a coherent position-something I argue undiluted panpsychism is not-neutral monism is somewhat closer to physicalistic respectability, since it does not assert that basic material ontology is rife with subjects of experience.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Given full specification of the ultimates composing the subject's experience, including details of the phenomenal quality each carries, it is inconceivable both that this micro-material setup obtains and that the subject does not instantiate an experiential state featuring coldness, tiredness and roast beef smell.

“it ought to be that given full specification of the ultimates composing the subject's experience, including details of the phenomenal quality each carries, it is inconceivable both that this micro--material setup obtains and that the subject does not instantiate an experiential state featuring coldness, tiredness and roast beef smell.”

May combine two claims.

Constitutive panpsychism successfully evades emergentism, providing a satisfactory realisation story for macro-experientiality by its material underpinnings.

“Constitutive panpsychism thus successfully evades emergentism, providing a satisfactory realisation story for macro--experientiality by its material underpinnings.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

It has been panpsychism's raison d'etre to preserve ontological continuity between the world's lower ontological levels and the conscious macro-mentality arising from these levels.

“raison d'etre to preserve ontological continuity between the world's lower ontological levels and the conscious macro--mentality arising from these levels.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

On constitutive panpsychism, a unified experiential field is literally constituted by parts, ultimates in the subject's brain, instantiating just those qualities that feature in consciousness.

“On constitutive panpsychism this unified experiential field is literally constituted by parts, ultimates in the subject's brain, instantiating just those qualities that feature in consciousness.”

May combine two claims.

There is no such thing as a quantity of point-of-view-edness or perspective; points of view are binary entities that exist either wholly or not at all.

“There's really no such thing as a 'quantity' of point--of--view--edness, or perspective.Points of view are binary entities: they exist either wholly or not at all.”

May combine two claims.

The author's metaphysical argument rules out the combination of subjects, thus ruling out constitutive panpsychism.

“my metaphysical argument rules this out, thus ruling out constitutive panpsychism.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Hence the ultimates are held to be subjects.

“Hence the ultimates are held to be subjects.”

May combine two claims.

Neutral monism is a coherent position, whereas undiluted panpsychism is not.

“This shift carries a further boon: as well as being a coherent position-something I argue undiluted panpsychism is not-neutral monism is somewhat closer to physicalistic respectability, since it does not assert that basic material ontology is rife with subjects of experience.”

May combine two claims.

Even if integration produces a third subject, the original two points of view are not components of the third; only their contents are.

“Is it possible to understand the original two points of view as components of the third?It is not.”

• Also stated in: § Ub doesn't experience red--to--the--exclusion--of--(blue--and)--all--else, nor blue--to--the-exclusion--of--(red--and)--all--else, let alone-impossibly-both together. Thus the original points of view are not ingredients in Ub's subjectivity.Only their contents-the redness and blueness-are.There are some deceptive conceptual possibilities in the neighborhood: We might imagine, first, Ub with 'stereoscopic' vision-two visual fields, one filled with blue, the other with red.But that is one point of view experiencing blue and red conjunctively, nothing like the original two points of view.If these visual fields are genuinely experientially separated, on the other hand, i.e. not given to the same consciousness, then we just have two separate subjects, much as if Ub never came to be.We might also imagine Ub experiencing all and only blue, then all and only red, in series.But that, while it might (perhaps) count as occupying now Red's point of view, now Blue's, is not to have their two points of view synchronously compose Ub's point of view, which is what combination requires.39 Another way to see that the original points of view don't compose the third is to imagine subtracting one of them.Recall that in a combination removal of a component compromises the whole-in removing a hydrogen from H2O we destroy the molecule.Now imagine Red disappears.Will Ub notice?It seems he need not: provided Red's experiential content-the relevant portion of phenomenal redness which Ub is experiencing-remains, what it is like for Ub won't change.Thus Red's point of view did not phenomenally compose Ub's. Someone might object that if Red disappears, so does her experiential content, so Ub must lose the redness from his experience-his purple experience will 39 It's true that in describing combination we noted that constituents are modified in combining, so it may be unduly artificial here to consider Red and Blue's pre--combination perspectives in unmodified form (i.e. as filled with unitary red and unitary blue, respectively).Perhaps the right picture has Red and Blue interacting to produce Ub, with all three now experiencing purple.But this does nothing to get around the problem the artificial setup serves to highlight: if the subjects survive, as they must, there will be three actual experiencings of purple.It's not possible to imagine Ub's unified point of view as comprising two synchronous experiencings of purple (pertaining to the perspectives of Red and Blue). devolve to blue.But that would at best prove Red's experiential content was integrated in Ub's.It does nothing to show that Red's very perspective was a component of Ub's perspective.Indeed, if Red's point of view did partially compose Ub's, then Red's disappearance should make more of a phenomenal difference to Ub than the mere loss of the red content.For that loss is achievable just by Red's reaching a 'zen state' of pure 'contentless' experience, without Red as a point of view departing the scene.We might additionally stipulate that Ub's existence depends on Red's (plus Blue's), so that if Red's point of view disappears Ub dies off.But that's as close as we can get-dependence is not constitution.No sense is to be made of points of view literally composing, as points of view, another point of view. · plain

  “Thus the original points of view are not ingredients in Ub's subjectivity.Only their contents-the redness and blueness-are.”

• Also stated in: § Ub doesn't experience red--to--the--exclusion--of--(blue--and)--all--else, nor blue--to--the-exclusion--of--(red--and)--all--else, let alone-impossibly-both together. Thus the original points of view are not ingredients in Ub's subjectivity.Only their contents-the redness and blueness-are.There are some deceptive conceptual possibilities in the neighborhood: We might imagine, first, Ub with 'stereoscopic' vision-two visual fields, one filled with blue, the other with red.But that is one point of view experiencing blue and red conjunctively, nothing like the original two points of view.If these visual fields are genuinely experientially separated, on the other hand, i.e. not given to the same consciousness, then we just have two separate subjects, much as if Ub never came to be.We might also imagine Ub experiencing all and only blue, then all and only red, in series.But that, while it might (perhaps) count as occupying now Red's point of view, now Blue's, is not to have their two points of view synchronously compose Ub's point of view, which is what combination requires.39 Another way to see that the original points of view don't compose the third is to imagine subtracting one of them.Recall that in a combination removal of a component compromises the whole-in removing a hydrogen from H2O we destroy the molecule.Now imagine Red disappears.Will Ub notice?It seems he need not: provided Red's experiential content-the relevant portion of phenomenal redness which Ub is experiencing-remains, what it is like for Ub won't change.Thus Red's point of view did not phenomenally compose Ub's. Someone might object that if Red disappears, so does her experiential content, so Ub must lose the redness from his experience-his purple experience will 39 It's true that in describing combination we noted that constituents are modified in combining, so it may be unduly artificial here to consider Red and Blue's pre--combination perspectives in unmodified form (i.e. as filled with unitary red and unitary blue, respectively).Perhaps the right picture has Red and Blue interacting to produce Ub, with all three now experiencing purple.But this does nothing to get around the problem the artificial setup serves to highlight: if the subjects survive, as they must, there will be three actual experiencings of purple.It's not possible to imagine Ub's unified point of view as comprising two synchronous experiencings of purple (pertaining to the perspectives of Red and Blue). devolve to blue.But that would at best prove Red's experiential content was integrated in Ub's.It does nothing to show that Red's very perspective was a component of Ub's perspective.Indeed, if Red's point of view did partially compose Ub's, then Red's disappearance should make more of a phenomenal difference to Ub than the mere loss of the red content.For that loss is achievable just by Red's reaching a 'zen state' of pure 'contentless' experience, without Red as a point of view departing the scene.We might additionally stipulate that Ub's existence depends on Red's (plus Blue's), so that if Red's point of view disappears Ub dies off.But that's as close as we can get-dependence is not constitution.No sense is to be made of points of view literally composing, as points of view, another point of view. · plain

  “Thus Red's point of view did not phenomenally compose Ub's.”

May combine two claims.

The panpsychist faces a choice of abandoning her explanatory project, or recanting the claim that the ultimates are subjects.

“The panpsychist faces a choice of abandoning her explanatory project, or recanting the claim that the ultimates are subjects.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: There really are human subjects, robustly real, and they are not merely splinters of a greater, universe-sized subject.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The presence of macro-consciousness should flow from the properties of the ultimates plus details of their arrangement.

“The presence of macro--consciousness should flow from the properties of the ultimates plus details of their arrangement.”

May combine two claims.

A panpsychism which posits ultimate-subjects is structurally unsound-it breaks its own anti-emergentist pledge.

“Since panpsychism is driven by an aversion to emergentism, the result we face is that a panpsychism which posits ultimate-subjects is structurally unsound-it breaks its own anti--emergentist pledge.”

May combine two claims.

Points of view are experientially distinct and isolated; they have different streams of consciousness.

“Their essential property defines them against it: in so far as they are points of view they are experientially distinct and isolated-they have different streams of consciousness.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Given a suitably complete catalogue of the world's micro-material contents, it should be inconceivable that ours is a zombie world lacking higher-level phenomenal consciousness of the sort we actually enjoy.

“This idea can be captured by saying that given a suitably complete catalogue of the world's micro--material contents, it should be inconceivable 10 that ours is a zombie world-one lacking higher--level phenomenal consciousness of the sort we actually enjoy.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The panpsychist seeks to add just enough to the world's micro-ingredients, as conceived by physicalism, to logically guarantee the instantiation of macro-consciousness.

“The panpsychist seeks thereby to add just enough to the world's micro--ingredients, as conceived by physicalism, to logically guarantee the instantiation of macro--consciousness.”

May combine two claims.

Masses can bequeath their massiness to their fusion, but subjects cannot bequeath their subjectivity; the destruction of their property of each having a point of view is needed.

“Masses can bequeath their massiness to their fusion.But subjects cannot bequeath their subjectivity: it is the destruction of their property of each having a point of view that is needed.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

By Goff's argument, we cannot see how the combination of micro-subjects could provide for the existence of a macro-subject.

“By Goff's argument we cannot see how the combination of micro--subjects could provide for the existence of a macro--subject.”

• cites Goff 2009 sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Phenomenal qualitative combination may have its own rules, but there is little reason to think there is anything much more conceptually challenging in such combination than in everyday models of qualitative combination.

“Again, phenomenal qualitative combination may have its own rules; but there seems little reason to think there is anything much more conceptually challenging in such combination than there is in the everyday models of qualitative combination.”

• cites [32]Not checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Concreteness from abstraction and extension from the unextended are cases where the underlying properties cannot generate their product structurally.

“These are cases where the underlying properties cannot generate their product structurally, because inputting what they areabstraction, non--extendedness-makes no contribution towards what results.”

May combine two claims.

If after integration just a single subject exists, at least one subject has gone out of existence, so it is not combination.

“If one subject is left where formerly we had two, this means at least one subject has gone out of existence, which is not combination but a fight to the death.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The real combination problem is the combination of subjects into a larger subject.

“What of the second putative problem, concerning the combination of subjects into a 'larger' subject?This is the real combination problem.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Constitutive panpsychism holds that the mentality of the ultimates is constitutive of the conscious mentality of high-level individuals.

“the natural way to construe the relationship between the mentality of the ultimates and the conscious mentality of high--level individuals is to say the former is constitutive of the latter.”

May combine two claims.

Panpsychists are plausibly correct in holding that qualia are irreducible, and so (given the structurality of higher-level properties) fundamental.

“Panpsychists are plausibly correct in holding that qualia-the qualitative properties we find in experience-are irreducible, and so (given the structurality of higher--level properties) fundamental.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

This sort of causation of the new entity, as opposed to its formation by antecedent elements, is a hallmark of emergence for O'Connor and Wong.

“This sort of causation of the new entity, as opposed to its formation by antecedent elements, is a hallmark of emergence for O'Connor and Wong:”

• cites O'Connor and WongNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Each subject is essentially a oneness; a set of subjects are essentially diverse.

“since each subject is essentially a oneness, a set of subjects are essentially diverse, for they must be a set of onenesses.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

With the commitment to ontological continuity comes the doctrine that the generation of conscious mentality from material underpinnings is in principle perspicuously explicable.

“With this commitment comes the doctrine that the generation of conscious mentality from material underpinnings is in principle perspicuously explicable.”

May combine two claims.

If one point of view remains after integration, at least one point of view has been eliminated, so it is not combination.

“Thus if one point of view remains at least one point of view has been eliminated, 37 which is not combination.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The proposal that ultimates possess phenomenal qualities without being subjects requires us to make sense of phenomenal qualities existing independently of experiencing subjects.

“This proposal requires us to make sense of phenomenal qualities existing independently of experiencing subjects, a challenge I tackle in the penultimate section.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The latter option, recanting the claim that the ultimates are subjects, is to be preferred.

“I argue that the latter option is to be preferred.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: There really are human subjects, robustly real, and they are not merely splinters of a greater, universe-sized subject.

May combine two claims.

The combination of subjects (points of view/consciousnesses) is demonstrably incoherent and cannot occur.

“The combination of subjects is a demonstrably incoherent notion, not just one lacking in a priori intelligibility or evident necessity.”

• Also stated in: § 5. Subjects do not Combine · plain

  “But this cannot work, simply because points of view cannot combine.”

• Also stated in: § Ub doesn't experience red--to--the--exclusion--of--(blue--and)--all--else, nor blue--to--the-exclusion--of--(red--and)--all--else, let alone-impossibly-both together. Thus the original points of view are not ingredients in Ub's subjectivity.Only their contents-the redness and blueness-are.There are some deceptive conceptual possibilities in the neighborhood: We might imagine, first, Ub with 'stereoscopic' vision-two visual fields, one filled with blue, the other with red.But that is one point of view experiencing blue and red conjunctively, nothing like the original two points of view.If these visual fields are genuinely experientially separated, on the other hand, i.e. not given to the same consciousness, then we just have two separate subjects, much as if Ub never came to be.We might also imagine Ub experiencing all and only blue, then all and only red, in series.But that, while it might (perhaps) count as occupying now Red's point of view, now Blue's, is not to have their two points of view synchronously compose Ub's point of view, which is what combination requires.39 Another way to see that the original points of view don't compose the third is to imagine subtracting one of them.Recall that in a combination removal of a component compromises the whole-in removing a hydrogen from H2O we destroy the molecule.Now imagine Red disappears.Will Ub notice?It seems he need not: provided Red's experiential content-the relevant portion of phenomenal redness which Ub is experiencing-remains, what it is like for Ub won't change.Thus Red's point of view did not phenomenally compose Ub's. Someone might object that if Red disappears, so does her experiential content, so Ub must lose the redness from his experience-his purple experience will 39 It's true that in describing combination we noted that constituents are modified in combining, so it may be unduly artificial here to consider Red and Blue's pre--combination perspectives in unmodified form (i.e. as filled with unitary red and unitary blue, respectively).Perhaps the right picture has Red and Blue interacting to produce Ub, with all three now experiencing purple.But this does nothing to get around the problem the artificial setup serves to highlight: if the subjects survive, as they must, there will be three actual experiencings of purple.It's not possible to imagine Ub's unified point of view as comprising two synchronous experiencings of purple (pertaining to the perspectives of Red and Blue). devolve to blue.But that would at best prove Red's experiential content was integrated in Ub's.It does nothing to show that Red's very perspective was a component of Ub's perspective.Indeed, if Red's point of view did partially compose Ub's, then Red's disappearance should make more of a phenomenal difference to Ub than the mere loss of the red content.For that loss is achievable just by Red's reaching a 'zen state' of pure 'contentless' experience, without Red as a point of view departing the scene.We might additionally stipulate that Ub's existence depends on Red's (plus Blue's), so that if Red's point of view disappears Ub dies off.But that's as close as we can get-dependence is not constitution.No sense is to be made of points of view literally composing, as points of view, another point of view. · boosted

  “While the qualitative contents of consciousness may perhaps combine, consciousnesses themselves-subjectscannot: this is precluded by the metaphysical logic of points of view.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The neutral monist HOTT is an example of a relational theory of subjectivity the neutral monist might produce.

“The neutral monist HOTT is an example of a relational theory of subjectivity the neutral monist might produce.”

May combine two claims.

The alternatives we would then be driven towards would be emergentism on the one hand, and dualism on the other.

“The alternatives we would then be driven towards would be emergentism on the one hand, and dualism on the other.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

Certain portions of matter exhibit a configuration which provides for awareness of the qualities they bear: matter, when specially arranged, can apprehend its own quality. This is consciousness.

“matter, when specially arranged, can apprehend its own quality, in effect.This is consciousness.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The neutral monist considers that qualities don't require subjects to experience them-the whole material world is en-qualitied.

“The neutral monist considers that qualities don't require subjects to experience them-the whole material world is en--qualitied.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

A position taking qualities as fundamental features of matter, but which makes subjective awareness of qualities a relational (thus reducible) affair, is neutral monism, of the sort James later inclines towards.

“A position taking qualities as fundamental features of matter, but which makes subjective awareness of qualities a relational (thus reducible) affair, is neutral monism, of the sort James later inclines towards.”

• cites James 1912Not checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

On neutral monism, unexperienced qualities permeate basic matter.

“On neutral monism, unexperienced qualities permeate basic matter.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

For neutral monists, consciousness is simply that relation whereby qualities are brought into subjectival awareness: it is the curling of the material world back upon itself, to apprehend its own character.

“For neutral monists, rather than a magical bubble or intrinsic phenomenal glow, consciousness is simply that relation whereby qualities are brought into subjectival awareness: it is the curling of the material world back upon itself, to apprehend its own character.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

To remain true to their anti-emergentism, panpsychists must relinquish micro-subjects of experience, even as they take qualia to be irreducible, and should aim to construct a relational account of high-level subjectivity.

“panpsychists must relinquish micro--subjects of experience, even as they take qualia to be irreducible, and should aim to construct a relational account of high-level subjectivity.”

May combine two claims.

The contradiction is performative or methodological rather than strictly logical: in attempting to evade emergentism the panpsychist who posits micro-subjects flees into the arms of another emergentism.

“The contradiction is performative or methodological rather than strictly logical: in attempting to evade emergentism the panpsychist who posits micro--subjects flees into the arms of another emergentism.”

May combine two claims.

Panpsychists require macro-subjectivity to be a structural property, and neutral monism duly obliges, by rendering conscious awareness as a relation.

“Panpsychists require macro--subjectivity to be a structural property, and neutral monism duly obliges, by rendering conscious awareness as a relation.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The self-representational model of neutral monism perhaps even more neatly explains the limited scope of subjectivity.

“The self--representational model of neutral monism perhaps even more neatly explains the limited scope of subjectivity.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

This combination amounts to a form of neutral monism, so panpsychists should be neutral monists.

“This combination amounts to a form of neutral monism, so panpsychists should be neutral monists.”